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Crimes
Crimes; assault and battery
Penal Code § 836.1 (new).
AB 461 (Rogan); 1995 STAT. Ch. 52
Existing law sets forth the definitions for assault' and battery2 generally and
also provides conditions wherein the penalties for these crimes will be enhanced?
Existing law further states that if an assault or battery is committed against a
firefighter, emergency medical technician,4 or a mobile intensive care paramedic5
engaged in the performance of his or her duties, and the perpetrator knows or
reasonably should know the victim is one of the aforementioned, then the
perpetrator may be punished more severely.6
Under existing law, a peace officer7 is authorized to arrest 8 without a warrant
when the officer has reasonable cause9 to believe that the person has committed
a public offense' ° in the officer's presence, or committed a felony" not in the
officer's presence, or when the officer has reasonable cause to believe that the
1. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 240 (West 1988) (defining "assault" as an unlawful attempt, coupled with
a present ability, to commit a violent injury on the person of another); id. § 24 1(a) (West Supp. 1995) (setting
forth the punishment for an assault as a fine not exceeding $1000 or by imprisonment in the county jail not
exceeding six months, or both); id. § 241.6 (West Supp. 1995) (specifying the punishment for an assault on
a school employee engaged in the performance of his or her duties); id. § 245 (West Supp. 1995) (providing
enhanced punishment for an assault with a deadly weapon).
2. See id. § 242 (West 1988) (defining "battery" as any willful and unlawful use of force or violence
upon another); id. § 243(a) (West Supp. 1995) (setting forth the punishment for a battery as a fine of not more
than $2000 or by imprisonment in a county jail for no longer than six months, or both); id. § 243.6 (West Supp.
1995) (providing the punishment for battery against a school employee engaged in the performance of his or
her duties).
3. Id. §§ 240,242 (West 1988). See generally CAL R. Cr., 421-23 (West 1995) (defining the circum-
stances for aggravation, mitigation, and enhancement).
4. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 1797.170-1797.172 (West 1990 & Supp. 1995) (defining
emergency medical technicians).
5. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 241(c)(3) (West 1988) (describing a mobile intensive care paramedic).
6. Id. § 241(b) (West 1988); see id. (providing that the penalty for such an assault is punishable by
a fine not exceeding $2000 or by imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding one year, or by both the fine
and the imprisonment).
7. See id. § 830 (West Supp. 1995) (defining peace officer).
8. See generally JOSHUA DRESLER, UNDERSTANDING CRmAL PROCEDURE 115-24 (1991)
(explaining the basic rules and exigencies involving arrests and arrest warrants).
9. See People v. Price, I Cal. 4th 324, 410, 821 P.2d 610, 657, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 106, 153 (1991)
(defining "reasonable cause to arrest without a warrant" as when such facts and circumstances are known to
an arresting officer that would cause an ordinarily prudent person to honestly believe and strongly suspect that
an offense has been committed and the accused is guilty of such offense).
10. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 15 (West 1988) (defining "public offense" as an act committed or omitted
in violation of a law forbidding or commanding it and to which is punished by any of the following: (1) death,
(2) imprisonment, (3) fine, (4) removal from office, or (5) disqualification to hold any state office).
11. See id. § 17(a) (West 1988) (defining a "felony" as a crime which is punishable with death or by
imprisonment in the state prison); id. (noting that every other crime or public offense is a misdemeanor except
those offenses that are classified as infractions).
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person has committed a felony regardless of whether or not it actually was
committed.
12
Chapter 52 adds a provision that authorizes a peace officer to arrest a person
without a warrant when the officer has reasonable cause to believe that the person
has committed an assault or battery against an on-duty firefighter, emergency
medical technician, or mobile intensive care paramedic, when the perpetrator
knew or reasonably should have known that the victim was one, of the
aforementioned, even though the assault or battery was not committed in the




Chapter 52 was enacted out of concern regarding the increasing number of
attacks upon firefighters, emergency medical technicians and mobile intensive
care paramedics when they are in the line of duty.' Chapter 52 expands the scope
12. Id. § 836 (West Supp. 1995).
13. Id. § 836.1 (enacted by Chapter 52); see id. § 241(b) (West Supp. 1995) (specifying that the person
who committed the assault must have known or reasonably should have known that the victim was a firefighter,
emergency medical technician, or mobile intensive care worker, among others, engaged in the performance
of his or her duties); id. § 243(b) (West Supp. 1995) (specifying that the person who committed the battery
must have known, or reasonably should have known, that the victim was, among others, a firefighter,
emergency medical technician, or mobile intensive care worker, engaged in the performance of his/her duties).
See generally Donald Dripps, More on Search Warrants, Good Faith and Probable Cause, 95 YALE LJ. 1424,
1424-30 (1986) (discussing the nature of the warrant process and probable cause); William A. Schroeder,
Warrantless Misdemeanor Arrests and the Fourth Amendment, 58 Mo. L. REV. 771, 853 (1993) (explaining
that at common law, warrantless arrests were not permitted for misdemeanors unless the offense involved a
breach of the peace and was committed in the presence of the person making the arrest); id. at 783 (noting that
a few jurisdictions have completely eliminated the presence requirement and allow warrantless arrests for both
felonies and misdemeanors if there is probable cause to believe that the person committed a crime).
14. ASSEMBLY CoMntHrEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, CoMMrr'rEE ANALYSIS op AB 461, at 3.4 (May 9,
1995); see Around the Tristate, CINCINKn ENQURER, Sept. 23, 1994, at B2 (discussing the arrest of a man
for felonious assault on a firefighter who was trying to get to the scene of a fire); see also East Hartford Police
News, HARORD CoURANT, Aug. 2, 1994, at D3 (reporting an incident in which a man attacked two
paramedics while they were aiding his sick father); House Bill. CHI. DAILY L. BULL., May 24, 1994, at 3
(discussing legislation in Chicago which would expand the offense of aggravated assault of an on-duty police
officer or firefighter from a misdemeanor to a Class-4 Felony); Chip Johnson, Plan Urges Contracting Out to
Aid Paramedics, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 5, 1994, at BI (noting that in 1993, there were 68 assaults on firefighters);
Lee Leonard, Bigger Penalties for Assault OK'd, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Mar. 3, 1994, at 2C (discussing the
passage of legislation in Ohio which sharply increased the penalty for assaulting a police officer or firefightcr
or police animal); Man Arrested in Attack on Police, SEA'rI.E TIMES, June 16, 1994, at B2 (describing an
incident in which a man attacked the victim and then kicked a firefighter and tried to hit two police officers);
Kammie Michael, Emergency Workers Seek New Law to Curb Attacks, HERALD-SUN (Durham, N.C.), May
24, 1995, at C2 (discussing the recorded 70 assaults on emergency workers over a five-year period and how
the increase in assaults on emergency workers is the reason for a call for legislation in North Carolina making
an assault on an emergency medical worker a felony); Kammie Michael, Working Firefighters Dodge Hurled
Objects, HERAn>-SuN (Durham, N.C.), July 21, 1994, at Al (describing the increasing frequency of situations
in which firefighters have been subjected to rocks, bottles and chunks of asphalt being hurled at them when
they respond to an emergency call); Ray Sanchez, 2 Charged in July Attack on Firefighters, NEWSDAY, Nov.
11, 1993, at 137 (discussing the arrest of several people in connection with the firebombing of a fire truck
which seriously injured three firefighters).
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of warrantless arrests in order to assure firefighters, emergency medical
technicians and mobile intensive care paramedics that if they are the victim of an
assault or battery, the attacker will not go unpunished. 5
Molly J. Mrowka
Crimes; child abuse reporting
Penal Code § 11167.5 (amended).
AB 1440 (Davis); 1995 STAT. Ch. 391
Under existing law, certain professionals and governmental employees must
report suspected child abuse to a child protective agency.1 Health care
practitioners' must perform an assessment of a newborn infant and the mother if
the infant's toxicology report indicates the presence of controlled substances.3 If
the assessment indicates a risk of child abuse, the assessment is forwarded to a
child protection agency as a suspected child abuse reports
15. ASSEMBLY COMMrFTEE oN PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMTrEEANALYSISOFAB 461, at 4 (May 9, 1995).
1. CAL. PENAL CODE § 11166 (West Supp. 1995); see id. (mandating reports from child care
custodians, health practitioners, employees of child protective agencies, firefighters, and animal control
officers, among others, to a child protective agency when there is a reasonable suspicion of child abuse based
on observations made during the scope of employment); see also id. § 270.5(b) (West 1988) (defining "child
protective agency" to include the police or sheriffs department, county probation departments, or county
welfare departments); In re Troy D., 215 Cal. App. 3d 889,902,263 Cal. Rptr. 869, 875-76 (1989) (finding
that the reporting requirement applies to children born under the influence of a controlled substance even
though the abuse was committed against the fetus prior to birth); People v. Youghanz, 156 Cal. App. 3d 811,
817-18, 202 Cal. Rptr. 907, 911 (1984) (holding that a health care worker does not need to provide warnings
regarding constitutional rights when the health care practitioner is questioning the suspected child abuser since
the provider is not a police agent); 72 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 216 (1989) (stating that a ballet teacher at a private
school is required to report suspected child abuse). But see 70 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 38 (1987) (opining that a
county probation officer has no duty to report physical injuries inflicted by police officers on a child during
an arrest involving excessive force). See generally Danny R. Veilleux, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and
Application of State Statute Requiring Doctor or Other Person to Report ChildAbuse, 73 A.L.R. 4TH 782, 810-
14, 844-45 (1989 & Supp. 1995) (discussing the right to privacy, the right against self-incrimination and the
need for supplemental child abuse reports).
2. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 11165.8 (West 1992) (defining "health care practitioners" to include
physicians, psychiatrists, dentists, nurses, and others).
3. Id. § 11165.13 (West 1992); see CAL. HEALTH & SAFM' CODE § 10900 (West 1991) (requiring the
state to develop an assessment procedure for pregnant and post-partum substance-abusing women); id. § 10901
(West 1991) (mandating that the counties provide a method for practitioner assessment).
4. CAL. PENAL CODE § 11165.13 (West 1992); see id. (noting that a positive toxicology report is
insufficient by itself to establish a risk of child abuse and that a report based solely on the parent's inability
to provide regular care for the child due to the parent's substance abuse will be reported only to the county
welfare departments and not to law enforcement agencies).
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These various reports are confidential and disclosure is a misdemeanor.-
However, various agencies and persons are exempt from the nondisclosure
mandate.6
Chapter 391 permits authorized persons within county health departments to
receive the assessment required by a positive toxicology screen of a newborn
infant.7
COMMENT
Chapter 391 is intended to allow county health departments access to prenatal
substance abuse information Given that perinatal substance abuse is a serious
health and economic problem, Chapter 391 allows county health departments
access to statistical information in order to help determine the extent of the
problem and relevant factors This approach recognizes California's interest in
5. Id. § 11167.5(a) (amended by Chapter 391); see id. (enumerating the punishment for violation as
up to six months in jail, a $500 fine, or both); see also id. § 17(a) (West Supp. 1995) (defining a
"misdemeanor" as a crime which is not a felony or an infraction). But see County of Los Angeles v. City of
Los Angeles, 219 Cal. App. 2d 838, 844, 33 Cal. Rptr. 503, 507 (1963) (holding that when the violation does
not relate to state affairs, the applicable punishment provisions are under city ordinances rather than under the
California Penal Code because cities enjoy freedom from state control with respect to municipal affairs).
6. CAL PENAL CODE § 11 167.5(b) (amended by Chapter 391); see, e.g., id § 11167.5(b)(4) (amended
by Chapter 391) (allowing disclosure of child abuse reports to multidisciplinary personnel teams); Id. §
11 167.5(b)(5) (amended by Chapter 391) (allowing disclosure of child abuse reports to child-care facility
licensing agencies); id. § 11 167.5(b)(8) (amended by Chapter 391) (allowing disclosure of child abuse reports
to coroners and medical examiners when conducting a child autopsy).
7. Id § 11167.5(c) (amended by Chapter 391); cf. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 415.504(l)(a) (West 1993)
(requiring that child abuse reports be made by health care practitioners to the Department of Health); id. §
415.504(4)(a)(4) (West Supp. 1995) (indicating that child abuse report information is to be used for statistical
reports); ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 325, para. 514 (Smith-Hurd 1993) (providing that child abuse reports be made by
health care practitioners to the Department of Children and Family Services); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119,
§ 51A (West 1993) (requiring that child abuse reports be made to the Department of Social Services if a health
care provider reasonably believes that child is victim of child abuse); MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-21-257(2) (Supp.
1994) (allowing the Division of Youth Services to compile statistical information regarding child abuse).
8. ASSEMLYFLOOR,COMmrI-EE ANALYSISOFAB 1440, at I (May 18, 1995); Telephone Interview
with Laura Opsahl, Legislative Consultant to Assemblymember Susan Davis on AB 1440 (June 24, 1995)
(notes on file with the Pacific Law Journal).
9. Telephone Interview with Laura Opsahl, supra note 8; see id. (indicating that receipt of assessments
will provide the county health department access to the aggregate data to track prenatal substance abuse and
determine the extent and nature of the problem); Tom Philp, Alarm Over Meth Babies, SACRAMENTO BEE,
Aug. 6, 1995, at Al (noting that while the impression is that methamphetamine use has resulted in a costly
medical program for newly born infants, no agency tracks the number of babies affected, the extent of the
medical treatment given to these newborns, or the amount of public funding used to treat these children); see
also 1994 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 950, sec. l(b)(3), at 4706 (enacting California Health and Safety Code §§
1502.3 and 1523.5; amending California Health and Safety Code §§ 1502 and 1520.5; and amending California
Welfare and Institutions Code § 16501) (reporting that child protective agencies have noticed an increasing
severity of child abuse, including that abuse which results from substance abuse); In re Troy D., 215 Cal. App.
3d 889, 898, 263 Cal. Rptr. 869, 873 (1989) (noting that an estimated 11% of all American births show prenatal
substance abuse, which indicates a problem of great proportions); SENATE COMMrrrEE ON CRIMINAL
PROcEDuRE COMmfrm ANALYSIS OF AB 1440, at 3 (July 11, 1995) (stating that the Department of Alcohol
and Drug Programs estimated in 1990 that between 59,000 and 72,000 children were born with prenatal drug
and alcohol exposure); Nancy L. Day & Gale A. Richardson, Comparative Teratogenicity ofAlcohol and Other
Drugs: Prenatal Exposure to Alcohol or Other Drugs Can Impair Physical, Intellectual and Behavioral
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maintaining the delicate balance between a parent's right to raise a child and the
government's right to protect and safeguard that child. 0
June D. Coleman
Crimes; custodial officers-tear gas weapons
Penal Code § 12403.9 (new); § 12403 (amended).
AB 176 (Bowler); 1995 STAT. Ch. 15
Existing law grants peace officers' the ability to purchase, possess, transport,
and use any tear gas weapon2 so long as the peace officer satisfactorily completes
an instruction program approved by the Commission on Peace Officer Standards
Development, ALCOHOL HEALTH & RES. WoRLD, Jan. 1994, at 42 (discussing the adverse effects of maternal
substance abuse, and noting that there is insufficient data to explore this area further); Michael M. Engelgaw
et al., Prevalence of Illicit Drugs Detected in the Urine of Women of Childbearing Age in Alabama Public
Health Clinics, U.S. DEP'TOFHEALTHAND HUMAN SERVS., PUB. HEALTH REP., July 1994, at 530 (arguing that
while prenatal substance abuse remains relatively constant, the incident rate is still a major public concern);
Mark G. Fuller, A New Day: Strategiesfor Managing Psychiatric and Substance Abuse Benefits, HEALTH CARE
MGMT. REv., Sept. 22, 1994, at 20 (indicating that the 375,000 to 740,000 drug-exposed newborns per year
result in additional neonatal care costs due to longer hospital stays, premature births, and low birth weight);
Philp, supra (stating that surveys at a local hospitals indicate that 25% of mothers who have a premature baby
use controlled substances); id. (citing a statewide study which indicates that 6.25% of mothers use
methamphetanine during pregnancy or the three months preceding pregnancy); Telephone Interview with
Laura Opsahl, supra note 8 (noting that prenatal substance abuse is on the rise).
10. See 1980 Cal. Stat. ch. 1071, sec. 5, at 3425 (enacting California Penal Code §§ 11165, 11166,
11167, 11168, 11169, 11170, 11171, 11172, 11174; and repealing California Penal Code §§ 11161.5, 11161.6,
and 11161.7) (recognizing California's interest in maintaining the balance); Telephone Interview with Laura
Opsahl, supra note 8 (explaining that the Governor was convinced that information made available by Chapter
391 would only contain statistical information, alleviating any fears regarding the disclosure of confidential
information); cf. SENATE FLOO, COMMTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1440, at 3-4 (July 20, 1995) (stating that the
Governor previously vetoed a bill nearly identical to Chapter 391 in 1994 because the bill did not limit the
information available to the county health department to statistical data).
I. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 830 (West Supp. 1995) (defining "peace officer" as any person who meets
the applicable standards required by law for a peace officer as determined under California Penal Code §§
830.1-.65) (West Supp. 1995); see also id. § 830.55 (West Supp. 1995) (including as peace officers those
persons employed as correctional officers who possess the authority and responsibility for supervision over
certain state prison inmates and who perform tasks relating to the operation of a detention facility). But see id.
§§ 830.7-.9, 830.11 (West Supp. 1995) (specifying that although certain persons are not peace officers, they
possess the powers of arrest that belong to a peace officer); hi. § 830.12 (West Supp. 1995) (stating that litter
control officers and vehicle abatement officers, sanitation workers, and solid waste specialists are not peace
officers and do not possess powers of arrest).
2. See id. § 12402 (West 1992) (defining "tear gas weapon" as either of the following: (1) a shell,
cartridge, or bomb capable of releasing tear gas; or (2) a revolver, pistol, fountain pen gun, billie or other form
of device intended for the release of tear gas); see also id. § 12401 (West 1992) (defining "tear gas" as
including any liquid, gaseous, or solid substance which, when vaporized or used, results in temporary physical
discomfort or permanent injury); People v. DeLaCnz, 20 Cal. App. 4th 955, 960, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 202, 205
(1993) (affirming that chemical mace constitutes tear gas); Cook v. Superior Court of San Diego County, 4 Cal.
App. 3d 822, 829, 84 Cal. Rptr. 664, 669 (1970) (finding that chemical mace is tear gas).
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and Training.3 In addition, existing law requires that any tear gas weapon utilized
must be deemed acceptable by the Department of Justice.4 Finally, existing law
permits custodial officers to use reasonable force in ensuring custody of
prisoners.5
Chapter 15 expressly grants custodial officers6 the ability to purchase,
possess, transport, and use tear gas weapons.7 However, this authority is subject
to the express limitation that custodial officers may carry tear gas weapons, in
accordance with Chapter 15, only while on duty While off duty, custodial
officers may carry tear gas weapons only in accordance with all other laws
governing their use.9
3. CAL. PENAL CODE § 12403 (amended by Chapter 15); see id. § 13500 (West Supp. 1995)
(establishing a Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training, consisting of 13 diverse members, within
the Department of Justice); cf AR. CODE ANN. § 5-73-124(b) (Michie 1993) (providing that peace officers
have the ability to use teargas while in the course of official duties); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 36(a)(1), (f)(1)
(1994) (allowing an officer of any city, county, or the state who is entitled or required to carry a chemical mace,
pepper mace or tear gas device as part of the officer's official equipment, to do so).
4. CAL. PENAL CODE § 12403 (amended by Chapter 15); see id. § 12451 (West 1992) (defining
"acceptable" as being reasonably free of any undue hazard, when used by or upon a human being, as
determined by several factors such as: (1) the reasonable safety, availability and effectiveness of other devices;
(2) the inherent hazard in using the device versus the inherent hazard in the situation that the weapon is
designed to control; and (3) the manner in which the weapon is expected to be used as well as the way the
manufacturer or seller recommended that it be used).
5. Id. § 831(f) (West Supp. 1995).
6. See id. § 831(a) (West Supp. 1995) (defining "custodial officer" as a public officer, employed by
a city or county law enforcement agency, with the authority and responsibility for securing custody of prisoners
and as one who assists in the operation of the local detention facility); see also id. (emphasizing that a custodial
officer is not a peace officer); id. § 831.5(a) (West Supp. 1995) (defining "custodial officer" additionally as
any non-peace officer employed by San Diego County, Fresno County, or any county with a population of
425,000 or less, with the responsibility of maintaining custody of prisoners, and as one who assists with the
operation of the detention facility); id. (stating that a custodial officer includes a person designated as a
correctional officer, jailer, or some other synonymous title by San Diego County, Fresno County or any other
county with a population of less than 425,000). But cf. County of Santa Clara v. Deputy Sheriff's Ass'n, 3 Cal.
4th 873, 880, 838 P.2d 781,785, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d 53, 57 (1992) (noting that legislative attempts to grant peace
officer status to custodial officers have proven fruitless); id. at 886, 838 P.2d at 789, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 61
(holding that a Director of Corrections cannot confer quasi-peace officer status upon custodial officer,, since
doing so would constitute a clear violation of legislative intent).
7. CAL. PENAL CODE § 12403 (amended by Chapter 15).
8. L § 12403.9 (enacted by Chapter 15); see id. (omitting the on-duty limitation for peace officers).
9. Id. § 12403.9 (enacted by Chapter 15); see id. § 12403.7(a) (West Supp. 1995) (allowing a person
to purchase, possess, or use tear gas and tear gas weapons, for self defense purposes, so long as the weapon
is deemed acceptable by the Department of Justice); see also id. § 12403.7(a)(1) (West Supp. 1995)
(prohibiting felons, or persons convicted of non-felony assault, or persons convicted of misuse of tear gas from
possessing, purchasing or using tear gas); id. 12403.7(aX2) (West Supp. 1995) (declaring that an addiction to
narcotic drugs precludes a person from purchasing, possessing, or using tear gas); id. § 12403.7(a)(3) (West
Supp. 1995) (forbidding a person from providing tear gas to a minor) id. § 12403.7(7)(a) (West Supp. 1995)
(stating that a person cannot purchase, possess or use tear gas or a tear gas weapon unless a tear gas instruction
card has been issued by the Department of Justice); id. (delineating prerequisites for the issuance of a tear gas
instruction card by the Department of Justice: (1) completion of a course certified by the Department of Justice;
(2) completion of an objective test, which includes successful use of a tear gas canister filled with inert
ingredients, to ensure knowledge of a tear gas safety, or (3) completion of instruction at the place of sale, which
must include the viewing of an instructional videotape approved by the Department of Justice and the
successful use of a tear gas canister filled with inert ingredients); DeLaCruz, 20 Cal. App. 4th at 962-63, 25
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 207 (holding that a person who used tear gas in response to a reasonable belief that bodily harm
Pacific Law Journal/Vol. 27
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COMMENT
Through Chapter 15, the Legislature addressed an anomaly existing in
California jails in which peace officers, but not custodial officers, were authorized
by law to possess and use tear gas weapons while on duty.1° Chapter 15 now
affords custodial officers, while on duty and given the requisite training, the same
opportunity to purchase, possess, transport, and use approved tear gas weapons
as peace officers.1 While off duty, custodial officers must comply with applicable
California law governing the use of tear gas weapons.1
2
Allowing custodial officers the opportunity to use tear gas weapons provides
an effective defensive tool in the face of increasing violence toward county jail
employees. 3 It is likely, though, the that use of tear gas by custodial officers in
performing employment responsibilities is subject to the same constraints im-
posed by the Eighth Amendment upon peace officers. 4
Pamela J. Keeler
was imminent, acted in self defense). See generally JJ. Director, Annotation, Validity and Construction of
Regulations Governing Carrying, Possession, or Use of Tear Gas or Similar Chemical Weapons, 30 A.L.R.
3D 1416 (1970 & Supp. 1994) (discussing regulations which govern the use, sale, or possession of tear gas).
10. SENATE COMMnTEEON CRMALPROCEDURE,CommITTEEANALYSIS ofAB 176, at 3 (May 16,
1995); see id, (reporting that the sponsors of AB 176 intended to resolve the inconsistency that existed because
the law prior to AB 176 specifically permitted peace officers to use tear gas and implicitly prohibited, through
omission, custodial officers from the use of tear gas weapons); see also SENATE FLOOR, COMMrrEE ANALYSIS
of AB 176, at 2 (May 18, 1995) (recognizing that while the use of chemical agents is permitted in detention
facilities, prior law only authorized peace officers to use tear gas weapons).
11. CAL. PENAL CODE § 12403 (amended by Chapter 15).
12. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
13. See SENATE FLOOR, COMMrIT E ANALYSIS OF AB 176, at 2 (May 18, 1995) (quoting a study
conducted by the California Board of Corrections which found that assaults on jailers increased 26% since
1994); see also CAI. PENAL CODE § 831(b) (West Supp. 1995) (declaring that a custodial officer cannot carry
or possess a firearm while on duty). But see id. § 831.5(b) (West Supp. 1995) (allowing custodial officers
employed by a law enforcement agency of either San Diego, Fresno or another county with a population of less
than 425,000 to carry and possess a firearm in certain enumerated circumstances if under the direction of a
sheriff or the chief of police); Bill Wallace, Attempt to Control Inmates with Stun Guns Prove Fatal, S.F.
CHRON., Oct. 4, 1994, at A7 (reporting that prison officials find the use of Tasers-high voltage electronic stun
guns--to be less dangerous and more effective than tear gas).
14. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIIl (banning the use, by the government, of cruel and unusual
punishment); Lock v. Jenkins, 641 F.2d 488, 496 (7th Cir. 1981) (finding that the use of tear gas in order to
effectuate the retrieval of a metal food tray from an uncooperative prisoner, and to stop shouting and yelling,
was constitutionally impermissible); Stringer v. Rowe, 616 F.2d 993, 999 (7th Cir. 1980) (overturning a grant
of summary judgment by finding there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether the use of mace by
a prison official was violative of the Eighth Amendment); Spain v. Procunier, 600 F.2d 189, 195 (9th Cir.
1979) (finding that the use of non-dangerous quantities of tear gas in small amounts is justified where there
is a reasonable likelihood of injury to persons); id. at 194 (holding that the use of possibly dangerous amounts
of tear gas is appropriate only when there is-an actual or imminent threat of death, bodily harm, escape, serious
damage to a substantial amount of valuable property, or a riot involving a large number of unconfined inmates).
See generally Daniel A. Klein, Annotation, Excessiveness or Adequacy of Awards of Compensatory Damages
in Civil Actionsfor Deprivation of Rights under 42 USCS § 1983-Modern Cases, 99 A.L.R. FED. 501,534
(1990) (discussing the awarding of compensatory damages to prisoners for impermissible acts of violence by
prison officers); M.L. Schellenger, Annotation, Civil Liability of Sheriff or Other Officer Charged with Keeping
Jail or Prison for Death or Injury of Prisoner, 14 A.L.R. 2D 353 (1950 & Supp. 1987) (analyzing the personal




Business and Professions Code § 22430 (amended); Penal Code § 483.5
(new).
AB 156 (Napolitano); 1995 STAT. Ch. 133
Existing law specifies that the production of a counterfeit government seal
with the intent to defraud, or possession and willful concealment of a counterfeit
government seal knowing that it is counterfeit, is a misdemeanor punishable by
imprisonment in the county jail not to exceed one year, or by a fine not exceeding
$1000 or by both the fine and the imprisonment.
Existing law also provides that possession of a forged driver's license or
identification card with the intent to facilitate the commission of any forgery is
an offense punishable by imprisonment in a state prison or up to one year in
county jail.2
Existing law provides that selling or manufacturing or offering to sell a
driver's license or government-issued identification card is a misdemeanor
offense, punishable by up to one year in the county jail or by an escalating fine
for subsequent offenses, or both imprisonment and fine If the offense is
committed by one who is under twenty-one years of age, but is thirteen years or
older, the punishment may also include the suspension of driving privileges for
one year.4
Existing law prohibits a deceptive identification documene from being
manufactured, sold, or offered for sale, unless a statement is printed diagonally
across the front of the document stating that the document is not a government
1. CAL. PENAL CODE § 529.5(a) (West 1995).
2. Id. § 470b (West 1988).
3. Id. § 529.5(a) (West Supp. 1995); see id. § 529.5(b) (West Supp. 1995) (specifying that any person
who, having been convicted of a violation of California Penal Code § 529.5(a), is convicted of a subs,:quent
violation of California Penal Code § 529.5(a), is punishable for the subsequent conviction by imprisonment
in a county jail, not exceeding one year, or by a fine not exceeding $5000, or by both the fine and the
imprisonment); id. § 529.5(c) (specifying that any person who possesses a document described in California
Penal Code § 529.5(a) and who knows that the document is not a government-issued document is guilty of a
misdemeanor punishable by a fine of not less than $1000 and not more than $2500); id. (specifying that the
misdemeanor fine must be imposed except in unusual cases where the interests of justice would be served);
id. (stating that the court may allow an offender to work off the fine by doing community service; if community
service work is not available, the misdemeanor must be punishable by a fine of up to $1000, based on the
person's ability to pay).
4. Id. § 529.5(d) (West Supp. 1995); CAL. VEH. CODE § 13202.5 (West Supp. 1995).
5. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 22430(b) (amended by Chapter 133) (defining a "deceptive
identification document" as any document not issued by a governmental agency of this state, another state, or
the federal government, and which purports to be, or which might deceive an ordinary person into believing
that it is, a document issued by such an agency, including, but not limited to, a driver's license, identification
card, birth certificate, passport or social security card); CAL PENAL CODE § 483.5(b) (amended by Chapter 133)
(providing the same definition).
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document and the manufacturer's name is printed on the document! Under
existing law, a violation of this provision by a person who knows or reasonably
should know that the document will be used for fraudulent purposes is guilty of
a crime punishable by imprisonment in the county jail not to exceed one year, or
imprisonment in state prison! Existing law also provides that any person who
violates this provision is subject to enjoinment!8
Chapter 133 expands the scope of the existing offense by additionally
prohibiting a deceptive identification document from being furnished, transported,
offered to be transported, imported, or offered to be imported into California.9
COMMENT
Chapter 133 was enacted to deter the booming sales of fake identification
documents.'0 Chapter 133 allows prosecutors to not only prosecute the people
who manufacture the fake cards, but also the sellers and the others who assist in
the lucrative trade of fake identification." Fake identification cards are used for
6. CAL. BUS. & PRoF. CODE § 22430(a) (amended by Chapter 133); see id. (specifying that forms of
deceptive identification may not be manufactured, sold, or offered for sale unless printed conspicuously on the
document, in to less than 14-point type, diagonally, and in permanent ink, containing the following declaration:
"NOT A GOVERNMENT DOCUMENT," along with the name of the manufacturer).
7. Id. § 22430(d) (amended by Chapter 133); CAL PENAL CODE § 483.5(d) (enacted by Chapter 133).
8. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 22430(c) (amended by Chapter 133); id. (specifying that actions for
injunction under California Business & Professions Code §22430 may be prosecuted by the California Attorney
General or any district attorney in this state in the name of the people of the State of California upon their own
complaint or upon the complaint of any person); CAL PENAL CODE § 483.5(a) (stating an analogous provision).
9. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 22430(a) (amended by Chapter 133); CAL. PENAL CODE § 483.5(a)
(enacted by Chapter 133) (stating the same provision).
10. ASSEmBLYCOMMrEEONPUBLICSAFrYCOMMITEEANALYStSOFAB 156, at2 (Apr. 4, 1995);
see id. (stating that the Los Angeles District Attorney's Office cites the U.S. Department of Justice statistics
for Los Angeles County showing a 50% increase over a one-year period in the seizure of counterfeit
documents); id. (specifying that Immigration and Naturalization Service reported seizing 395,950 counterfeit
documents with a street value of over $15,000.000 during the same one-year period); see also Computers Start
to Crack Foolproof Hologram in California Driver's License, SAN DIEGO UNIoN-TRm., June 5, 1995, at BI
(explaining that while no figures are available on the amount of money annually lost due to false
identifications, the amount is estimated to be in the hundreds of thousands of dollars); id. (explaining that a
driver's license is prized by criminals because it establishes identity, and it is an important gatekeeper
document that allows criminals to cash checks, receive public assistance, rent apartments and buy guns); id.
(indicating that authorities across the country report that a California's driver's license is one of the most
sought-after documents in the United States because California is a port of entry for a lot of illegal immigrants);
Feds Arrest Nine Accused of Selling Counterfeit IDs, REUTERS, LTD., May 19, 1995, at I (reporting that nine
Mexican nationals were arrested and charged with selling false identification cards and that the Mexican
nationals were earning $1,000,000 a month from the sale of false identification documents); id. (indicating that
the false identification documents included illegal work visas, Social Security cards, and state driver's
licenses); id. (quoting the Dallas district chief for the Immigration and Naturalization Service as saying that
while the arrests would make a significant dent in the nationwide distribution of these fraudulent documents,
the arrests would not stop the use of fraudulent documents).
11. ASSEmLY CmmmrnE ON PUBLc SAFETy, COMmIrEE ANALYSIS OF AB 156, at 2 (Apr. 4, 1995);
ASSEMBLY Co~mMrIrEON PuBLIc SAFETY, COMMIrrEE ANALYSiS OF AB 156, at 2 (Mar. 21, 1995); see id.
(stating that according to the L.A. District Attorney's Office, a typical sale of a false identification card
involves anywhere from three to five people, "[t]he modus operandi is the following: one seller will solicit
customers on the street and take orders, i.e., records the information the customer wants on the false card. A
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a variety of purposes which include the following: (1) receiving fraudulent
welfare payments, 2 (2) cashing stolen or forged checks, 13 (3) purchasing alcohol
when a person is a minor, 4 and (4) obtaining employment when a person is an
undocumented worker. 5 Chapter 133 provides prosecutors with the necessary
tools to put a stop to this growing crime problem.'
6
Molly J. Mrowka
second person operates as a runner who takes the information from the seller to the 'mill,' where the false card
is being made. Often there is a supervisior who must approve the quality of the card before the runner, a new
person, delivers the finished product to the customer"); id. (specifying that in a typical case, only the runner
who carries the finished card to the buyer can be charged, assuming that possession of the card can be shown
"through willful concealment;" therefore, the runner and the salesperson on the street who solicit the sale of
the false identification documents, and collect the money are not charged with the crime); id. (noting that AB
156 would include the sale, offer to sell, transportation, or importation of fraudulent cards, therefore the runner
and the salesperson could also be convicted).
12. See Seth Faison, Woman with 15 Aliases for Welfare Pleads Guilty, HOUSTON CHRON., Aug. 5,
1994, at A13 (specifying that a woman deceived one welfare office after another with a collection of fake or
stolen documents for herself and fictitious children, claiming parenthood for 11 sets of twins); Fraud How To
Collect $450,000 in Six Years From Welfare, CHARLESTON DAILY MAIL, May 26, 1994, at 6A (stating that the
same woman collected $450,000 in welfare payments for 73 fictitious children between 1987 and 1993; she
was caught by United States State Department when she applied for multiple passports).
13. See Jim Kirksey, Crime Network Exposed Cops Say Ring Fueled by Speed, DENvER POST, May 24,
1995, at B1 (reporting that a group of 30 to 50 criminals committed crimes such as check forgery, and the
criminals obtained credit cards and stolen checks through burglaries and searching through people's garbage
cans for credit card and bank account numbers); Tim May, East Valley Focus: San Fernando; Group to Host
Class to Deter Check Fraud, L.A. Tims, May 20, 1995, at B3 (reporting that because a band of people cashed
nearly $10,000 in fake checks in Mike Majers' liquor store, Majers has given many workshops on how to spot
false identification and credit cards; Majers and his staff have helped the police arrest an average of 250 con
artists, shoplifters, and criminals each year from his store).
14. See Toni Locy, 2 Plead Guilty to Selling Fake Driver's Licenses, WASH. POST, June 2, 1995, at A6
(discussing the arrest of two students who pleaded guilty to producing and selling fake driver's licenses; the
students used computers to make nearly perfect copies to sell to underage students in several states so that they
could buy liquor); id. (indicating that the students sold the licenses for $65 each and made approximately $8000
in less than six months); Jane Meinhardt, Spring Break Takes a Rest from the Rowdy, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES,
May 13, 1995, at 2 (reporting that during spring break at Clearwater Beach, the police made about 250 arrest,
and agents confiscated 68 false identifications).
15. See Robert Enstad, Fake Licenses Hard to Find for Authorities, CHt. TRi., Oct. 4, 1993, at IL
(reporting how the police cracked one of the largest phony license operations ever in Illinios, and recovered
927 illegally issued driver's licenses); id. (noting that the majority of the licenses were sold to illegal
immigrants, sometimes for as much as $800 each); Alice Thomas & Bernie Karsko, INS Says 65 Workers at
Plant Illegal, CoLuxi~us DISPATCH, Apr. 20, 1995, at IC (reporting that an INS raid on a chicken processing
plant resulted in about 50% of the company's workforce being taken due to illegal status; one worker admitted
that he had bought a green card (a card granting United States residency and the ability to work) and a Social
Security card for $100 in Florida); see also Lora Foo, Symposium: The Informal Economy: The Vulnerable and
Exploitable Immigrant Workforce and the Need for Strengthening Worker Protective Legislation, 103 YALE
LJ. 2179,2182 (1994) (noting that many employers hire immigrants with false documentation because they
know that the workers will tolerate labor abuses out of fear that they will be turned into the Immigration and
Naturalization Service); Kathleen M. Johnson, Coping with Illegal Immigrant Workers: Federal Employer
Sanctions, U. ILL. L. REv. 959, 973 (1984) (discussing legislation which would create a phone system to verify
whether a worker had a valid social security number in order to minimize the false identification problem).
16. ASSEMBLYF.oOR,COMM1TTEEANALYSISOFAB 156, at2 (hay11. 1995); ASSEMDLYCOMM T'rE
ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 156, at 2 (Apr. 4, 1995); ASSEMBLY COiMrrrEE ON PuBLIC
SAFETY, CoMMnrTEE ANALYSIS oFAB 156, at 2 (Mar. 21, 1995).
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Crimes; domestic violence-law enforcement officer training
Penal Code §§ 13519, 13730 (amended).
SB 132 (Watson); 1995 STAT. Ch. 965
Existing law requires the Commission on Peace Officer Standards and
Training,' in consultation with specified groups and individuals,2 to implement
courses and guidelines for training law enforcement officers3 to handle domestic
violence complaints 5 Existing law also encourages local law enforcement
1. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 13500 (West Supp. 1995) (defining the composition of the Commission);
see also id. § 13503(e) (West 1992) (describing the duties of the Commission as including development of
training and education courses to enhance the effectiveness of law enforcement).
2. See id. § 13519(d) (amended by Chapter 965) (listing the groups and individuals that are to assist
the Commission in establishing training guidelines, such as one representative from the California Peace
Officers' Association, the Peace Officers' Research Association of California, the State Bar of California, the
California Women Lawyers' Association, and the State Commission on the Status of Women; two
representatives from the Commission and the California Alliance Against Domestic Violence; two peace
officers, who are recommended by the Commission; and two domestic violence experts, who are recommended
by the commission); see also SENATE COMMrrTEE ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, CoMMrrrEE ANALYSIS OF SB
132, at 3 (Mar. 21, 1995) (noting that in 1986, 1988, and 1994, the Commission published a booklet entitled
"Guidelines and Curriculum for Law Enforcement Response to Domestic Violence" that provides guidelines
on domestic violence law enforcement, arrests, report writing, protective and restraining orders, and victim
assistance).
3. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 13519(a) (amended by Chapter 965) (defining "law enforcement officer"
as any officer or employee of local police or sheriff's department, any peace officer of the Department of Parks
and Recreation, any peace officer of the University of California or California State University Police
Department, or peace officer); see also id. § 830.1(a) (West Supp. 1995) (defining "peace officer' as any
sheriff, undersheriff, deputy sheriff, employed in that capacity, of a city, any peace officer, employed in that
capacity and appointed by the chief of police or the chief executive of the agency, of a city, any chief of police,
or police officer of a district authorized by statute to maintain a police department); id. § 830.2(c), (d), (g)
(West Supp. 1995) (defining "peace officer' as a member of the University of California Police Department,
California State University Police Department, or Department of Parks and Recreation); id. § 830.3 1(d) (West
Supp. 1995) (defining "peace officer as a housing patrol officer).
4. See CAL. FAm. CODE § 6211 (West 1994) (defining "domestic violence" as violence perpetrated
against a spouse or former spouse, a cohabitant or former cohabitant, a person having had a dating relationship
with the perpetrator, a person with whom the perpetrator has had a child, or any child of the perpetrator); see
also id. § 6209 (West 1994) (defining a "cohabitant" as a person who regularly resides in the household with
the perpetrator). See generally ASSEMBLY COMMITrEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMM=TrEE ANALYSIS OF SB 132,
at 3 (June 6, 1995) (reporting that in 1993 there were 238,895 reported incidents of domestic violence with 206
homicides committed by males and 47 committed by females); Benjamin Pimental, Domestic Abuse Is
Growing, Group Warns; Women's Advocates Say Battering at Crisis Level, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 8, 1995, at A17
(stating that two to three million women are battered annually in the United States, and 2000 to 4000 of these
women are killed).
5. CAL. PENAL CODE § 13519(a), (d) (amended by Chapter 965); see id. § 13519(b) (amended by
Chapter 965) (listing procedures and techniques that must be included in the basic training of law enforcement
officers); see also SENATE COMMirTEE ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, COMMrrrEE ANALYSIS OF SB 132, at 3 (Mar.
21, 1995) (indicating that the guidelines of the Commission require eight hours of basic training in domestic
violence, and require 24 hours of domestic violence training every two years); cf. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §
7-294g(a) (West Supp. 1995) (requiring that basic or review training of law enforcement officers regarding
domestic violence must be a minimum of two hours); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1034(c) (Supp. 1994) (requiring
at least 20 hours of domestic violence training during basic training of new law enforcement officers); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 943.171(1) (West 1985) (providing for a minimum of six hours of training in handling domestic
violence cases); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 590.105(8) (Vernon 1995) (requiring that all prospective law enforcement
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agencies to provide periodic updates and training on domestic violence. Chapter
965 requires each law enforcement officer below the rank of supervisor who is
assigned to patrol and would respond to domestic violence calls to complete,
every two years, updated training on domestic violence.8
Existing law requires each law enforcement agency to create an incident
report form that includes a domestic violence identification code and to write a
report of all incidents of domestic violence.9 Chapter 965 requires, in addition to
an identification code, other specified information to be included in a domestic
violence incident report.'"
COMMENT
Chapter 965 will improve law enforcement officers' responses to domestic
violence complaints, and requires updated training on domestic violence instead
of relying on local legislatures or the local law enforcement to provide the
updated training." These training programs provide a crucial component of the
attempt to make law enforcement more responsive by allowing law enforcement
officers to perceive how their language and behavior regarding domestic violence
officers must receive a minimum of 30 hours of instruction on domestic and family violence); OHIo REv. CODE
ANN. § 109.744(A) (Anderson 1994) (requiring fifteen hours of basic training on domestic violence for all new
law enforcement officers); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-29-6(a) (1994) (requiring all new law enforcement officers
of the Providence police academy, the state police academy, and the municipal academy to receive at least eight
hours of training on domestic violence issues); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 99b(c) (Supp. 1994) (providing that
the basic training of all police cadets must include a minimum of 20 hours in responding to domestic violence
cases).
6. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1545(b) (West 1982) (defining "law enforcement agency" as the Attorney
General of the State, every district attorney, and every agency of the State expressly authorized by statute to
investigate or prosecute law violators).
7. Id. § 13519(c)(4) (amended by Chapter 965); see Elizabeth Fernandez, How S.F. Police Handle
Domestic Violence; City's Model Program Criticized for Falling Short, S.F. EXAMINER, Mar. 22, 1995, at Al
(explaining how San Francisco law enforcement officers receive eight hours of training on domestic violence
every year, and noting how some police departments do not receive any updated training). But see id. (noting
that the amount of training that San Francisco law enforcement officers receive is much less than the 20 hours
per year that Quincy, Massachusetts, officers receive).
8. CAL. PENAL CODE § 13519(e) (amended by Chapter 965); see ASSEMBLY COMMITFEE ON PUBLIC
SAFY, CmmEE ANALYsIs OF SB 132, at 2-3 (June 6,1995) (noting that the Commission on Peace Officer
Standards and Training currently requires 24 hours of continued training every two years, and a two hour
telecourse dedicated exclusively to domestic violence); cf R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-29-6(b) (1994) (requiring all
law enforcement agencies to provide at least four hours of in-service domestic violence training); V.I. CODE
ANN. tit. 16, § 99b(d) (Supp. 1994) (providing that the advanced training of all police officers shall include
a minimum of 12 hours annually in responding to domestic violence cases).
9. CAL. PENAL CODE § 13730(c) (amended by Chapter 965).
10. Id.; see id. (requiring information on whether the abuser was under the influence of alcohol or a
controlled substance and whether there was a previous incidence of domestic violence involving the same
abuser).
11. ASSFaiBLY COMMITEE ON PuBLIC SAFErY, COMMIT'EE ANALYSISON SB 132, at 2-3 (June 6,
1995); see SENATE FLOOR, COmMrITEE ANALYSIS OF SB 132, at 2 (Apr. 27, 1995) (stating that the author's
intent is to ensure appropriate updated training on domestic violence in the context of the continuing
professional training the officers obtain every two years).
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affect future behavior of the victim and abuser.' 2 Thus, law enforcement officers
will receive the necessary understanding to appropriately react in order to achieve
successful intervention during a domestic violence call. 3
Chapter 965 also provides the ability to compile data and conduct a statistical
analysis on substance abuse and prior abusive acts in domestic violence calls. 4
Thus, if the information is properly utilized, the data can educate the public about




12. Developments in the Law-Legal Responses to Domestic Violence, 106 HARv. L. REv. 1498, 1555
(1993); see id. (discussing the training implemented by San Francisco, and noting that the training helps turn
a reluctant victim into a cooperating victim when the victim does not want to turn against the abuser); see also
Kathleen Waits, The Criminal Justice System's Response to Battering: Understanding the Problem, Forging
the Solution, 60 WASH. L. REv. 267, 299-300 (1985) (discussing how police have traditionally viewed
domestic violence as a family matter because there is the assumption that family members will reach mutually
beneficial and satisfactory answers based on their love for each other, and because many areas of family life
entail controversial value judgments and the superiority of one over the other is unprovable); Developments
in the Law, supra, at 1535-40 (discussing the disadvantage of mandatory arrest because it only provides a short
term solution and may incite the abuser to inflict more violence on the victim); Susan Sward, O.J. Simpson
Case Throws Spotlight on Domestic Violence, S.F. CHRON., June 24, 1994, at Al (quoting Assemblywoman
Deirdre Alpert, who notes that there is a strong ethic against the government getting involved in family life).
But see Developments in the Law, supra, at 1535-40 (addressing the advantages of the mandatory arrest policy
that some states implement because it takes the abuser away from the victim and allows the victim time to
assess his or her situation); id. (commenting that mandatory arrest provisions properly establish the role of
police as law enforcement officers rather than family counselors).
13. Developments in the Law, supra note 12, at 1555; see id. (discussing how San Francisco trains law
enforcement officers to work through hypothetical fact patterns and how, by integrating domestic violence
theory and practical challenges of law enforcement, officers will understand that acting properly in a domestic
violence situation is necessary for effective intervention); see also Waits, supra note 12, at 320 (asserting that
trained police officers can help a victim of domestic violence realize that the abuser's behavior is beyond the
victim's control, and that the victim should take steps to assure her own safety); id. (noting that some police
officers will be unable to get beyond their bias against getting involved in domestic disputes, but others will
be much more open to the topic when there is also training regarding police safety). But see Isaac Guzman,
Breaking the Cycle; LAPD Program Helps Officers Step in Before Domestic Violence Escalates, L.A. TIm ,
Nov. 3, 1994, at B I (illustrating that despite LAPD's policies and training on domestic violence, there are some
officers that are still insensitive toward domestic violence and its victims); Susan Sward, Arrests Soar in
Domestic Abuse Cases: Vast Change in Police Attitudes in Past 10 Years, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 29, 1993, at Al
(discussing how police officers do not like to respond to domestic violence calls because they always end up
in the middle of the dispute and embrace the belief that most officer killings are due to domestic violence calls,
but the article attempts to dispell the myth by illustrating that less than six percent of officer killings are due
to domestic violence calls). See generally Raucci v. Town of Rotterdam, 902 F.2d 1050, 1056-58 (2d Cir.
1990) (holding that the police department established a special relationship with the victims and owed them
a duty of protection from the abuser); id. (holding that the city was negligent for failing to protect the victims
because the police had knowledge that the abuser was a violent person and could cause harm).
14. ASSEMBLY COMMITrEE ON PUBUCSAETY, COMMIT'EEANALYSISoFSB 132, at2 (June 6, 1995);
see SENATE FLOOR, ComMnrEE ANALYSTS OF SB 132, at 2 (Apr. 27, 1995) (stating the intent of the bill to
provide a mechanism for collecting data on substance abuse and prior acts in domestic violence cases).
15. Developments in the Law, supra note 12, at 1553; see id (contending that information and statistics
on domestic violence stimulates public awareness of the problem); see also Waits, supra note 12, at 319 n.294
(discussing how most police departments do not have a mechanism for the police to know that there has been
a prior incident of domestic violence at that residence); id. (noting that violence escalates over time and that
inadequate information endangers everyone, including the police and the victim).
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Crimes; false representation-public utility and municipal utility district
employees
Penal Code § 538f (new).
AB 400 (Gallegos); 1995 STAT. Ch. 460
Existing law makes it a misdemeanor' to fraudulently impersonate police
officers, fire department personnel, and officers of the State Fire Marshal.2
Chapter 460 establishes the crime of false impersonation of a public utility or
district employee, providing that anyone who fraudulently represents himself or
herself as an employee of a public utility or district3 to a customer of the utility
or district is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by up to six months in county
jail, a fine of no more than $1000, or both.4 The misrepresentation must be made
willfully 5 and with fraudulent intent 6to impersonate a utility employee or to
induce the false belief that one is such an employee! Chapter 460 expressly
excludes from the scope of the offense labor actions arguably protected by state
law or the National Labor Relations Act.8
1. See CAL. PENALCODE § 17(a) (West Supp. 1995) (defining "misdemeanor" as a crime punishable
by a sentence less than death or imprisonment in state prison).
2. Id. §§ 538d, 538e (West 1988).
3. See CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 216(a) (West Supp. 1995) (defining "public utility" to include every
common carrier and every corporation which operates a toll bridge or a pipeline, or supplies gas, electricity,
telephone service, telegraph service, water, sewer service, or heat where the service is performed for the public
or the commodity is delivered to the public); id § 11503 (West 1994) (defining "district" as a municipal utility
district).
4. CAL. PENALCODE § 538f (enacted by Chapter 460); cf. NEv. REv. STAT. § 207.345 (1993) (making
it a misdemeanor for anyone to impersonate an officer or employee of a public utility company and commit
any act purporting to represent the utility company); Wis. STAT. Ami. § 946.69(2)(a), (b) (West Supp. 1994)
(creating a Class A misdemeanor for anyone assuming to act in an official capacity or performing an official
function as a utility employee knowing that one is not the utility employee that he or she assumes to be).
5. See CAL PENALCODE § 7(1) (West 1988) (defining "willfully" when applied to intent as no more
than the intent to do the act referred to, without requiring an intent to break the law or cause harm).
6. See5 B.E. WrKN, SuMMARYOFCALFORNIA LAw, Torts § 676(9th ed. 1988) (listing the elements
of fraud as follows: (1) misrepresentation, (2) knowledge of falsity, (3) intent to induce reliance, (4) justifiable
reliance, and (5) resulting damage).
7. CAL. PENAL CODE § 538f (enacted by Chapter 460). Compare CAL. PENAL CODE § 538d (West
1988) (requiring fraudulent intent for commission of the crime of impersonating a police officer) with 18
U.S.C.A. § 912 (West Supp. 1995) (creating the crime of falsely assuming or claiming to be an officer or
employee of the United States and acting as such, but not specifying the element of intent). But see United
States v. Rosser, 528 F.2d 652, 655 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (holding that revision of 18 U.S.C. § 912 to delete the
phrase "with intent to defraud" did not indicate congressional intent to increase the scope of the statute).
8. CAL PENAL CODE § 538f (enacted by Chapter 460); see 29 U.S.C.A. § 151 (West 1973)
(introducing the National Labor Relations Act and declaring that it is the policy of the United Stztes to
encourage collective bargaining by protecting workers' rights to organize themselves and appoint
representatives of their own choosing).
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COMMENT
The ostensible purpose of Chapter 460 is to provide law enforcement with an
additional tool for the prevention of two types of crime: (1) extortion committed
by those who, either in person or over the telephone, pose as service workers and
threaten to disconnect utility service; and (2) robbery committed by those who
gain entry into the homes of victims by impersonating public utility or district
employees.9 By criminalizing the act of impersonation, Chapter 460 will permit
the police to stop such impostors before they commit more serious offenses.'
0
An additional purpose of criminalizing impersonation of public utility or
district employees may be a desire on the part of the Legislature to preserve the
public's trust in such employees." If this is the case, an issue could arise as to
whether violating Chapter 460 will also provide victims of the crime with a civil
cause of action.t2
The language in Chapter 460 requiring fraudulent intent was added in
response to legislative concerns that such innocent activities as the wearing of a
costume might be criminalized.3 Similarly, the explicit exception provided for
activities arguably protected by state or federal labor law was added after the
possibility was raised in committee that Chapter 460, without such an exception,
9. ASSEMBLYCOMMrrrEEONPUBtLIC SAFETY, COMMrTEE ANALYSIS OFAB 400, at 2 (Mar. 21,1995).
10. Id.; see CAL. PENAL CODE § 530 (West 1988) (providing that impersonation of any other person
for the purpose of receiving money or property under false pretenses is punishable as a crime, but requiring
that the money or property so converted must first be received by the impostor); see also Sharon Hartnell,
Assembly Bill Targets Bogus Utility Workers, LONG BEACH PRESS TELEGRAM, Feb. 17, 1995 (facsimile
transmission from Assemblymember Gallegos' office, copy on file with the Pacific Law Journal) (reporting
that Assemblymember Gallegos' sponsorship of the bill was sought by Southern California Edison in response
to an increase in impostor crime); New Bill Introduced to Help Stem Increase in Utility Worker Impersonations
and Reduce Crime, PR NEwswIRE, Mar. 17,1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws file [hereinafter
New Bill] (quoting Assemblymember Gallegos to the effect that his bill would allow police to act immediately
when criminals impersonate service workers rather than having to wait until harm has occurred).
11. See SENATE COMMrrTEE ON CRIHNAL PROCEDURE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 400, at 2 (June
27, 1995) (citing the author of AB 400 as believing that Southern California Edison was concerned that the
safety of its own employees might be jeopardized because they could be mistaken for impersonators); see also
id. (noting that letters of support for AB 400 received from East Bay Municipal Utility District, Pacific Bell,
and Southern California Gas indicated that utility employee impersonation was perceived to be a problem by
utility companies and municipal utility districts statewide); see also Hartnell, supra note 10 (reporting that
Southern California Edison took the initiative to seek Assemblymember Gallegos' sponsorship of AB 400, a
fact which suggests that the desire to maintain public trust in utility workers played at least some role in the
introduction of AB 400); New Bill, supra note 10 (noting that enactment of Chapter 460 was supported by all
major utility companies in California).
12. See United States v. Barnow, 239 U.S. 74, 80 (1915) (holding that the predecessor to 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 912 was intended not merely to protect the victims of those who fraudulently impersonated federal officers,
but to protect the dignity and reputation of the federal service itself). But see Fullerton v. Monongahela
Connecting R.R., 242 F. Supp. 622, 624-25 (W.D. Pa. 1965) (holding that violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 912, in
light of Barnow, could not give rise to a civil cause of action because its purpose was to protect the dignity and
reputation of the federal service rather than to protect a particular class of victims).




could be used against a striking utility worker or one contesting his or her
termination. 4
By responding to the crime statistics provided by Southern California Edison
Company which show a marked increase in criminal acts facilitated by service-
worker impersonation since 1990, the Legislature apparently seeks both to
preserve the confidence usually placed in public utility or district service workers,
and to protect the personal security of the most trusting and vulnerable elements
of the public itself.1 5
Dan Johannes
Crimes; firearms-criminal possession of ammunition
Penal Code §§ 12020.5, 12021.5, 12323 (amended).
AB 99 (Burton); 1995 STAT. Ch. 263
Existing law makes possession, manufacture, importation, or sale of
ammunition, designed primarily to penetrate metal or armor, a felony.'
Chapter 263 clarifies existing law by defining "handgun ammunition
designed primarily to penetrate metal or armor" as ammunition primarily
designed to penetrate a body vest or shield.2
14. Id.
15. See ASSEMiBLY COMMrI'frEON PUBuC SAFETY, COMMITrEE ANALYSIS oFAB 400, at 1-2 (Mar. 21,
1995) (citing a four-fold increase in reported impersonations in Edison's service territory from 1990 to 1994
over the previous eight years, amounting to 308 cases with losses of more than $83,000 in the four-year period,
and reporting that similar legislation enacted in Wisconsin and Nevada was proposed by Edison). See generally
Debra Cano, Orange County Focus: Buena Park; Police Warn About Utility Worker Ruse, L. A. TIMEs, Aug.
23, 1993, at B3 (warning that thieves posing as utility workers were preying on elderly people); Rita Malley
& Seamus McGraw, Two Men Charged with Burglarizing Homes of Seniors-Phony Utility Workers Stole
Money, Tm REcoRD, Nov. 24, 1993, at B3 (pointing to a growing trend in crimes committed by thieves who
pos as utility workers, victimizing senior citizens in particular).
1. CkL PENAL CODE §§ 12320, 12321 (West 1992). But see id. § 12322 (West 1992) (permitting the
sale to and possession of any ammunition by any member of the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, or
National Guard while on duty, or any police or forensic agency holding a valid permit). See generally 2 B.E.
W',rrt & NORMAN L. E'STaN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW, Crimes Against Public Peace and Welfare §
1107(5) (2d ed. 1988) (summarizing California statutes prohibiting sale and possession of armor piercing
ammunition); 18 CAL. JUR. 3D, Criminal Law § 1606 (1984) (restating California statutes prohibiting sale and
possession of armor piercing ammunition).
2. CAL. PENAL CODE § 12323(b) (amended by Chapter 263); see id. (requiring that for ammunition
to fall under the definition of ammunition primarily designed to penetrate metal or armor, its projectile or
projectile core must be constructed entirely from one or a combination of tungsten alloys, steel, iron, brass,
beryllium copper, or depleted uranium, or any equivalent material of similar density or hardness, or it must be
primarily designed, by virtue of its shape, cross-sectional density, or any coating applied thereto, to breach or
penetrate a body vest or body shield when fired from a handgun); id. § 12323(c) (amended by Chapter 263)
(defining "body vest" or "shield" as any bullet-resistant material intended to provide ballistic and trauma
protection for the wearer or holder); SENATE FLOOR, COMMIrrr ANALYSIS OF AB 99, at 2 (May 4, 1995)
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Existing law prohibits any person3 from advertising the sale of certain
weapons and devices which are illegal to possess.4
Chapter 263 adds handgun ammunition primarily designed to penetrate metal
or armor to the list of weapons and devices, the sale of which may not be
advertised.5
COMMENT
Chapter 263 is intended merely to clarify existing law.6 Statutes prior to the
enactment of Chapter 263 prohibited possession of ammunition designed
primarily to penetrate metal or armor, without further definition! This rather
vague language has been broadly interpreted by law enforcement officers.8
(stating that the purpose of Chapter 263 is to clarify the existing definition of ammunition designed to penetrate
metal or armor); see also CAL PENAL CODE § 12360 (West 1992) (requiring any body armor purchased by the
commissioner of the California Highway Patrol to be first certified by the Department of Justice); id. §
12361(a) (West 1992) (requiring that before any armor is purchased for use by state peace officers, the
Department of Justice must establish minimum performance standards, and determine that such armor satisfies
such standards); 11 CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 11, §§ 941-957 (1991) (setting forth requirements and procedures
for testing police body armor); cf. 18 U.S.C.A. 921(a)(17)(B) (West Supp. 1995) (defining "armor piercing
ammunition" as a projectile or projectile core which can be used in a handgun and constructed entirely of one
or a combination of tungsten alloys, steel, iron, brass, bronze, beryllium copper, or depleted uranium, or a full
jacketed projectile larger than .22 caliber designed and intended for use in a handgun and whose jacket has a
weight of more than 25% of the total weight of the projectile, but excluding certain types of ammunition used
for hunting, target, sporting, or industrial purposes); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 237.060(7) (Baldwin 1994)
(defining "armor-piercing ammunition" as a projectile or projectile core which can be used in a handgun and
constructed entirely of one or a combination of tungsten alloys, steel, iron, brass, bronze, beryllium copper,
or depleted uranium, but excluding certain types of ammunition used for hunting, target, sporting, or industrial
purposes); MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. § 750.224c(3)(a) (West Supp. 1995) (defining "armor piercing
ammunition" similarly to Kentucky); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6121(d) (Supp. 1995) (defining "armor-
piercing" ammunition as that which is determined to be capable of penetrating bullet-resistant apparel or body
armor); TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 46.01(12) (West 1994) (defining "armor-piercing ammunition" as handgun
ammunition that is designed primarily for the purpose of penetrating metal or body armor and to be used
principally in pistols and revolvers).
3. See CAL PENAL CODE § 12277 (West Supp. 1995) (defining "person" as an individual, partnership,
corporation, limited liability company, association, or any other group or entity, regardless of how it was
created).
4. Id. § 12020.5 (amended by Chapter 263); see U. (prohibiting advertising in newspapers, magazines,
or any other form of advertisment); id. (forbidding persons from advertising the sale of weapons which are
illegal to possess under California Penal Code §§ 12020, 12220, or 12280); see also id. § 12020(a), (c) (West
Supp. 1995) (prohibiting the sale, possession, and manufacture of certain weapons including, but not limited
to, short-barreled shotguns, tracer ammunition, zip guns, and other weapons commonly used in crimes); id. §
12220(a) (West 1992) (prohibiting the possession, transportation, manufacture or sale of machine guns); id.
§ 12280 (West 1995) (prohibiting the manufacture, sale, possession, transportation, importation, and
distribution of assault weapons).
5. Id. § 12020.5 (amended by Chapter 263).
6. SENATE FLOOR, COMM=IEE ANALYStS OF AB 99, at 2 (June 15, 1995).
7. CAL. PENAL CODE § 12320 (West 1992); see id. (prohibiting persons from knowingly possessing
any handgun ammunition designed primarily to penetrate metal or armor).
8. See Telephone Interview with John Carter, Legislative Assistant to Assemblymember John Burton
(July 18, 1995) (notes on file with the Pacific Law Journal) (noting that there was a case where someone was
charged with possessing ammunition designed primarily to penetrate metal or armor because the arresting
officer thought the bullets in the defendant's gun looked "weird").
Selected 1995 Legislation
Crimes
Supporters argued that even though it was questionable whether bullets
marketed as armor piercing can actually penetrate body armor worn by police,
Chapter 263 was needed to protect officers who wear protective body armor in
the course of their duties by generically banning armor piercing ammunition in
case that type of ammunition is ever perfected!
Opponents argued that because there were no minimum standards for the
body armor used for the ammunition testing, determinations of which bullets will
be prohibited will vary widely. 0 This will in turn diminish effectiveness of
ammunition available to law abiding citizens who need to defend themselves."
The author of Chapter 263 intended to change the definition of the prohibited
ammunition to track the federal definition of armor piercing ammunition. 2
However, the federal definition of armor piercing ammunition is more specific
than that used in Chapter 263, in that it relies only on specified physical
properties of the ammunition, while Chapter 263 prohibits ammunition that by
virtue of its shape, density, or coating applied thereto, is designed to penetrate a
9. SENATE FLOOR, COMMITrEE ANALYSIS oFAB 99, at 2 (June 15, 1995); see Paul Richter, Clinton
Calls for Ban on Bullets that Pierce Body Armor, L.A. TIMES, July 1, 1995, at A22 (reporting that President
Clinton demanded a ban on any handgun ammunition able to pierce bulletproof vests or other body armor);
Letter from John F. Fleming, Legislative & Retiree Liaison, Los Angeles County Professional Peace Officers
Association, to Assemblymember John Burton (June 15, 1995) (copy on file with the Pacific Law Journal)
(suggesting that Chapter 263 will provide badly needed protection from ammunition designed to penetrate
metal or armor equipment use by peace officers); Letter from Sherman Block, Sheriff, County of Los Angeles,
to Assemblymember John Burton (June 14, 1995) (copy on file with the Pacific Law Journal) (asserting that
armor penetrating ammunition poses a threat to officers and the citizens they serve); Letter from Arlo Smith,
District Attorney, San Francisco, to Assemblymember John Burton (Mar. 3, 1995) (copy on file with the
Pacific Law Journal) (commenting that Chapter 263 will put an end to "Rhino" type ammunition which can
pierce a bullet-proof vest, break into thousands of razor sharp shards when it hits flesh, and leave a gaping
wound which causes almost instantaneous death); Letter from Norm Boyer, Chief Legislative Representative,
Los Angeles City Council, to Assemblymember John Burton (Feb. 21, 1995) (copy on file with the Pacific Law
Journal) (writing that the Los Angeles City Council has recently declared its policy in support of all efforts
to ban non-sporting ammunition, and that since armor-piercing ammunition is approximately four dollars per
round, it is unaffordable for sporting purposes); id. (noting that because deer do not wear bullet-proof vests,
hunters do not need armor piercing bullets); see also Judy Pasternak, Taking Aim at Exotic Bullets, L.A. TtMES,
Jan. 11, 1994, at Al (stating that in reaction to the sale of a bullet called the "Black Talon" which unfolded into
a pattern of sharp, metal petals once inside a victim, Dr. Stephen Haragarten wrote an article for the Journal
of Trauma about the dangers of armor-piercing bullet fragments which can easily cut a surgeon's glove); Letter
from Debby Boucher, Legislative Advocate, California Nurses Association, to Assemblymember John Burton
(May 3, 1995) (copy on file with the Pacfic Law Journal) (stating that the jagged edges of armor-piercing
bullets often cut the surgeons and members of the trauma team attempting to identify bullet placement to
remove them, which creates the risk of transmitting AIDS and other infectious diseases).
10. SENATE FLOOR, CoMMrrrm ANALYStS OF AB 99, at 2 (June 15, 1995); see Letter from Jack G.
Wilson, Legislative Affairs. Gun Owners of California Inc., to Senate Republican Caucus Members (May 15,
1995) (copy on file with the Pacfic Law Journal) (arguing that because there are no minimum standards for
the protective vests to be used for the required ammunition testing, resulting prohibitions on ammunition will
vary widely); see also CAl. PENAL CODE § 12323(c) (amended by Chapter 263) (defining "body vest or shield"
as any bullet resistant material intended to provide ballistic and trauma protection for the wearer).
11. SENATE FLOOR, CommrrrEE ANALYSTS OFAB 99, at 2 (June 15, 1995).
12. Telephone Interview with John Carter, supra note 8.
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"body vest or shield."13 Therefore, the definition of ammunition designed
primarily to penetrate metal or armor promulgated by Chapter 263 will eventually
need clarification as to whether "body vest or shield" as used in that definition,




Crimes; fleeing a bicycle officer
Vehicle Code § 2800.1 (amended).
SB 170 (Leonard); 1995 STAT. Ch. 68
Under existing law, it is a misdemeanor for any person while operating a
motor vehicle' to intentionally evade, willfully flee, or otherwise attempt to evade
a pursuing peace officer's2 motor vehicle if certain conditions exist
13. Compare 18 U.S.C.A. § 921(a)(17) (West Supp. 1995) (defining "armor piercing ammunition" as
a projectile or projectile core which can be used in a handgun and constructed entirely of one or a combination
of tungsten alloys, steel, iron, brass, bronze, beryllium copper, or depleted uranium, or a full jacketed projectile
larger than .22 caliber designed and intended for use in a handgun and whose jacket has a weight of more than
25% of the total weight of the projectile, but excluding certain types of ammunition used for hunting, target,
sporting, or industrial purposes) with CAL. PENAL CODE § 12323(b)(2) (amended by Chapter 263) (defining,
as one alternative, "handgun ammunition designed primarily to penetrate metal or armor" as ammunition that
is primarily manufactured or designed, by virtue of its shape, cross-sectional density, or coating applied to it,
to penetrate a body vest or shield).
14. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 11, § 941 (1991) (requiring the State Armor Committee to consist of
representatives from the California Highway Patrol, State Police, Department of Justice, and Office of
Procurement).
1. See CAI. VEH. CODE § 415 (West Supp. 1995) (specifying that a "motor vehicle" is a vehicle which
is self-propelled); id. § 670 (West 1987) (defining "vehicle" as a device that moves person or property upon
a highway, "excepting a device moved exclusively by human power or used exclusively upon stationary rails
or tracks").
2. See CAL PENAL CODE § 830.1 (a) (West Supp. 1995) (providing an exhaustive list of persons who
could be described as "peace officers").
3. Id. § 2800.1(a) (amended by Chapter 68); see id. (enumerating the conditions that make it a
misdemeanor to evade a pursuing peace officer as the following: (1) The peace officer's motor vehicle is
displaying at least one red light visible from the front and the person either sees or reasonably should have seen
the light; (2) the officer's motor vehicle is sounding a siren; (3) the officer's vehicle is marked distinctively;
and (4) the officer's motor vehicle is operated by a peace officer wearing a distinctive uniform); cf. ALA. CODE
§ 32-5A-193(a) (1989) (providing that "any driver of a motor vehicle who willfully fails or refuses to bring
his vehicle to a stop, or who otherwise flees or attempts to elude a pursuing police vehicle, when given a visual
or audible signal to bring the vehicle to a stop, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor"); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
316.1935(1) (West Supp. 1995) (maintaining that it is unlawful for the operator of any vehicle who knows he
has been directed to stop by a duly authorized law enforcement officer to refuse or fail to stop the vehicle in
compliance with such directive or, after having stopped in knowing compliance with the directive to flee in
an attempt to elude the officer); GA. CODE ANN. § 40-6-395(a) (Michie 1995) (indicating that it is unlawful for
any driver to fail or refuse to stop his or her vehicle or otherwise attempt to elude a pursuing police vehicle or
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Chapter 68 makes it a misdemeanor for any person to operate a motor vehicle
in order to evade, flee, or elude a pursuing peace officer's bicycle under specified
conditions
COMMENT
Chapter 68 grants bicycle officers the ability to detain suspects in the same
manner as other law enforcement officers who use motor vehicles.5
The impetus behind the enactment of Chapter 68 was to correct a legal
oversight in the law where a suspect could have evaded an arrest by a bicycle
officer by merely driving away.6 Moreover, Chapter 68 was intended to mimic
law enforcement vehicle laws with respect to stopping motorists and to place
bicycle law enforcement officers on par with vehicle law enforcement officers!
Tad A. Devlin
officer when given a visual or an audible signal to halt the vehicle); IDAHO CODE § 49-1404(1) (1994)
(specifying that any driver who willfully flees or attempts to elude a pursuing police vehicle when given a
signal to stop the vehicle, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor); OHIO. REv. CODEANN. § 2921.331(B) (Anderson
1994) (stating that no person may operate a vehicle so as to elude or flee a police officer after receiving a signal
from a police officer to stop his motor vehicle); OR. REv. STAT. § 811.540(1), (2) (1993) (setting forth the
crime of fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer and setting forth the applicable penalty).
4. CAL. PENAL CODE § 2800.1(b) (amended by Chapter 68); see id. (enumerating the specific
conditions that make it a misdemeanor to evade, willfully flee, or otherwise attempt to elude a pursuing peace
officer's bicycle as the following: (1) The officer's bicycle is distinctively marked; (2) the officer's bicycle is
operated by a peace officer wearing a distinctive uniform; (3) the officer gives a verbal command to stop; (4)
the officer sounds a hom producing a sound of at least 115 decibels; (5) the officer displays a hand signal
commanding the person to halt; and (6) the person is aware or reasonably should have been aware of the verbal
command, hom, and hand signal, but still refuses to comply).
5. SENATE COMzmEm ON CRIMINAL PROcEDURE, ComrrEE ANALYSiS OF SB 170, at 2 (March 21,
1995).
6. Id.; see id. (providing that on a number of occasions drivers have driven away from bicycles officers
after the officers have made contact with the driver of the motor vehicle); id. (noting that flight from a bicycle
officer occurs frequently when a bicycle officer is working in congested traffic situations, and the officer
attempts to pull over a motor vehicle).
7. Telephone Interview with Charles Bacchi, Legislative Assistant for Senator Bill Leonard (Nov. 1,
1995) (notes on file with the Pacific Law Journal); see id. (discussing the legal problem that bicycle officers
were facing when they attempted to pull over motorists, whereby the motorists drove away and there were no
legal penalties for evading the bicycle officer).
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Crimes; Gun-Free School Zone Act
Penal Code § 626.9 (amended).
AB 624 (Allen); 1995 STAT Ch. 659
Under existing law it is a felony, punishable by two, three, or five years in
state prison, for any person, with the exception of certain authorized individuals,'
to possess a firearm 2 in a school zone,3 without special permission,4 where the
person knew or should have known that the area was a school zone. Prior law,
1. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 626.9(/) (amended by Chapter 659) (allowing the following individuals
to possess firearms on school grounds: (1) A California peace officer, (2) a full-time paid peace officer of
another state or the federal government who is carrying out official duties while in California; (3) any person
summoned by these officers to assist in making arrests or preserving the peace; (4) members of the California
state military forces or the United States military forces who are engaged in the performance of their duties;
(5) any person holding a valid license to carry a firearm pursuant to the California Penal Code; and (6) an
armored vehicle guard in the performance of his or her duties); id. § 626.9(m) (amended by Chapter 659)
(permitting a security guard authorized to carry a loaded gun pursuant to California Penal Code § 12031 to
possess a firearm on school grounds); see also id. § 12031(dX4), (5) (West Supp. 1995) (stating that uniformed
security guards employed by a public agency or persons engaged in a lawful business, while acting within the
scope of and course of their employment, are allowed to carry loaded firearms).
2. See id. § 12001(b) (West Supp. 1995) (defining "firearm" as a device designed to be used as a
weapon from which a projectile is expelled through a barrel by force or explosion or other form of
combustion).
3. See id. § 626.9(eX1) (amended by Chapter 659) (defining "school zone" as an area on the grounds
of, or within 1000 feet of, a public or private school providing instruction in kindergarten through the twelfth
grade).
4. See id. § 626.9(b) (amended by Chapter 659) (allowing possession of a firearm on school grounds
with the written permission of the school district superintendent or an equivalent school authority).
5. Id. § 626.9(b) (amended by Chapter 659); see Johnnie B. Beer, Review of Selected 1994 California
Legislation, 26 PAC. LJ. 202, 396 (1995) (discussing the 1994 amendments to California Penal Code § 626.9);
see also In re Joseph G., 32 Cal. App. 4th 1735, 1743, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 902, 907 (1995) (holding that
California Penal Code § 626.9 requires only that a person be in possession of a loaded firearm on school
grounds, while the offense of possession of a loaded firearm, under California Penal Code § 1203 1(a)(1),
requires that the defendant carry the firearm on his or her person or in a vehicle in a public place); cf. FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 810.095(1) (West 1994) (stating it is a felony for a person trespassing on school grounds to
possess a firearm on school property); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4204(a)(5), (6) (Supp. 1994) (stating it is a
misdemeanor to possess, or refuse to remove, a firearm on school grounds or school sponsored event without
permission); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:95.2(A), (D) (West Supp. 1995) (providing that any person who
possesses a firearm on school grounds or in a firearm-free zone shall be imprisoned at hard labor for not more
than five years); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. Ch. 269, § 10(j) (West Supp. 1995) (providing that whoever, despite
any license, carries on his person a firearm, loaded or unloaded, on school grounds, shall be punished by a fine
and/or imprisonment for not more than one year); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:39-5(e) (West Supp. 1994) (stating
that any person who knowingly possesses a firearm or various other weapons on school grounds is guilty of
a crime regardless of any permit or license); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.01(3) (McKinney 1989 & Supp. 1995)
(stating that a person is guilty of criminal possession of a weapon if he knowingly has in his possession a
firearm upon the grounds of any school); R.I. GEN. LAwS § 11-47-60(a), (b) (1994) (stating that no person,
unless exempt, shall have a firearm in his possession on school grounds); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-
1309(bX), (2) (1991) (stating that it is a felony to carry any weapon on school grounds with the intent to go
while armed, but it is only a misdemeanor to merely possess a firearm); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-280(B) (Michie
Supp. 1994) (stating that it is a felony to willfully discharge a firearm on, or within 1000 feet of, school
grounds); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 948.605(2)(a) (West Supp. 1994) (providing that it is a misdemeanor to
knowingly possess a firearm on, or within 1000 feet of, school grounds). Compare People v. Singer, 56 Cal.
App. 3d Supp. 1, 4, 128 Cal. Rptr. 920, 921-22 (1976) (holding that California Penal Code § 626.9 is
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for penalty purposes, did not distinguish between possession of a firearm on
school grounds6 and possession of a firearm within 1000 feet of school grounds.7
Existing law requires that a sentence of two, three, or five years be imposed on
any person who possesses a firearm on the actual grounds of a school Chapter
659 establishes a provision, whereby, depending upon the circumstances, an
individual may be charged with either a misdemeanor or a felony for the
possession of a firearm within 1000 feet of school grounds.9
Chapter 659, except in unusual circumstances,' establishes a three month
minimum sentence for persons convicted of possession of a firearm, on or within
1000 feet of school grounds, who have been previously convicted of specified
constitutional) with United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1630-31 (1995) (holding that the federal Gun-Free
School Zone Act of 1990 is an unconstitutional extension of Congress' power under the Commerce Clause).
6. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 626.9(eX1) (amended by Chapter 659) (specifying that the schools covered
by the statute are public or private schools providing instruction in kindergarten or grades one through twelve);
see also id. § 626.9(h) (amended by Chapter 659) (applying the provisions of Chapter 659 to the University
of California, California State University, California Community Colleges or any private university or college).
7. 1994 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 1015, sec. 1, at 5158-59 (amending CAL. PENAL CODE § 626.9); see id.
(providing that any person who violates the provision will be punished in the state prison for two, three or five
years); see also ASSEMBLY COMMIrrE ON PUBLIC SAFErY, COMMrrEE ANALYSIS OF AB 624, at 1 (Apr. 18,
1995) (mentioning that the law prior to enactment of Chapter 659 did not distinguish between possession of
a firerm on school grounds and possession of a firearm within 1000 feet of school grounds); cf. CAL. PENAL
CODE § 626.9(f)(I)-(3) (amended by Chapter 659) (providing that possession of a firearm on school grounds
shall be punishable in state prison for two, three, or five years, while possession merely within 1000 feet of
school grounds is punishable by either one year or less in county jail or imprisonment in state prison for two,
three, or five years).
8. CAL. PENAL CODE § 626.9((1) (amended by Chapter 659).
9. Id. § 626.9(f)(2XA) (amended by Chapter 659); see id. (establishing a penalty of imprisonment for
two, three, or five years in state prison if: (1) The individual has been previously convicted of a violation of
California Penal Code § 12000, the Dangerous Weapon Control Law; (2) the individual is within the class of
persons prohibited from possessing or acquiring a firearm pursuant to California Penal Code §§ 12021 or
12021.1 or California Welfare and Institutions Code §§ 8100 or 8103; or (3) the firearm is capable of
concealment and the offense is punished as a felony pursuant to California Penal Code § 12025); see also id.
§ 626.9(f02)(B) (amended by Chapter 659) (establishing a penalty that consists of imprisonment for one year
or less in the county jail or by imprisonment in the state prison for two, three, or five years for all violations
other than those specified in California Penal Code § 626.9(f)(2)(A)); id. § 626.9(f)(3) (amended by Chapter
659) (providing that an individual, who with reckless disregard for the safety of others discharges or attempts
to discharge a firearm in a school zone, is to be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for two, three,
or five years); id § 626.9(o) (amended by Chapter 659) (allowing an honorably retired peace officer to possess
a firearm on school grounds if he or she is authorized to carry a concealed or loaded firearm pursuant to
California Penal Code §§ 12027 or 12031).
10. See id § 626.9(g)(4) (amended by Chapter 659) (stating that the court must apply a three month
minimum sentence except where the interests of justice would best be served by granting probation or
suspending the sentence and that the court is required to specify on the record the reasons why justice would
best be served by such a disposition).
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misdemeanors,'" felonies, 2 or firearm related offenses. 3
COMMENT
The purpose of Chapter 659 is to correct the inconsistency that exists where
a person, who would otherwise be guilty of a misdemeanor firearm violation, is
charged with a felony merely because the person passed within 1000 feet of
school grounds.' 4 Additionally, prosecutors are concerned that overcharging a
defendant makes it extremely difficult to persuade sympathetic juries to return
felony convictions. 5 Chapter 659 allows prosecutors to choose between filing
misdemeanor or felony charges where the defendant possessed a firearm in a




11. See id. § 626.9(gX) (amended by Chapter 659) (stating that the specified misdemeanors are those
enumerated in California Penal Code § 12001.6); see also id. § 12001.6(a)-(d) (West Supp. 1995) (providing
that the specified misdemeanors are violations of California Penal Code §§ 245(a)(2) (assault with a firearm),
245(aX3) (assault with a machine gun or assault weapon), 246 (discharge of a firearm at an inhabited dwelling
house or occupied building), 417(a)(2) (drawing or exhibiting a firearm in a threatening manner or during a
fight), and 417(c) (drawing or exhibiting a firearm in the immediate presence of a peace officer)).
12. See id. § 626.9(gX2), (3) (amended by Chapter 659) (stating that the minimum three month sentence
is mandatory if the defendant has been convicted of a felony violation of California Penal Code § 626.9(b) or
(d), and (1) has previously been convicted of a misdemeanor enumerated in California Penal Code § 12601.6,
or (2) has previously been convicted of any felony or of any crime punishable by to California Penal Code §
12000).
13. Id. § 626.9(g)(1)-(4) (amended by Chapter 659); see id. § 12000 (West 1992) (establishing the
Dangerous Weapon Control Law).
14. ASSEmBLYCOMMrrFEEoNPUBLcSAFETY,COMMT-rEEANALYSISOFAB 624, at2 (Apr. 18, 1995);
see CAL PENAL CODE § 12031(a)(1) (West Supp. 1995) (making possession of a loaded firearm in a public
place a misdemeanor); id. § 12025 (West Supp. 1995) (providing that possession of a concealed firearm in
public is punishable as a misdemeanor); see also Guns, Schools and Common Sense, TAMPA TRIB., May 12,
1995, at 14 (discussing the federal firearm-free school zone law and stating that it is impractical to make it a
federal crime merely because someone possessed a weapon too near a school); Mike McCloy, Tempers Flare
Over Bills Aimed at Youths, Guns, PHOENIX GAZETTE, Jan. 25, 1994, at BI (reporting that citizens legally
carrying handguns will get caught up in the criminal justice system because of the unfortunate mistake of
traveling too near a school).
15. ASSEMBLY COMMrTEONPUBC SAFETY, COMMnTEEANALYSIS OF AB 624, at 2 (Apr. 18, 1995);
see Gary T. Lowenthal, Mandatory Sentencing Laws: Undermining the Effectiveness of Determinate
Sentencing Reform, 81 CAL. L. REV. 61, 107 (1993) (outlining conflicts between sentencing laws and
prosecutors' caseload management, conviction rates, and desire for consistent punishments); see also Newton
N. Minow & Fred H. Cate, What the Jury Doesn't Know... Could Hurt You; Using Criminal's Past As
Evidence, WASH. MONTHLY, Sept. 1994, at 18 (stating that in three-strike cases, the defendant may want to
have his past criminal convictions entered into evidence to sway sympathetic jurors).
16. ASSEsMBLyCOMMrTmONPUBIXcSA ETY,COMMrTTEANALYSISOFAB 624. at2 (Apr. 18,1995).
See generally P.S. Kane, Note, Why Have You Singled Me Out? The Use of Prosecutorial Discretion For
Selective Prosecution, 67 ToL. L. REV. 2293, 2294 (1993) (outlining the role and effect of prosecutorial
discretion); DWI Statistics Need Deeper Investigation, NEws & REC. (Greensboro, NC), Jan. 2, 1995, at A6
(stating that American courts wisely give discretion to prosecutors to abandon bad cases to avoid wasting
manpower, court time, and money).
Selected 1995 Legislation
Crimes
Crimes; hate crimes-probation, rewards
Government Code § 50050 (amended); Penal Code §§ 422.75, 422.95,
154.7, 2085.5, 11413 (amended).
SB 911 (Marks); 1995 STAT. Ch. 876
Existing law makes it unlawful to use force, threats, or destruction of
property to interfere with another person's enjoyment of any constitutional right
because of that person's race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, disability,
gender, or sexual orientation t Existing law further provides that an offense
directed against a person because of the factors listed above, which causes bodily
injury or destruction of property in excess of $500, is punishable by up to one
year imprisonment in either a state prison or a county jail and a fine of up to
$10,000.2
Existing law provides that as a condition of probation for specified offenses,3
the court may order the offender to complete a class or program on racial or
1. CAL. PENAL CODE § 422.6(a), (b) (West 1988); see id. § 422.6(c) (West 1988) (providing that a
violation is punishable by incarceration in the county jail for up to one year and/or a fine not exceeding $5000);
see also id. § 13519.6(a) (West Supp. 1995) (calling for the creation of courses to train law enforcement
officials in how to handle hate-crimes); Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. 2194, 2201 (1993) (upholding
Wisconsin's hate crime statute by reasoning that First Amendment protections did not extend to the conduct
prohibited by the statute); In re M.S., 10 Cal. 4th 698, 718, 896 P.2d 1365, 1376, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d 355, 366
(1995) (ruling that California Penal Code § 422.6 was not unconstitutionally vague since it expressly requires
willful behavior); c ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 720, para. 5/12-7.1(a) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1995) (declaring that a hate-
crime is committed when a person assaults, batters, or commits theft of, or trespass to, another person's
property, by reason of the victim's race, religion, gender, ancestry, sexual orientation, or physical or mental
disability); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 22C, § 32 (West 1994) (defining a hate-crime as any overt criminal
act which is motivated by the perpetrator's bigotry and bias). See generally Marguerite Angelari, Hate Crime
Statutes: A Promising Tool for Fighting Violence Against Women, 2 Am. U. J. GENDER & L. 63 (1994)
(exploring how hate-crime statutes may be employed to combat violence against women); Claire Cooper, State
Laws Against Hate Crime Survive Court Challenge, SAcRAMENTo BEE, July 4, 1995, at B4 (discussing how
the California Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the state's hate-crime statute); Lori A. Spillane,
Hate Crimes: Violent Intolerance, THE PROSECUTOR, July/Aug. 1995, at 24 (indicating that in determining
whether to prosecute a crime as one that is bias-motivated, the prosecutor must examine (1) the language used
by the perpetrator, (2) the severity of the attack, (3) lack of provocation, (4) prior contact between the victim
and the suspect, (5) history of similar incidents in the locale, and (6) the absence of any other motive for the
crime).
2. CAL. PENAL CODE § 422.7 (West Supp. 1995); see id. § 422.7(c) (West Supp. 1995) (stating that
a previous violation under California Penal Code § 422.6 will constitute an aggravating factor in the sentencing
of the offender); see also In re M.S., 10 Cal. 4th at 725, 896 P.2d at 1381, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 372 (ruling that
California Penal Code § 422.7 is constitutionally valid since it does not infringe on a person's freedom of
speech, but instead, merely enhances punishment for a misdemeanor which is unlawfully bias-motivated); In
re Joshua H., 13 Cal. App. 4th 1734, 1750, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 291, 301 (1993) (holding that since California
Penal Code § 422.7 proscribed conduct and not speech, it is constitutionally valid).
3. Compare 1991 Cal. Stat. ch. 607, sec. 8. at 21-22 (enacting CAL PENAL CODE § 422.95(a)) (listing
California Penal Code §§ 422.6, 422.7, and 422.75 as the specified offenses) with CAL. PENAL CODE §
422.95(a) (amended by Chapter 876) (specifying California Penal Code §§ 422.6,422.7, 422.75, 594.3, and
11411 as the relevant hate-crimes).
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ethnic sensitivity.4
In addition, existing law makes it unlawful to knowingly5 commit an act of
vandalism against any religious institution.6 Existing law also proscribes
displaying a sign, mark, symbol, emblem, or other physical impression on the
property of another with the purpose of terrorizing7 the owner or occupant of that
property
Chapter 876 provides that any person, who is convicted of a specified hate-
crime,9 may as a condition of probation, be sentenced by the court to complete a
one year counseling program intended to reduce the offender's anti-social
behavior.'0 Chapter 876 also allows the court to order the offender to pay
compensation to the victim" and/or to a community based program organized to
4. CAL PENAL CODE § 422.95(aXI) (amended by Chapter 876); see Id. (providing that the court may
only impose a counselling program as a probation condition if such a program is available); id. § 422.95(c)
(amended by Chapter 876) (declaring that the Legislature intends to reduce the incidence of hate-crimes by
including counseling programs as probation conditions).
5. See id. § 7(5) (West 1988) (defining "knowingly" to mean knowledge that the facts exist which
brings the act or omission within the provisions of the penal code); see also People v. Calban, 65 Cal. App.
3d 578, 584, 135 Cal. Rptr. 441, 444 (1976) (explaining that the word "knowing" in a criminal statute only
requires an awareness of the facts which bring the proscribed act within the terms of the statute).
6. CAL PENAL CODE § 594.3(a) (West 1988); see id. (providing that an offense is punishable by up
to one year incarceration in the county jail); id. § 594.3(b) (West 1988) (stating that any act of vandalism
against a religious institution which is committed because of the race, color, religion, or national origin of
another person or group to deter people from exercising their religious beliefs, is punishable by imprisonment
in the state prison); cf. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-7-26(a) (1992) (declaring that a person who maliciously defaces
or desecrates a place of worship is guilty of vandalism); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 574.085(1) (Vernon 1995) (defining
the crime of institutional vandalism as any vandalizing, defacing, or damaging of any place of worship).
7. See CAL. PEmALCODE § 11411 (d) (West 1992) (defining "terrorizing" as causing an ordinary person
to fear for his or her personal safety).
8. Icd § 11411(a) (West 1992); see id. (providing that an offense is punishable by incarceration in the
county jail for up to one year, and/or a fine not exceeding $15,000); id. § 11411(b) (West 1992) (making
repeated offenses punishable by incarceration in the state prison for a term ranging from 16 months to 3 years,
and/or a fine of up to $10,000; or by imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding one year and/or a fine not
exceeding $5000); id. § 11411(c) (West 1992) (providing that it is unlawful to desecrate or bum a religious
symbol on another person's property for the purpose of terrorizing that person); see also In re Steven S., 25
Cal. App. 4th 598, 615-16, 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d 644, 653 (1994) (ruling that California Penal Code § 11411(c) was
not unconstitutional since it was directed against acts of terrorism against private property, rather than the
expression of ideas). But see R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2547 (1992) (finding that a municipal
ordinance making it unlawful to place any symbol or object on the property of another knowing that it would
tend to arouse anger or alarm in others on the basis of race, creed, religion or gender, facially violated the First
Amendment since it prohibited speech based solely on the subjects addressed). See generally Lisa S.L. Ho,
Comment, Substantive Penal Hate Crime Legislation: Toward Defining Constitutional Guidelines Following
the R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul and Wisconsin v. Mitchell Decisions, 34 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 711 (1994)
(attempting to reconcile the seemingly contradictory decisions in R.A.V. and Mitchell).
9. See CAL PENAL CODE § 422.95(a) (amended by Chapter 876) (listing California Penal Code §§
422.6,422.7, 422.75, 594.3, and 11411 as the specified hate-crimes).
10. Id. § 422.95(a)(1) (amended by Chapter 876); see id. (providing that the one year counselling
program may be imposed as an alternative to a class or program on ethnic sensitivity); id. (requiring the
counselling program to be developed or authorized in cooperation with organizations within the affected
community).




provide services to victims of hate crimes. 2
Existing law also provides for sentence enhancements for felonies committed
because of the victim's race, color, religion, nationality, country of origin,
ancestry, disability, or sexual orientation. 3
Chapter 876 provides that the court may enhance the sentence of any person
convicted of committing a felony against the property of any public or private
institution 4 because of that institution's association with a person or group of an
identifiable race, color, religion, nationality, country of origin, ancestry,
disability, or sexual orientation.' s
Existing law also makes it a felony for a person to explode, ignite, or
12. Id. § 422.95(a)(2) (amended by Chapter 876); see id. § 422.95(a)(3) (amended by Chapter 876)
(specifying that the defendant may be liable to the victim for the reasonable costs of counselling and other
expenses the victim has incurred as a result of the attack); id. § 422.95(b) (amended by Chapter 876)
(mandating that a defendant must pay any restitution payments in whole before making any payments ordered
under this section); see also CAL. CIV. CODE § 52(a) (West Supp. 1995) (providing that whoever violates
another's civil rights is liable for up to three times the actual damages-in no case less than $1000--and any
additional attorney fees); cf ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 720, para. 5/12-7.1 (b) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1995) (authorizing
the court to order a defendant convicted of a hate-crime to perform 200 hours of public service as a probation
condition); id. ch. 720, para. 5/12-7.1(c) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1995) (allowing courts to order a defendant
convicted of a hate-crime to compensate the victim for emotional distress, punitive damages, and attorney
fees); id. ch. 730, para. 515-5.3(c)(2)(L) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1995) (authorizing the court to order a defendant
convicted for a subsequent hate-crime to pay restitution to the victim); IOWA CODE ANN. § 729A.5 (West 1993)
(providing that the victim of a hate-crime may bring a civil action against the offender for injunctive relief,
general and special damages, and attorneys fees); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 850(D) (West Supp. 1995)
(providing that a person convicted of malicious intimidation because of race, color, religion, ancestry, national
origin, or disability, may be held civilly liable for any damages caused by the offense); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-
42.1(A) (Michie 1992) (allowing the victim of a hate crime to seek injunctive relief and/or civil damages).
13. CAL PENAL CODE § 422.75 (amended by Chapter 876); see id. § 422.75(a) (amended by Chapter
876) (providing that a person convicted of a hate-crime will receive an additional term of one to three years
in the state prison); id. § 422.75(c) (amended by Chapter 876) (providing that a person who voluntarily
commits a hate crime in concert with another will receive an additional term of two to four years in the state
prison); id. § 422.75(d) (amended by Chapter 876) (listing the use of a firearm by the defendant in the
commission of a hate-crime as an aggravating factor); id. § 422.75(e) (amended by Chapter 876) (providing
that a person convicted of a hate-crime will receive an additional year in the state prison for each prior hate-
crime conviction); see also People v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 4th 735, 741, 896 P.2d 1387, 1390, 42 Cal. Rptr.
2d 377, 381 (1995) (declaring that a conviction under California Penal Code § 422.75 requires that the bias-
motivation must have been a substantial factor in bringing about the crime).
14. See CAL. PENALCODE § 422.75(b) (amended by Chapter 876) (specifying that institutions include
schools, educational facilities, libraries, community centers, meeting halls, or the offices of advocacy groups).
15. Id.; see 1d. (providing that the offender will receive an additional term from one to three years in
the state prison); cf. IOWA CODE ANN § 716.8(3) (West 1993) (declaring that a person who trespasses on the
property of another with the intent to commit a hate-crime is guilty of a serious misdemeanor); id. § 716.8(4)
(West 1993) (indicating that a person is guilty of an aggravated misdemeanor if he or she trespasses onto the
property of another with the intent to commit a hate-crime which results in bodily harm); Wis. STAT. ANN, §
939.645(2)(c) (West Supp. 1994) (stating that a court may increase a defendant's sentence by up to five years
where the defendant has committed a felony against property on the basis of the owner or occupant's race,
religion, disability, sexual orientation, or ancestry).
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attempt16 to explode or ignite any destructive device, 17 or to commit arson, 18on
or about any place specified by law,' 9 with the purpose of terrorizing another
person.20
Chapter 876 adds private property that is targeted because of the race, color,
religion, ancestry, national origin, disability, gender, or sexual orientation of the
owner or occupant, to the list of specified places.2 t
Existing law also authorizes the Governor to offer a reward' for information
leading to the arrest and conviction of any person who has committed a specified
offense. 3
Chapter 876 adds certain hate-crimes24 which result in serious bodily injury
or destruction of property in excess of $10,000 to the list of crimes for which the
Governor may offer a reward for the arrest and conviction of the perpetrator."
16. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 21a (West 1988) (defining "attempt" as consisting of two elements: a
specific intent to commit a crime, and a direct but ineffectual act done towards its completion).
17. See id. § 12301(a) (West 1992) (indicating that the term, "destructive device," includes: (1) any
projectile containing explosive or incendiary material; (2) any bomb, grenade, rocket or explosive missile; (3)
any weapon of a caliber greater than .60; or (4) any breakable container which contains a flammable liquid).
18. See id. § 451 (West Supp. 1995) (dictating that a person who willfully and maliciously sets fire to,
or aids in setting fire to, any structure or property is guilty of the crime of arson); id. § 45 1(a) (West Supp.
1995) (mandating that a person who commits arson which causes bodily harm may be sentenced to the state
prison for five to nine years); id. § 451(b) (West Supp. 1995) (declaring that a person who sets fire to an
inhabited structure may receive a sentence of three to eight years in the state prison); idU § 45 1.5(a) (West Supp.
1995) (indicating that one who sets fire to a building or a structure with the intent to cause bodily harm may
be guilty of aggravated arson).
19. See id. § 11413(b)(1)-(7) (amended by Chapter 876) (listing specified places as licensed health
facilities, places of worship, meeting places and offices of pro-and anti-abortion groups, bookstores or libraries,
courthouses, and homes and offices of judicial officers); id. § 11413(b)(8) (amended by Chapter 876) (adding
probation department facilities to the list).
20. Id. § 11413 (amended by Chapter 876); see id. § 11413(a) (amended by Chapter 876) (providing
that an offense is punishable by incarceration in the state prison for a term ranging from three to seven years
and/or a fine of up to $10,000).
21. Id. § 11413(b)(9) (amended by Chapter 876).
22. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12031(b) (West 1992) (requiring the Governor to keep an account of all
rewards offered).
23. CAL PENAL CODE § 1547 (amended by Chapter 876); see id. § 1547(a) (amended by Chapter 876)
(setting the limit of the reward which may be offered at $50,000); id. § 1547 (a)(1)-(10) (amended by Chapter
876) (listing offenses for which the Governor may offer a reward); U § 1547(a)l 1) (amended by Chapter 876)
(providing that the Governor may offer a reward for the arrest of any person who sets fire to a property
designated as a hazardous fire zone); id. § 1547(b) (amended by Chapter 876) (providing that the Governor
may offer a reward of $100,000 for the capture of a person who kills a peace officer or fire fighter who is acting
in the line of duty); see also Lees v. Colgan, 120 Cal. 262, 267, 52 P. 502, 503-44 (1898) (ruling that it was
against public policy to allow police officers to receive rewards offered by the Governor).
24. See CAL. PENALCODE § 1547(aX12), (13) (amended by Chapter 876) (declaring that rewards may
be offered for violations of California Penal Code § 422.75 and § 11411).
25. Id.; see id. § 1547(a)(13) (amended by Chapter 876) (providing that the Governor may only offer
a reward for a violation of California Penal Code § 11411 if it is determined that the act is one in a series of
similar or related acts).
Selected 1995 Legislation
Crimes
Chapter 876 also retains existing law authorizing the Director of Corrections 2
to collect monies owing on a restitution order27 from a parolee, and to transfer
these amounts to the State Board of Control' for payment to the victim29 or for
deposit in the restitution fund.3"
Finally, existing law mandates that any collected restitution money which is
unclaimed after a three year period is to be deposited into the restitution fund?'
Chapter 876 provides that any unclaimed money in a local agency's 32treasury
may also be used to fund victim services.33
COMMENT
Chapter 876 was enacted in an effort to discourage the increase in hate
crimes34 by imposing additional probationary requirements, such as restitution
26. See id. § 5051 (West Supp. 1995) (indicating that the Director must be appointed by the Governor
with the Senate's consent); id. § 5053 (West 1982) (proclaiming that the Director is the chief administrative
officer of the Department of Corrections); id § 5054 (West 1982) (entrusting the Director with the supervision
of the state prisons, and the responsibility for the care, custody, and treatment of the inmates).
27. See id. § 1202.4(b) (west Supp. 1995) (permitting the court to impose a restitution fine on any
person convicted of a crime proportional to the gravity of the offense); see also id. (establishing that a
restitution fine for a felony may range from $200 to $10,000, and a restitution fine for a misdemeanor may
range from $100 to $1000); id § 1202.4(d) (west Supp. 1995) (setting forth the factors a court may consider
in determining the amount of a defendant's restitution fine); id. § 1202.4(g) (West Supp. 1995) (listing the
various losses for which a victim may receive restitution). See generally id. § 1202.4(a)(1) (West Supp. 1995)
(expressing the Legislature's intent that a victim of a crime should receive restitution directly from the
defendant convicted of the crime).
28. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 13901 (West 1992) (recognizing the existence of the Board of Control,
which is composed of the Director of General Services, the Controller, and a third member appointed by the
Governor); see also id §§ 13920-13928 (West 1992 & Supp. 1995) (setting forth the powers and duties of the
Board of Control).
29. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1202.4(k) (West Supp. 1995) (declaring that for purposes of restitution,
the term "victim" includes the victim's surviving immediate family).
30. Id. § 2085.5(a), (b) (amended by Chapter 876); see SENATE FLOOR, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB
911, at 4 (Sept. 8, 1995) (declaring that SB 911 is intended to prevent SB 1095, which amended California
Penal Code § 2085.5, from becoming operative). Compare 1995 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 876, sec. 4, at 5191-92
(amending CAL. PENALCoDE § 2085.5(d)) (stating that where a parolee owes money on a restitution fine, the
Director may collect the money from the parolee and transfer that amount to the State Board of Control) with
1995 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 377, sec. 6. at 1693-94 (amending CAL. PENAL CODE § 2085.5(d), intended to
become operative on January 1, 1996) (requiring the Director to collect money for a restitution order from a
parolee before collecting money for a restitution fine).
31. CAL GOV'T CODE § 50050 (amended by Chapter 876); see id. (permitting the local treasurer to
publish notice of the unclaimed funds in a local newspaper at the expiration of the three-year period).
32. See id. (including all districts within the term, "local agency").
33. Id.; cf. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 1568.2(A) (West Supp. 1995) (permitting the Juvenile Court to
distribute unclaimed restitution funds to elderly victims of crimes who have not received restitution); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 46-18-250(1) (1993) (authorizing unclaimed restitution funds to be deposited in a county's
restitution fund); ki. § 46-18-250(2) (1993) (providing that funds in the county restitution fund may be used
to pay victims who are not receiving restitution because the offender is unable to pay).
34. See SENAT FLOOR, CopMIorTEE ANALYSIS OFSB 911, at 4 (Sept. 8, 1995) (reporting that 332 hate
crimes were committed against homosexuals in Los Angeles last year, a 53% increase); SENATE CoMrtIr11
ON APPROPRIATIONS, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 911, at 2 (May 15, 1995) (observing that approximately
5000 hate crimes had been committed statewide according to preliminary numbers released by the Attorney
General's Office); SENATE COMMrM EON CRIMNAL PROCEDURE, CMMrITE ANALYSIS OFSB 911, at 3 (Apr.
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and counselling programs,35 and creating sentence enhancements for certain hate-
related offenses.36
In addition, Chapter 876 was created to deal with the rise in the use of
explosives and firebombs as weapons of terror against victims chosen on the basis
of their race.37
Chapter 876 is also intended to assist in reducing the number of hate crimes
that go unsolved and unpunished.38 Proponents hope that the offering of rewards
will lead to more apprehensions and convictions of hate crime perpetrators.39
A. James Kachmar
4, 1995) (indicating that the number of hate crimes being committed has increased despite legislation creating
new crimes and imposing sentence enhancements); see also Tony Bizjak, Crimes Against Asians Tallied,
SACRAMENTO BEE, Apr. 25, 1994, at BI (reporting that of 8918 hate crimes committed in 1992, 3.4% were
against Asian-Americans); Denise Hamilton, Violence Against Minorities on the Rise, L.A. TIMES, May 17,
1994, at B I (observing that hate crimes were becoming more violent with assaults constituting almost one-third
of all hate crimes committed in Los Angeles County, California, in 1993). See generally Anthony S. Winer,
Hate Crimes, Homosexuals, and the Constitution, 29 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 387 (1994) (detailing the rise
of hate crimes being committed against homosexuals).
35. See Impact of Counseling on Skinheads Seen as 'Positive,'L.A. TIMES, Jan. 5, 1994, at B2 (noting
that a three-day counseling program had a positive impact on gang members accused of hate crimes). But see
Bettina Boxall & Frederick Muir, Prosecutors Taking Harder Line Toward Spouse Abuse, L.A. TIMES, July
11, 1994, at Al (reporting that some prosecutors believe imprisonment is a better method of deterring offenses
such as spousal abuse than counselling).
36. SENATE FLOOR, COMMnT EANALYSTS oFSB 911, at 3 (May 23,1995); see ASSEMBLY COMMrITEE
ON APPROPRIATIONS, COMMrrrEE ANALYSiS OF SB 911, at 2 (Aug. 23, 1995) (observing that on average, only
four people each year are incarcerated in the State prison for hate crimes); SENATE COMMrrFEE ON CRIMINAL
PROCEDUR, COMM=TT ANALYSTS OF SB 911, at 6 (Apr. 4, 1995) (stating that the sentence enhancements for
hate crimes committed against the property of a public institution were enacted to deal with situations where
a crime is committed against property that is identified with a particular group, but not owned by it). But see
SENATE COMMrrErM ON CRMIAL PROCEDURE, supra, at 6 (quoting a letter sent by the California District
Attorneys Association requesting lawmakers to refrain from enacting piecemeal sentencing increases which
tend to complicate criminal sentencing).
37. SENATE COMM=TTEE ON CRUmmAL PROCEDURE, COMMrr'rEE ANALySIs OF SB 911, at 5 (Apr. 4,
1995); see id. (observing that there had been many instances where explosives or fire had been used in the
commission of hate crimes); id. (stating that the use of explosives or fire should be added to the hate crime
section because of the dangerous nature of explosives and their potential harm to bystanders); see also Ramon
Coronado & Robert Davila, Campos Guilty of 5 Bomb Charges, SACRAMENTO BEE, Aug. 30, 1994, at Al
(reporting the conviction of Richard Campos for a string of firebombings in Sacramento, California, in 1993);
id. (explaining that Campos was convicted for, among other things, firebombing a Chinese-American
councilmember's home and the Sacramento offices of the Department of Fair Employment).
38. SENATE FLOOR, COMMITrE ANALYSIS OF SB 911, at 4 (May 23, 1995); see ASSEMBLY FLOOR,
COMMrrrE ANALYSIS OF SB 911, at 4 (Aug. 31, 1995) (estimating that more than 90% of all hate crimes go
unsolved); SENATE CommInTEE ON CRuNAL PROCEDURE, CoMMrrEF ANALYSIS OF SB 911, at 4 (Apr. 4,
1995) (describing an attack on a gay couple in San Francisco, California, that went unsolved where one victim
was struck by the attacker's car and shot).




Fish and Game Code § 2010 (amended).
AB 1305 (Bowler); 1995 STAT. Ch. 321
Existing law prohibits an individual from using or possessing a shotgun' that
is larger than 10-gauge or capable of holding more than six cartridges at one
time.2 California case law has construed this provision to apply only to those
possessing such shotguns for the purpose of hunting.3 Chapter 321 clarifies
existing law by adding language to the statute, which specifically limits its
application to those whose purpose is to take any mammal or bird. Chapter 321
also defines the cartridge capacity of guns that have been modified by means of
a plug5 as the capacity after modification. 6 Chapter 321 authorizes the Fish and
Game Commission to place further limitations on shotguns used for hunting once
a public hearing has taken place.
7
COMMENT
Prior to Chapter 321, California Fish and Game Code section 2010 had not
been amended since its enactment in 1957.8 The purpose of Chapter 321 is to
clarify the statutory provision so as to harmonize the section with the case law
interpreting it.9 By resolving any ambiguities in the statute, the Legislature
1. See CAL. PEN. CODE § 12020(c)(21) (West Supp. 1995) (defining "shotgun" as a weapon
manufactured and intended to be fired from the shoulder and using the explosive energy in a fixed shotgun
shell, which fires either a single projectile or multiple projectiles through a smooth bore each time the trigger
is pulled).
2. CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 2010 (amended by Chapter 321).
3. Ex Parte Peterson, 119 Cal. 578, 578 (1898); see id. (interpreting former CAL. PENAL CODE § 627
(1897 Cal. Stat. ch. 89, sec. 11, at 92) (current version at CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 2010)); id. (stating that
it was not the Legislature's intent that the statute apply to all situations where one possesses a shotgun, rather
only to those in which a shotgun is used to kill game or other animals); see also 65 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 76, 81
(1982) (concluding that California's fish and game laws do not prohibit the possession and use of a shotgun
that holds more than six cartridges for purposes other than hunting).
4. CAL FISH & GAME CODE § 2010 (amended by Chapter 321); cf. GA. CODE ANN. § 27-3-4(3) (1993)
(limiting shotguns to 20 gauge when hunting deer, bear, or feral hogs, unless using slugs or buckshot); NEV.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 503.150(l)(a) (Michie Supp. 1993) (restricting shotguns used for hunting game birds or
game mammals to a maximum of 10-gauge); VA. CODE ANN. § 29.1-519(A)(1) (Michie 1992) (prohibiting the
use of a shotgun which is larger than 10-gauge for hunting wild animals or wild birds).
5. See WEBSTER'S NEw INT'L DicroNARY 1743 (3d ed. 1931) (defining "plug" as a piece of wood
or metal that is placed in the magazine of a repeating shotgun to reduce the magazine's ammunition capacity),
6. CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 2010 (amended by Chapter 321); cf. GA. CODE ANN. § 27-3-4(5)(A),
(B) (Michie 1993) (permitting the use of plugs to modify shotguns so as to be in compliance with the law so
long as the plug is one piece and incapable of being removed through the loading end of the gun).
7. CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 2010 (amended by Chapter 321); see CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 20(b)
(creating a five member Fish and Game Commission to be appointed by the Governor and approved by the
Senate for six-year terms).
8. 1957 Cal. Stat. ch. 456, sec. 2010, at 1342 (enacting CAL. FISH& GAME CODE § 2010).
9. SENATE COiMMrrrEE ON NATURAL REsoURcEs AND WIULuF, COMImsrM ANALYSIS OF AB 1305,
at 2 (June 27, 1995).
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intends to assist law enforcement officials with the correct application of the
law.10
Stricter regulations regarding the taking of specific types of animals may be
adopted without conflicting with California Fish and Game Code section 2010;
however, they may not exceed those limits established by section 2010.1
Shotguns are subject to other statutory and regulatory restrictions as well. Loaded
shotguns may not be stored in a vehicle which is either standing or moving on a
public roadway."2 Setting, causing to be set, or placing a trap gun is also
prohibited.13 California regulations require that only steel or other nontoxic shot,
which has been approved by the United States Fish and Wildlife Service, may be
used when hunting waterfowl, American coot, and common moorhen. 4 While
these provisions affect the use of shotguns, California Fish and Game Code
section 2010 pertains to the specifications of the shotgun itself.'
5
Christopher P. Blake
10. Id.; see SENATE COMMItrEE ON CRDmNAL PRocEDURE, COMMrrEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1305, at 3
(July 11, 1995) (reporting anecdotal evidence that State Fish and Game Wardens have cited individuals who
were involved in trap shooting or target practice and confiscated their guns under authority of California Fish
and Game 1 2010 when such activities are not prohibited by that section).
11. 65 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 76, 81 (1982); see id. (considering any other stricter provisions to be
exceptions to California Fish and Game Code § 2010); cf. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 353(b) (1994) (limiting
shotguns to a maximum capacity of three shells when hunting deer, bear, or wild pigs); id. § 551(b)(2) (1994)
(prohibiting a person from possessing or firing a shotgun larger than a 12-gauge in designated widlife areas).
12. CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 2006 (West 1984); see id. (defining "loaded" as an unexpended
cartridge or shell in the firing chamber).
13. Id. § 2007 (West 1984); see id. (defining a "trap gun" as a loaded firearm which is attached to a
string or other instrument which enables it to be discharged).
14. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 507.1 (1995). See generally Bruce B. Weyrauch, Waterfowl and Lead
Shot, 16 ENvTL L. 883, 893-99 (discussing the vulnerability of waterfowl and other wildlife to the damaging
effects of lead poisoning through the digestion of lead shot).
15. CAL FISH & GAME CODE § 2010 (amended by Chapter 321).
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Crimes; income tax-fraudulent returns
Revenue and Taxation Code §§ 18626, 19720, 19721 (new).
SB 633 (Kopp); 1995 STAT. Ch. 845
Under existing law, a person failing to comply with California's tax laws is
subject to various penalties! Existing law also allows for the seizure of any
computer equipment that is used to commit a crime.2
Chapter 845 declares that electronic filing is included in the term "return" for
purposes relating to the filing of fraudulent returns? Chapter 845 also makes it
I. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE §§ 19701-19717 (West 1994 & Supp. 1995); see id. § 19701(a) (West
1994) (providing that any person who fails to file a return, or fraudulently files a return, may be punished by
a fine of not more than $5000); id. 19701(b) (West 1994) (permitting a $5000 penalty to be levied against any
person who assists another person in evading taxes); id. § 19701.5(a), (b) (West Supp. 1995) (providing that
any person who signs his or her spouse's name to a tax return or file3 a tax return electronically, without that
spouse's consent, is guilty of a misdemeanor and may be sentenced to one year imprisonment and/or a $5000
fine); id. § 19705(a) (West 1994) (listing various tax-evading activities that are punishable by a fine of up to
$20,000 andor imprisonment for up to three years); id. § 19706 (West 1994) (declaring that any corporation
employee who fails to file the corporation's tax return, or fraudulently files a return, may be fined up to
$20,000 and/or imprisoned for not more than one year); id. § 19708 (West 1994) (indicating that any person
who willfully fails to collect or account for any tax due, may be additionally punished by a fine not exceeding
$2000 and/or imprisoned in the state prison); id. § 19709 (West 1994) (making it a misdemeanor punishable
by a fine of up to $1000 and/or incarceration for up to one year, for any person to fail to withhold or to pay
over any withheld tax); id. § 19711 (West 1994) (providing that any person who fails to supply information
to his or her employer which might result in an increase in his or her taxes, may be punished by a fine not
exceeding $1000 and/or imprisonment for up to one year); id. § 19712 (West 1994) (stating that any tax
preparer who endorses or negotiates any warrant issued to a tax payer, may be fined up to $1000 and/or
imprisoned for up to one year); id § 19713(a) (West 1994) (declaring that any person who fails to comply with
California Revenue and Taxation Code § 190O9(b), is guilty of a misdemeanor and may be fined not more than
$5000 and/or imprisoned for up to one year); id. § 19714 (West 1994) (making it punishable by a fine of up
to $5000 for any taxpayer to institute any frivolous proceeding with the intent to cause delay); see also Id. §
19009(b) (West 1994) (mandating that an employer who has collected any tax, must deposit that money in a
separate bank account within California until it is paid over to the Franchise Tax Board). See generally People
v. Allen, 20 Cal. App. 4th 846, 855, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 26, 31 (1993) (ruling that a failure to file a tax return is
a public welfare offense, and therefore it is not necessary to show criminal intent); People v. Roper, 1,4 Cal.
App. 3d 1033, 1042, 193 Cal. Rptr. 15, 20-21 (1983) (finding that a statute which made it unlawful to file
fraudulent tax returns did not violate a defendant's right to privacy); People v. Rosseau, 129 Cal. App. 3d 526,
533, 179 Cal. Rptr. 892, 895 (1982) (upholding defendant's conviction for a failure to pay employee taxes
where the defendant had substantial control over the corporation); People v. Singer, 115 Cal. App. 3d Supp.
7, 10-11, 171 Cal. Rptr. 587, 588 (1980) (finding evidence that a defendant had money to pay taxes she owed
sufficient to support a conviction for willfully failing to account for employee withholdings and taxes).
2. CAL. PENAL CODE § 502.01 (West Supp. 1995); cf. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-45-7(A)(1) (Michie
1989) (declaring that any computer equipment which is used to violate the state's Computer Crimes Act, is
subject to forfeiture). See generally Robert M. Couch, Note, A Suggested Legislative Approach to the Problem
of Computer Crime, 38 WASH. & LEE L. REV 1173 (1981) (discussing a nationwide increase in computer crime
and some new methods of policing required to deal with it).
3. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 18626 (enacted by Chapter 845). See generally Elizabeth Douglass,
Electronic Tax Filing Has Its Bugs But Despite This Year's Problems, It's the Coming Thing, SAN DIEGO
UNioN-TRi., Apr. 1, 1995, at Al (reporting that 14 million federal tax returns were filed electronically in
1994); id (estimating that 80 million federal tax returns will be filed electronically by the year 2000); Elizabeth
Douglass, Electronically: Not Free, Not Too Hard, SANDIEGO UNIoN-TRim., Apr. 1, 1995, at A19 (describing
the process by which one may file an electronic tax return).
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unlawful for a person, either knowingly 4 or with intent to defraud,5 to fraudulently
file, or to assist6 someone else in fraudulently filing an income tax return for an
income tax refund which he or she is not entitled to receive. In addition, Chapter
845 provides that an individual's signature on an income tax refund check is
prima facie evidence to support a conviction!
4. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 7(5) (West 1988) (defining "knowingly" as having knowledge that facts
exist which bring about an act, but not requiring the knowledge that the act is itself unlawful); see also People
v. Calban, 65 Cal. App. 3d 578, 584, 135 Cal. Rptr. 441,444 (1976) (rejecting the argument that ajury must
be instructed as to specific intent where the statute employs the word, "knowing," since its use imports only
an awareness of the facts which bring the act within the terms of the statute).
5. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 8 (West 1988) (stating that there is sufficient evidence where it appears
that any person intended to defraud another person, association, body politic, or corporation); cf. CAL. Civ.
CODE § 1572 (West 1982) (defining "actual fraud" as consisting of any of the following acts by a contract party
with the intent to deceive another party to enter into the contract: (1) The suggestion that a fact may be true
by one who does not believe it to be true; (2) the positive assertion of that which is not true, although the
declarant believes it to be true, in a manner not warranted by the information possessed by the declarant; (3)
the suppression of the truth; (4) a promise made without any intention of performance; and (5) any other act
intended to deceive).
6. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 31 (West 1988) (providing that any person who aids or abets in the
commission of a crime shall be considered to be a principal in the commission of the crime); see also People
v. Demes, 220 Cal. App. 2d 423, 432, 33 Cal. Rptr. 896, 901 (1963) (stating that the test for determining
whether someone is an aider and abettor is whether that person, directly or indirectly, aided the perpetrator by
acts or gave encouragement by words or gestures), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 946 (1964); People v. Etie, 119 Cal.
App. 2d 23, 28, 258 P.2d 1069, 1072 (1953) (holding that it is not necessary to prove felonious intent to
support a conviction for aiding and abetting).
7. CAL. RPv. & TAx. CODE §§ 19720(a), 19721(a) (enacted by Chapter 845); see id. § 19720(a)
(enacted by Chapter 845) (declaring that any person who knowingly commits a crime under Chapter 845 can
be punished by a fine not exceeding $5000); id. § 19720(d) (enacted by Chapter 845) (providing that a person
who knowingly files for a tax refund which he or she is not entitled to receive is guilty of a misdemeanor and
may be punished by incarceration not to exceed one year and/or a fine of up to $10,000, at the court's
discretion); id. § 19721(a) (enacted by Chapter 845) (permitting a fine of up to $10,000 to be levied against
any person who, with the intent to defraud, violated the provisions of Chapter 845); id. § 19721(h) (enacted
by Chapter 845) (mandating that any person who, with the intent to defraud, violates the provisions of Chapter
845 may, at the court's discretion, be sentenced for up to one year in the county jail or state prison, and/or
receive a fine not to exceed $20,000 plus the costs of the investigation and prosecution); cf. N.Y. TAx LAW §§
1804(a), 1807(a) (McKinney 1987) (making it a misdemeanor to file, or to assist another in filing, a fraudulent
tax return with the intent to evade a tax); Id. §§ 1804(b), 1807(b) (McKinney 1987) (providing that any person
who substantially understates his or her tax liability, or assists another person in understating his or her tax
liability, with the intent to evade a tax is guilty of a felony); UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-1--401(9)(b) (Supp. 1994)
(providing that any person who, with intent to defraud, files a false or fraudulent tax return can be fined from
$1000 to $5000).
8. CAL REv. &TAx. CODE §§ 19720(b), 19721(c) (enacted by Chapter 845); see il § 19705(c) (West
Supp. 1995) (stating that an individual's signature on a return, statement, or other filed document, will
constitute prima facie evidence that the return, statement, or document has been signed by him or her); id. §
19703 (West 1994) (providing that a certificate issued by the Franchise Tax Board that states that a tax return
has not been filed is prima facie evidence that the return has not been filed); see also 26 U.S.C.A. § 6064 (West
1989) (declaring that a person's name signed to a return shall constitute prima facie evidence that the person
has signed the return); United States v. Crooks, 804 F.2d 1441, 1448 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that there was
sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction against the defendant for knowingly filing a false return where the
defendant had signed the return); United States v. Carrodeguas, 747 F.2d 1390, 1396 (1Ith Cir. 1984) (finding
that the defendant's signature on his return was prima facie evidence that he had actually signed them, which
could have been rebutted by the defendant); cf ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 35, para. 5/503(a) (Smith-Hurd 1993)
(stating that the fact a person's name is signed to a return shall be considered prima facie evidence for all




The Internal Revenue Service has noticed an increase in tax fraud over the
past few years, especially with the increase in the use of electronic filing of tax
returns.9 Chapter 845 was enacted to deter the filing, electronically or by mail, of
fraudulent claims for income tax refunds.'0 Proponents of Chapter 845 believe
that allowing the signature on a refund check as evidence will significantly help
with electronic fraud prosecutions."
A. James Kachmar
Crimes; mandatory work release programs
Penal Code § 4024.3 (new).
SB 485 (Solis); 1995 STAT. Ch. 106
Under existing law, the board of supervisors 'of any county may authorize the
sheriff or other equivalent county correctional facility official2 to offer a voluntary
9. SENATE RuLEs COMMr~rEE, CommIr EENANALYSIS OF SB 633, at 2 (May 23, 1995); see SENATE
COMmiTFEEON RvEN AND TAXATION, COMMiTEE ANALYSIS OFSB 633, at2 (Apr. 5, 1995) (reporting that
the I.R.S. had observed that incidents of electronic filing fraud had increased from 5700 returns in 1990 to
34,500 returns in 1993, with the amount of illegal claims increasing from $17 million to S79 million); Aaron
Nathans, IRS Moves to Block 'Rapid Refind' Scar Artists Fraud, L.A. TIMEs, Oct. 27, 1995, at A24 (quoting
U.S. Treasury officials as estimating that fraudulent tax filings cost the federal government about $5 billion
each year); Robert A. Rosenblatt, IRS Loses Millions in Fraud with Electronic Tax Filing Crime, L.A. TIMES,
Feb. 11, 1994, at Al (reporting that incidents of electronically filing false returns had increased over 105% in
1993); David G. Savage, Nine Indicted for Alleged Electronic Tax Fraud, L.A.TIMEs, May 23, 1991, at D2
(discussing how a group of nine people in Los Angeles had been indicted for electronically filing false tax
returns by using fictitious names).
10. SENATE CoMMrrEE ON REVENUE AND TAXATION, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 633, at 2 (Apr. 5,
1995); see id. (observing that deterring tax fraud will reduce tax losses to the state's General Fund); Fact Sheet
on SB 633, from the Office of Senator Quentin Kopp (Aug. 2, 1995) (copy on file with the Pacific Law
Journal) (suggesting that the problem of fraud posed by electronic tax filing was created by the Franchise Tax
Board's efforts to move toward a paperless filing system). See generally Jim H. Zamora, Tax Cheaters
Entering the ComputerAge, L.A. TLMv, Aug. 25, 1991, at BI (reporting that a group in Southern California
was charged with filing more than 200 fraudulent tax returns for refunds exceeding $500,000).
11. SENATE COMMrrIEEONAPPROPRIATIONS, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 633, at 2 (May 15, 1995);
see id. (observing that with the use of electronic filing, the endorsed refund check is usually the only evidence
that fraud has been committed); SENATE COMMrITEE ON CVRMINAL IF.OCEDURE, COMMrInEE ANALYSIS OF SB
633, at 2-3 (Apr. 18, 1995) (stating that the use of the signature as evidence is helpful since criminal acts
committed by computer do not leave "paper trails").
1. See CAL GOV'T CODE § 25000 (West 1988) (requiring that each county have a five member board
of supervisors); see also id. § 53000 (West 1983) (providing that the board of supervisors is the legislative
body for the county); Johnston v. Board of Supervisors of Manin County, 31 Cal. 2d 66, 74, 187 P.2d 686, 691
(1947) (holding that county boards of supervisors perform administrative and legislative functions).
2. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 23013 (West 1988) (stating that the county board of supervisors can
establish a department of corrections, which shall have control over all county facilities relating to institutional
punishment-including county jails, industrial farms, and road camps). But see id. § 26605 (West Supp. 1995)
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work release program to any person committed to a county correctional facility?
Additionally, under voluntary work release programs, existing law provides that:
(1) The board of supervisors can establish various rules and regulations governing
work release programs; (2) any person who fails to appear for the work release
program is guilty of a misdemeanor; (3) a peace officer may retake an individual
into custody to serve the remainder of their sentence if the peace officer
reasonably believes that the individual has failed to appear for his or her program,
or will fail to appear; (4) the proper authority is not required to assign an
individual to a work release program if the individual has not performed
satisfactorily or has failed to comply with any rules or regulations; (5) eligibility
for work release is determined by the proper authority; and (6) the board of
supervisors may establish a program of administrative fee.4
Chapter 106 creates a separate, involuntary, work release program allowing
the board of supervisors of any county to authorize the sheriff or equivalent
correctional facility authority to institute and operate such a program.5 To institute
such a program, however, the county must have an average daily jail population
of ninety percent of the county's correctional system's mandated capacity.6 The
provisions governing involuntary work release programs, under Chapter 106, are
the same as those governing voluntary work release programs.7 Additionally,
(providing that, except where the sheriff was not the sole and exclusive authority to keep the county jail prior
to July 1, 1993, sheriffs are the sole and exclusive authority to keep county jails); CAL. PENAL CODE § 4000
(West 1982) (stating that sheriffs are keepers of the common jails in their jurisdictions).
3. CAL PENAL CODE § 4024.2(a) (West Supp. 1995); see id. § 4024.2(b) (West Supp. 1995) (setting
forth that the criteria for authorizing work release programs includes such projects as: manual labor to improve
and maintain public facilities; manual labor in support of nonprofit organizations; graffiti cleanup; and manual
labor for senior citizens). Credit may also be given for participation in education, vocational training, or
substance abuse programs. Id.
4. Id. § 4024.2(c)-(e) (West Supp. 1995); cf. id. § 4024.3(c)-(e) (enacted by Chapter 106) (incorp-
orating the voluntary work release program requirements in the newly established involuntary work release
program).
5. Id. § 4024.3(a) (enacted by Chapter 106); see id. (stating that the criteria for involuntary work
release programs is the same as found in California Penal Code § 4024.2(b) and that priority for participation
in the work release programs is given to inmates who volunteer); cf. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-4(a), (b) (1994)
(providing that participation in a work release program is voluntary and that the inmate must return to the
institution when not working); TEx. CODE CriM. PRoc. ANN. art. 42.034(a) (West Supp. 1995) (stating that
work release programs are voluntary and at the court's discretion).
6. CAL PENAL CODE § 4024.3(a) (enacted by Chapter 106); see id. § 4024.3(b)(1) (enacted by Chapter
106) (defining the "county correctional system's mandated capacity" as the county's total capacity of all
correctional facilities for permanent housing of adult inmates); see also id. § 4024.3(b)(2) (enacted by Chapter
106) (defining "mandated capacity" as the lesser capacity of either that established by court order or by the
Board of Corrections); id. § 4024.3(b)(3) (enacted by Chapter 106) (defining "average daily jail population"
as the county jail system's average number of inmates incarcerated on a yearly basis).
7. SENATE COMMtTTEE ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, COMMITrEE ANALYSIS OF SB 485, at 2 (May 9,
1995); see id. (stating that all aspects of the involuntary work release programs parallel those of the voluntary
work release programs). Compare CAL. PENAL CODE § 4024.2 (West Supp. 1995) (outlining the provisions
governing voluntary work release programs) with id. § 4024.3(c)-(f) (enacted by Chapter 106) (providing that
the provisions governing involuntary work release programs are to be the same as those outlined in California
Penal Code § 4024.2).
Selected 1995 Legislation
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under Chapter 106, inmates earn the same sentence reduction credits that they
would have received had they been incarcerated!
COMMENT
Complying with court orders to relieve jail overcrowding and circumventing
the inability to construct new correctional facilities, authorities have been forced
to release inmates early and to close correctional facilities.9 Prior to the enactment
of Chapter 106, because work release programs were only voluntary, there was
no way to force inmates who were released early to complete the portion of their
sentences that were excused.' 0 Work release programs yield two benefits to the
community: they lessen jail overcrowding, and they provide a work force to
perform much needed public work that would otherwise go undone." Until
Chapter 106 was enacted, though, there was no incentive for inmates to
participate in work release programs because such programs were voluntary and
8. CAL. PENAL CODE § 4024.3(a) (enacted by Chapter 106); see id. § 4019(b), (c) (West Supp, 1995)
(providing the standard credits and deductions from a period of confinement); see also id. § 4024.2(a) (West
Supp. 1995) (stating that one day of work is in lieu of one day of confinement); id. § 8052(e)(8) (West Supp.
1995) (defining "work, in lieu of confinement" as an intermediate sanction, as something other than simple
incarceration); People v. Bravo, 219 Cal. App. 3d 729, 735, 268 Cal. Rptr. 486,489 (1990) (noting that the
Legislature intended any partial day to count as a whole day and that the sentencing court must award credit
for all days in custody, up to and including the day of sentencing); In re Walrath, 106 Cal. App. 3d 426, 431,
164 Cal. Rptr. 923, 926 (1980) (concluding that if sentenced for one year, a prisoner is entitled to 60 days
credit and that if there is misconduct--depending on the severity of the misconduct and regardless of whether
it occurs at the beginning or end of the sentence-the sheriff may deduct any part of the credit); In re Allen,
105 Cal. App. 3d 310, 313, 164 Cal. Rptr. 319, 322 (1980) (explaining that conduct credits are computed on
the full period of confinement, beginning with the day of arrest).
9. SENATE CoMMrrrIEE ON CRMINAL PROCEDURE, CoMMrrrEE ANALYsis OF SB 485, at 3 (May 9,
1995); see CAL. PENAL CODE § 4024.1(a), (b) (West 1982) (providing that the person responsible for the
county's correctional facilities may apply to the court for authorization to accelerate inmate releases); see also
Terence P. Thorberry & Jack E. Call, Constitutional Challenges to Prison Overcrowding: The Scientific
Evidence of Harmful Effects, 35 HASTINGS LJ. 313, 315 (1983) (discussing how prison administrators,
correction authorities, and legislatures are in an increasingly untenable positions as more mandatory sentences
and longer minimum sentences are established, while budgetary constraints will not allow the expansion of
correction facilities); Andy Fufillo, Presto! Prison Overcrowding Would Disappear, SACRAMENTO BEE, June
9, 1995, at Al (suggesting, as an alternative to work release, doubling up inmates in one cell); Rene Lynch,
'3 Strikes' Leads to More Early O.C. Jail Releases; Corrections: Inmates Asking for Trials to Avoid Another
Conviction Crowd Prisons, Pushing Other Criminals Out, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 19, 1994, at Al (arguing that the
three strikes law is benefitting criminals where overcrowded jails are leading to new legislation aimed at early
release).
10. SENATE COMMrrrE ON CRMAL PROCEDURE, COMMrrrEEANALYSIS OF SB 485, at 2 (May 9,
1995); see Senate OKs Bill on Mandatory Manual Laborfor Inmates Freed Early, L.A. TIMES, May 20, 1995,
at B2 (stating that inmates can avoid mandatory work because programs only apply to those who volunteer).
11. SENATE COMMIrrEE ON CRMINAL PROCEDURE, COMMrlEE ANALYSIS OF SB 485, at 2-3 (May 9,
1995); see J. Harry Jones, County Unveils 6 Steps to Cut Jail Crowding, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Apr. 8,
1995, at Bl (explaining that the San Diego Sheriff Department wants to ease restrictions on work release
programs because it is impossible to put inmates to work in the community); Kathleen Kellerher, Firefighting
Felons; Female Prisoners Battle Blazes, Clear Away Tinder and Gain Self-Esteem While Serving Out Their
Sentences at Malibu's Fire Camp 13, L.A. TIMEs, Sept. 4, 1994, at J10 (finding that fire camps help ease
overcrowding in jails, provide the community valuable services, and rehabilitate prisoners).
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many inmates were already eligible for court mandated early release.'2 According
to a statement of legislative intent, the purpose of Chapter 106 is to ensure that
all early released inmates serve their sentences in one form or another by
mandating that they successfully complete a work release program. 3
Nonetheless, there is an issue as to whether Chapter 106 violates the
Constitution's prohibition against involuntary servitude. 4 In light of this, the
Legislative Counsel has opined that mandatory work release programs in lieu of
imprisonment, like those established by Chapter 106, are constitutional.'5 The
case of Draper v. Rhay16 supports the position that the Thirteenth Amendment has
no application where a person has been convicted under a penal statute.
7
Therefore, it appears that Chapter 106 will withstand constitutional challenge
under the Thirteenth Amendment.
Timothy J. Moroney
12. SENATE CoMMIrTEE oN CRImINAL PROCEDURE COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OFSB 485, at 2-3 (May 9,
1995); see id. (describing how, prior to Chapter 106 being enacted, work release was merely voluntary and
there was no way to force inmates to participate in a work release program, even though several California
counties are under a court order to keep their jail populations at 90%); see also Matt Lait, Rift Deepens Between
O.C. Sheriff, Judges, L.A. TbMS, Apr. 27, 1995, at Al (stating that the Orange County Sheriff is under a
federal court order to cure the jail overcrowding problem); Molina Wants Work-Release for Inmates Freed
Early, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 11, 1995, at B2 (suggesting that inmates opt to stay in jail rather than to participate
in work release because they know they will be released only after serving one-third of their sentences).
13. 1995 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 106, sec. 1, at 391 (enacting CAL. PENAL CODE § 4024.3); see id. (finding
that because of chronic budget problems, jail overcrowding, and court orders, Los Angeles County was forced
to close Pitchess Honor Rancho and Biscailuz Center allowing 3200 inmates to avoid serving their entire
sentence; the Legislature, by enacting Chapter 106 intends to stop circumstances like these from happening
again); SENATE COMMrrrEEON CRUINALPROCEDJRE, COMMrrrEE ANALYSIS oF SB 485, at 2 (May 9, 1995)
(stating that Chapter 106 will see that criminals actually receive the punishment to which they are sentenced).
14. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII (providing that slavery and involuntary servitude are only allowed
to exist in the United States as a punishment for a crime, after an individual has been duly convicted). See
generally Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4, 17 (1944) (holding that the Thirteenth Amendment was not only
meant to end slavery, but to maintain a system of completely free and voluntary labor across the United States).
But see Mikeska v. Collins, 900 F.2d 833, 837 (5th Cir. 1990) (establishing that forcing inmates to work
without pay does not constitute involuntary servitude since compensating prisoners for work is not a
constitutional requirement); Ray v. Mabry, 556 F.2d 881,882 (8th Cir. 1977) (holding that requiring an inmate
to perform manual labor does not constitute involuntary servitude).
15. Inmates: Mandatory Work Release Programs, California Office of Legislative Counsel, Op. No.
19519, at 4 (May 3, 1995) (copy on file with the Pacific Law Journal); see also CAL. GOV'T CODE § 25359
(West 1988) (providing that the county board of supervisors can authorize prisoners convicted of
misdemeanors to work for the benefit of the public); CAL. PENAL CODE § 2700 (West Supp. 1995) (stating that
the Department of Corrections is to require able-bodied prisoners to work); id § 4017 (West 1982) (permitting
the county board of supervisors to require inmates to perform labor on public works and to engage in fire
prevention); Patterson v. Oberhauser, 331 F. Supp. 220, 221 (C.D. Cal. 1971) (holding that there is no federal
right which exempts state prisoners from working while imprisoned). But see United States v. Reynolds, 235
U.S. 133, 149-50 (1914) (providing that the state cannot accept the obligation of another, to whom the prisoner
owes a debt, and force an individual to work); Ex parte Arras, 78 Cal. 304, 306, 20 P. 683, 684 (1889)
(providing that hard labor cannot be imposed to collect a fine).
16. 315 F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1963).
17. Id. at 197; see id. (holding that an individual held in a state penitentiary or county jail may be




Penal Code § 636 (amended).
AB 1892 (Burton); 1995 STAT. Ch. 129
Prior law provided that every person who eavesdropped or recorded, by
means of an electronic or other device, a conversation between a person who was
in the physical custody of a law enforcement officer and his or her attorney,
religious advisor, or licensed physician was guilty of a felony, unless consent was
given by all parties to the conversation!
Chapter 129 narrows the felony provision of existing law to apply only to
eavesdropping by electronic device.2 Additionally, Chapter 129 adds a wobbler
provision3 to existing law that prohibits the intentional non-electronic
1. 1967 Cal. Stat. ch. 1509, sec. 1, at 3588 (enacting CAL PENALCODE § 636); see CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 636(c) (amended by Chapter 129) (stating that the provisions of California Penal Code § 636 do not apply
to the employee of a public utility acting within the scope of his or her employment who listens to
conversations for the limited purpose of testing or servicing telephone or telegraph communications
equipment); see also In re Escobedo Arias, 42 Cal. 3d 667, 681,725 P.2d 664, 671,230 Cal. Rptr. 505, 512
(1986) (construing California Penal Code § 636 as prohibiting the monitoring of conversations in a Youth
Authority school between a ward and his religious advisor in locations traditionally used for that purpose); cf.
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4001 (1988) (defining "eavesdropping" as any of the following: (1) entering into a
private place with intent to secretly listen to private conversations or to spy on persons therein; (2) installing
or using outside a private place any device for hearing or recording sounds, without the consent of the person
entitled to privacy, or (3) installing or using any device or equipment for the interception of telephone or wire
communication without the consent of the person in control of the wire communication facilities); Id.
(classifying the crime of eavesdropping as a class A misdemeanor); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 526.010, 526.020
(Baldwin 1995) (stating that a person is guilty of eavesdropping, a class D felony, when he or she intentionally
uses any device to overhear, record, amplify, or transmit any part of a wire or oral communication of others
without the consent of at least one party to the conversation); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.539c (West
1991) (instructing that any person who intentionally uses any device to eavesdrop upon a private conversation
or employs another to do the same, without the consent of all parties thereto, is guilty of a felony regardless
of whether that person is present during the conversation); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 250.05 (McKinney 1989)
(declaring that a person is guilty of eavesdropping, a class E felony, when he or she unlawfully engages in
wiretapping, utilizes a mechanical device to surreptitiously listen to a conversation, or intercepts or accesses
an electronic communication). But see John T. Soma & Loma C. Yongs, Confidential Communications and
Information in a Computer Era, 12 HOFSTRA L. REv. 849, 854 (1984) (noting that under the traditional rule,
an eavesdropper who surreptitiously listens to the conversation between an attorney and his client is not
precluded from testifying as to what he or she overheard because the client assumes the risk that some third
person will be listening). See generally Michael Goldsmith & Kathryn Ogden Balmforth, The Electronic
Surveillance ofPrivileged Communications: A Conflict in Doctrines, 64 S. CAL L. REV. 903 (1991) (discussing
the limited protection that privileged conversations receive from initial interception by electronic surveillance);
25 AM. JuR. 2d Eavesdropping § 1 (1966 & Supp. 1995) (providing an overview of the common law crime of
eavesdropping); Kenneth J. Rampino, Annotation, Admissibility, in Criminal Prosecution, of Evidence
Obtained by Electronic Surveillance of Prisoner, 57 A.L.R. 3D 172 (1994) (discussing cases considering the
admissibility of evidence procured through surreptitious electronic surveillance of a prisoner during
conversations with persons other than interrogating police officers).
2. CAL. PENAL CODE § 636(a) (amended by Chapter 129).
3. See SENATE COMMnTIEE ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, ComffrTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1892, at 3 (June
13, 1995) (explaining that a wobbler provision accords the prosecutor a degree of discretion to charge the crime
as a misdemeanor or a felony depending on the circumstances); see also Letter from Attorney General, Daniel
L. Lungren, and Assistant Attorney General, Jack R. Stevens, to Assemblymember James Rogan, (May 12,
1995) (copy on file with the Pacific Law Journal) (noting that AB 1892 treats violations of California Penal
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eavesdropping on a conversation between an in-custody defendant and his or her
attorney, religious advisor or licensed physician, under circumstances where there
exists a reasonable expectation of privacy.4
COMMENT
Chapter 129 was precipitated by Morrow v. Superior Court,5 a case in which
a Deputy District Attorney was alleged to have engaged in unethical activity by
conspiring with an investigator to eavesdrop on a conversation between a
burglary suspect and his defense counsel.6 While charges were initially filed
against the Deputy District Attorney, they were dismissed on the grounds that the
statute was vague and applied only to electronic eavesdropping7 Consequently,
Chapter 129 was enacted to ensure that privileged conversations are protected
from both electronic and non-electronic eavesdropping.!
Laura K. O'Connor
Code § 636 as a "wobbler," thereby giving prosecutors flexibility in dealing with the offense).
4. CAL PENAL CODE § 636(b) (amended by Chapter 129); see id. (exempting conversations that are
inadvertently overheard or that take place in a courtroom or other room used for adjudicatory proceedings from
the provisions of California Penal Code § 636(b)); id. (establishing that the violation of this subdivision is a
public offense punishable by incarceration in the state prison or county jail for a term not to exceed one year,
or by a fine not to exceed $2,500, or by both the fine and imprisonment); see also Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (holding that the Fourth Amendment protects people and not places; therefore, what a
person seeks to preserve as private may be constitutionally protected, even in an area accessible to the public);
Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139, 144-45 (1962) (noting that those relationships that the law has endowed
with particularized confidentiality must continue to receive unceasing protection even when such conversations
occur in a jail cell); cf. North v. Superior Court, 8 Cal. 3d 301, 311-12, 502 P.2d 1305, 1311, 104 Cal. Rptr.
833, 839 (1972) (holding that a reasonable expectation of privacy was accorded to a conversation between a
prisoner and his wife where the conversation occured in a private office and under circumstances indicating
that the couple was lulled into believing that their conversation would be confidential). But see In re Joseph
A., 30 Cal. App. 3d 880, 885-86, 106 Cal. Rptr. 729, 733 (1973) (finding no reasonable expectation of privacy
as to a conversation between a prisoner and his uncle where such conversation was conducted in an
interrogation room under circumstances that would not be likely to induce the parties to believe that their
conversation was confidential).
5. 30 Cal. App. 4th 1252, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d 210 (1994).
6. See SENATE FLOOR, COMMIrrEE ANALYsIs OF AB 1892, at 2 (June 22, 1995) (declaring that the
conversation between the burglary suspect and the defendant took place in a room specifically reserved for
such privileged conversations); see also Morrow, 30 Cal. App. 4th at 1255, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 213 (finding
that the prosecutor instructed an investigator to sit next to the holding cell and listen to the conversation
between defendant and his attorney); ASSEMBLY COMMrTrEE ON PUBuC SAFETY, COMMrTEE ANALYSIS OFAB
1892, at 1 (May 2, 1995) (describing the Morrow case in which the Deputy District Attorney is alleged to have
directed her investigator to position herself in a place where she could surreptitiously listen to the confidential
conversation between a criminal defendant and the defendant's attorney).
7. Morrow, 30 Cal. App. 4th at 1256, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 213; see SENATE FLOOR, CoMMrrrEE
ANALYsts OF AB 1892, at 2 (June 22, 1995) (declaring that the language of California Penal Code § 636 is
ambiguous in that it could not be determined whether "or other device" included the naked ear).
8. See SENATE FLOOR, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1892, at 2 (June 22, 1995) (declaring that the
purpose of AB 1892 is to prohibit all intentional eavesdropping on certain privileged conversations).
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Welfare and Institutions Code §§ 6600, 6601, 6602, 6603, 6604, 6605,
6606, 6607, 6608 (new); § 6250 (amended).
AB 888 (Rogan); 1995 STAT. Ch. 763
Chapter 763 creates a new type of criminal in California-the sexually
violent predator.' A sexually violent offense is defined by Chapter 763 to include
a felony act committed on, before, or after the effective date of the Sexual
Predator Act and resulting in a conviction, plus a determinate sentence involving
any of the following crimes, when the crime is committed against a person's will
by way of force,2 violence,3 duress, 4 menace,5 or fear6 of immediate and illegal
1. CAL. WELF. &INST. CODE §6600(a) (enacted by Chapter 763); see iti (defining a "sexually violent
predator" as a person who has been found guilty of a sexually violent offense against two or more individuals
for which the convicted received a determinate sentence and who has been diagnosed with a mental disorder
which makes him or her a danger to the health and safety of others in that it is likely that the person will
partake in sexually violent criminal behavior); id. § 6600(c) (enacted by Chapter 763) (determining that the
phrase "diagnosed mental disorder" includes a hereditary or acquired symptom that affects the emotional or
voluntary control of a person that predisposes that person to commit criminal sexual acts that constitute a
danger to the health and safety of others); id. § 6600(d) (enacted by Chapter 763) (stating that the phrase
"danger to the health and safety of others" does not necessitate the proof of a recent overt act while the
individual is in custody); id. § 6600(e) (enacted by Chapter 763) (mandating that the term "predatory" is an
act that is aimed toward a stranger or an individual in which a relationship has been made or encouraged for
the main purpose of victimization); id. § 6600(f) (enacted by Chapter 763) (stating that a "recent overt act" is
any criminal behavior that shows a likelihood that the actor may partake in sexually violent predatory criminal
behavior); cf. IOWA CODE ANN. § 709C.2(l) (West Supp. 1995) (defining the term "mental abnormality" almost
exactly the same way as California Welfare and Institutions Code § 6600(c) defines the phrase "diagnosed
mental disorder"); id. § 709C.2(2) (West Supp. 1995) (providing that the term "predatory" means an act that
is directed toward a stranger or an individual with whom that person has established a relationship for the
primary purpose of victimization); id. § 709C.2(4) (West Supp. 1995) (defining the term "sexually violent
predator" as a person who has been found guilty of or charged with a sexually violent offense and who is
afflicted with a mental abnormality or personality disorder which makes that person a likely candidate to
commit predatory acts of sexual violence); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02(a)-(c) (1994) (defining tha ternis
"sexually violent predator," "mental abnormality." and "predatory" exactly the same as found in Iowa Code
§ 709C.2); WASH. REV. CODEANN. § 71.09.020(l)-(3) (West Supp. 1994) (defining the terms "sexually violent
predator," "mental abnormality." and "predatory" exactly the same as found in Iowa Code § 709C,2). See
generally CAL. PENAL CODE § 667.71(a) (West Supp. 1995) (describing a "habitual sexual offender" as a
person who has been previously convicted of at least one of the enumerated felonies in California Penal Code
§ 667.71(d) and who is presently being convicted of one of those felonies); id. § 667.71(d) (West Supp. 1995)
(enumerating similar crimes and providing similar wording as found in California Welfare and Insitutions
Code § 6600(b)); Decio C. Rangel, Jr., Review of Selected 1994 California Legislation, 26 PAC. L.J. 202,399-
401 (1995) (providing an in-depth discussion of California Penal Code § 667.71).
2. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 242 (West 1988) (defining "battery" to include the use of unlawful force
upon another person); People v. Mansfield, 200 Cal. App. 3d 82, 88, 245 Cal. Rptr. 800, 803 (1988)
(concluding that force, as used in the context of battery, need not be violent or harsh and does not even need
to cause pain or bodily injury, nor leave any type of mark); People v. Martinez, 3 Cal. App. 3d 886, 889, 83
Cal. Rptr. 914, 915 (1970) (finding that the use of force in the context of battery is any type of harmful or
offensive contact); see also People v. Shulz, 2 Cal. App. 4th 999, 1004, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 799, 802 (1992)
(providing that the term force as used in California Penal Code § 288(b) is physical force that differs
substantially or is substantially excessive to that required to commit a lewd or lascivious act itself); Powe v.
State, 597 So. 2d 721, 725 (Ala. 1991) (explaining that in cases involving sex crimes committed against
children, the force required to complete the crime differs from the force necessary to complete the crime against
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bodily injury to that person or another: rape,7 spousal rape,8 the aiding or abetting
of a rape,9 lewd or lascivious acts committed upon a child,10 acts of penetration
with a foreign object," sodomy, 2 or oral copulation. 3
a mature female).
3. Compare CAL. PENAL CODE § 13700(b) (West Supp. 1995) (defining the term domestic violence
to include any abuse committed against a cohabitant or closely related relative) with Mansfield, 200 Cal. App.
3d at 87-88, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 802 (concluding that the word violence as used in California Penal Code § 242
has no real meaning).
4. See CAL PENAL CODE § 261(b) (West Supp. 1995) (defining the term "duress" as used in this
section as being a direct or inferred threat of force, violence, danger, or retribution that is enough to coerce a
reasonable person of ordinary faculties to partake in an act to which that person otherwise would not have
partaken); id. (explaining that the totality of the circumstances, including the victim's age and his or her
relationship to the accused, are factors to be weighed in determining if duress exists); Schulz, 2 Cal. App. 4th
at 1005, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 803 (holding that "duress" as used in § 288 of the California Penal Code can arise
from different circumstances, including the existence of a family relationship, the difference in ages, and
contrast in size); People v. Pitmon, 170 Cal. App. 3d 38, 50, 216 Cal. Rptr. 221,227 (1985) (defining the term
"duress" as used in California Penal Code § 288 as a direct or implied threat of danger, force, hardship,
violence, or retribution that is sufficient to induce a reasonable person of average susceptibilities to do an act
that ordinarily would not have been done or, acquiesce in an act to which the person would not have otherwise
submitted).
5. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 261(c) (West Supp. 1995) (defining "menace," as used in this section to
mean any threat, act, or declaration which shows a purpose to inflict harm upon another person).
6: See People v. Cardenas, 21 Cal. App. 4th 927, 939-40, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 567, 574-75 (1994)
(declaring that the term 'Year" as used in California Penal Code §§ 288 and 289 is defined as a feeling of
distress that is caused by an expectation of danger, pain, disaster, or something similar, terror and dread;
apprehension; and submissive or awe towards a higher power).
7. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 261(a) (West Supp. 1995) (explaining that "rape" is the act of sexual
intercourse done with a person who is not the spouse of the aggressor).
8. See iU § 262 (West Supp. 1995) (setting forth a similar definition as found in California Penal Code
§ 261 except that the act is done with the perpetrator's spouse).
9. See id. § 264.1 (West Supp. 1995) (stating that notwithstanding California Penal Code § 264, in any
instance where the defendant who voluntarily acts in concert with another person, by force or violence and
against the will of the victim, commits an act that is described in California Penal Code §§ 261,262, or 289,
either himself or herself or by assisting the other person, is guilty of aiding or abetting a rape); see also id. §
264 (West Supp. 1995) (setting forth the punishments for the crime of rape).
10. See id. § 288(a) (West Supp. 1995) (asserting that any person who willfully and lewdly commits
any lewd or lascivious act, including any other act found in the California Penal Code, upon a child who is
younger than 14 years old, with the intent of arousing, appealing to, or satisfying the lust, passions, or sexual
wants of that person or child is guilty of a felony); People v. Gilbert, 5 Cal. App. 4th 1372, 1380, 7 Cal. Rptr.
2d 660, 664 (1992) (expounding that the crime of lewd and lascivious conduct committed upon a child need
not be inherently sexual in nature nor must it be shown that the defendant touched the child's genitalia); People
v. Cordray, 221 Cal. App. 2d 589, 593, 34 Cal. Rptr. 588, 590 (1963) (holding that the intent to arouse the
passions in a child may be based upon conduct, or the manner or performance of the act in a criminal case
concerning lewd and lascivious conduct).
11. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 289(a) (West Supp. 1995) (defining "penetration by a foreign object" as
any penetration, even slight, caused by a person or directed by that person to another person, of the genital or
anal cavities of any person for the reason of sexual arousal, gratification, or abuse by any foreign object,
substance, device, or instrment, or by an object that is unknown when the act is done); id. § 289(k)(1) (West
Supp. 1995) (providing that the terms "foreign object," "substance," "instrument," or "device" include any part
of the body except a sexual organ); id. § 2890k)(2) (West Supp. 1995) (explaining that the term "unknown
object" includes any foreign object, substance, instrument, or device, or any portion of the body, which
includes the penis, when it is not known if penetration was made by a penis or by a foreign object, substance,
instrument, or device, or by any other part of the body); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6600(b) (enacted by
Chapter 763) (listing California Penal Code § 289(a) as a specified penetration with foreign object violation
and repealed California Penal Code § 289.5); 1991 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 293, sec. 1, at 1598 (enacting CAL.
PENAL CODE § 289.5) (describing a crime similar to § 289 of the California Penal Code that concerned
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Chapter 763 mandates that whenever the Director of the Department of
Corrections14 finds that a person, who is in custody under the jurisdiction of the
department and who is either in the midst of a prison term or whose parole has
been revoked, may be a sexually violent predator, the director must, at a
minimum of six months before that person's scheduled date for release from
incarceration or termination of parole, refer that individual for evaluation
pursuant to California Penal Code section 6601.15
If a person has been referred for evaluation, Chapter 763 sets forth the
procedure for the evaluation. 6 If the county's selected counsel agrees with the
penetration by a penis or foreign object).
12. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 286(a) (West Supp. 1995) (defining "sodomy" as sexual conduct that
consists of contact between the penis of one male and the rectum of another person and stating that even slight
sexual penetration is enough to commit the crime of sodomy); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6600(b) (enacted
by Chapter 763) (listing sodomy acts in violation of California Penal Code § 286 when committed by force,
violence, duress, menace, or fear of immediate and illegal bodily injury on the victim or another).
13. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6600(b) (enacted by Chapter 763); see CAL. PENAL CODE § 288a(a)
(West Supp. 1995) (defining "oral copulation" as the act of copulating the mouth of one person with the sexual
organ or rectum of any other person); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6600(b) (enacted by Chapter 763) tlisting
violations of California Penal Code § 286, oral copulation violations, when committed by force, duress,
violence, menace, or fear of immediate and illegal bodily harm on the victim or another individual); see also
id. § 6600(a) (enacted by Chapter 763) (mandating that conviction of one or more of the crimes found in
California Welfare and Institutions Code § 6600 will constitute evidence that can support a jury or court
finding that an individual is a sexually violent predator, but cannot be the only basis for such a finding); id.
(requiring that jurors be told that they may not find that an individual is a sexually violent predator based upon
prior offenses without relevent evidence of a presently diagnosed mental disorder that would make that person
likely to te a sexually violent predator and dangerous to the community). For examples of other states'
definitions of sexually violent offenses, see IOWA CODE ANN. § 709C.2(3) (West Supp. 1995); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 59-29a02(e) (1994); MNN. STAT. AN. § 609.1352(b) (West Supp. 1995); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
71.09.020(4) (West Supp. 1995).
14. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 5001 (West 1982) (stating that the California Department of Corrections
is to be composed of the Director of Corrections and the Prison Industry Authority); id. § 5002 (West Supp.
1995) (describing the powers and duties of the California Department of Corrections). See generally 3 B.E.
WniN & NOPitAN L. EPsrEIN, CALIFORNiA CRIMINAL LAw, Punishment for Crime § 1254 (2nd ed. 1989 &
Supp. 1995) (providing an overview of the California Department of Corrections).
15. CAL. Wa., & INST. CODE § 6601(a) (enacted by Chapter 763); see id. § 6601(b) (enacted by
Chapter 763) (mandating that the individual must be screened by the Department of Corrections and the Board
of Prison Terms based on whether the individual has partaken in a sexually violent predatory offense and upon
an examination of the person's social, criminal, and institutional background); id. (stating that the screening
must be done in accordance with a structured screening instrument created and updated by the State
Department of Mental Health with advice from the Department of Corrections); id. (announcing that if through
the screening it is found that the person is likely to be a sexually violent predator, the Department of
Corrections must refer that individual to the State Department of Mental Health for a complete evaluation as
to whether the individual meets the criteria as set forth in California Penal Code § 6600).
16. d § 6601(c)-(g) (enacted by Chapter 763); see § 6601(c) (enacted by Chapter 763) (indicating that
the State Department of Mental Health must examine the person in accordance with accepted assessment
protocol, created and updated by the State Department of Mental Health, to find whether the individual is a
sexually violent predator); id (propounding that the standardized assessment protocol must include assessment
of mental disorders, in conjunction with various known factors to be associated with the risk of re-offense
among sex offenders); id (instructing that risk factors to be weighed must include criminal and psychosexual
history, kind, degree, and duration of sexual deviance, and severity of personality disorder); id. § 6601(d)
(enacted by Chapter 763) (providing that any individual who has been referred must be examined by two
practicing psychiatrists or psychologists, or one of each, designated by the Director of Mental Health); Id.
(explaining that if both evaluators agree that the individual is a possible sexually violent predator, the Director
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recommendation, a petition for commitment 17 must be filed in the superior court
of the county in which the person was convicted of the offense.1 8 Chapter 763
provides the guidelines for judicial review of the petition, which is used to
determine whether a trial is to be had. 19 If so, Chapter 763 provides the means and
of Mental Health may pass on a request for a petition for commitment pursuant to California Penal Code §
6602(i) and copies of the evaluation reports and any other supporting information, must be made available to
the lawyer designated by the county pursuant to California Penal Code § 6601(i), who then may file a petition
for commitment); id. § 6601(e) (enacted by Chapter 763) (stating that if one of the examiners does not believe
that the person meets the criteria of a sexually violent predator, the Director of Mental Health must arrange for
further examination of the individual by two independent professionals selected pursuant to California Penal
Code § 6601(g)); id. § 6601(0 (enacted by Chapter 763) (announcing that if an evaluation by individual
professionals pursuant to California Penal Code § 6601(e) is done, a petition to ask for commitment under this
article can only be submitted if both independent professionals who examine the individual agree that the
person meets the criteria for commitment as set forth in California Penal Code § 6601(d)); id. (declaring that
professionals chosen to examine the person pursuant to California Penal Code § 6601(g) must inform the
individual that the aim of their examination is not treatment but rather to determine if the individual meets
specific criteria to be involuntarily committed, but noting however, that it is not necessary that the individual
appreciate or understand that information); id. 6601(g) (enacted by Chapter 763) (mandating that any
independent professional who is selected by the Director of Corrections or the Director of Mental Health, must
have at a minimum five years of experience in the treatment and diagnosis of mental problems, and includes
psychiatrists and licensed psychologists who have received a doctorate degree in psychology, but cannot be
a state government employee); id. (providing that the law set forth in California Penal Code § 6601(g) also
applies to any professionals who are appointed by the court to examine the individual for purposes of any other
proceeding under the Sexual Predator Article).
17. See Diane B. Bartley, Note, State v. Field: Wisconsin Focuses on Public Protection by Reviving
Automatic Commitment Following a Successful Insanity Defense, 1986 Wis. L. REv. 781,781-82 (stating that
in the context of insanity defendants, the purpose of commitment is to treat the defendant's mental illness and
protect the public); see also Louis A. Chiafullo, Comment, Innocents Imprisoned: The Deficiencies of the New
Jersey Standard Governing the Involuntary Commitment of Children, 24 SEroN HALL L. REv. 1507,1508 n.3
(1994) (defining the term "involuntary civil commitment" as any compulsory hospitilization or other restriction
on personal liberty that is imposed by a state due to a person's mental illness).
18. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6601(i) (enacted by Chapter 763); see id. (requring that the petition
must be filed and the proceedings handled by either the district attorney or the county counsel of that county);
id. (stating that the county board of supervisors must designate either the county counsel or district attorney
to handle the responsibility for commitment proceedings); see also id. § 6601(h) (enacted by Chapter 763)
(announcing that copies of the examination records and any other pertinent documents must be made available
to the lawyer designated by the county pursuant to California Penal Code § 6601(i) who may submit a petition
for commitment). For examples of other states' petition procedures, see IOWA CODE ANN. § 709C.3 (West
Supp. 1995); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a03 (1994); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 71.09.025, 71.09.030 (West
Supp. 1995). See generally Kelly A. McCaffrey, Comment, The Civil Commitment of Sexually Violent
Predators in Kansas: A Modern Law for Modern Times, 42 KAN. L. REv. 887, 891-92 (1994) (describing the
petition process in the state of Kansas).
19. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6602 (enacted by Chapter 763); see id. (declaring that a judge of the
superior court must review the petition and then determine whether there is probable cause to believe that the
person named in the petition is likely to partake in sexually violent criminal conduct upon his or her release);
id. (stating that if probable cause is not found, the petition must be dismissed, but if probable cause is found,
a trial must be conducted); iU. (relating that the individual named in the petition has the right to an attorney at
the probable cause hearing). But cf. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.040 (West 1992) (reciting that upon the
filing of a petition, the judge must determine whether probable cause exists to believe that the individual named
in the petition is a sexually violent predator, and if so, then the judge must direct that the individual be taken
into custody and transferred to an appropriate place for an examination as to whether the person is a sexually
violent predator); id. (stating that the examiner must be professionally qualified to evaluate mental disorders);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 709C.4 (West Supp. 1995) (providing a similar provision as found in Washington Code




procedures for a trial for this offense.O Finally, Chapter 763 establishes the
burden of proof, which is beyond a reasonable doubt, that must be met in these
cases.
21
Chapter 763 provides that if a person is found to be a sexually violent
predator, the person must be committed for two years to the custody of the State
Department of Mental Health2 for proper treatment and confinement in a secure
place as specified by the Director of Mental Health.23 A person who is found to
be a sexually violent predator and committed to the custody of the State
Department of Mental Health is allowed to have a current examination of his or
her mental condition at least once a year.2 Further, a person is guaranteed
treatment of his or her condition by Chapter 763.
20. CAL WELF. & INST. CODE § 6603 (enacted by Chapter 763); see id. § 6603(a) (enacted by Chapter
763) (prop3unding that a person facing possible commitment as a sexually violent predator is entitled to a trial
byjury, the help of counsel, the right to have experts or professional persons to perform an examination on his
or her behalf, and have available to him or her all relevant medical and psychological reports and records); id.
(providing that when a person is indigent, the court must appoint counsel to help him or her, and, upon the
request of that individual, help the person obtain an expert or professional person to perform an evaluation or
participate in the trial on the defendant's behalf); id. § 6603(b), (c) (enacted by Chapter 763) (declaring that
the attorney who petitions for commitment may demand the trial be before a jury, but if no demand is made
by the defendant or the petitioning attorney, the trial will be before the court without a jury); id. § 6603(d)
(enacted by Chapter 763) (mandating that a unanimous verdict is required by any jury trial in a case involving
the possible commitment of an alleged sexually violent predator); see also id. § 6600(a) (enacted by Chapter
763) (stating that conviction of any crime listed in California Penal Code § 6600 will constitute evidence that
can support a court or jury finding that a person is a sexually violent predator, but can not be the only basis for
such determination). For examples of other states' trial procedures in these type of cases, see IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 709C.6 (West Supp. 1995); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29-a07 (1994); WASH. REV. CODE AN. § 71.09.060 (West
1992). See generally MeCaffrey, supra note 18, at 892 (discussing the trial procedure in the state of Kansas
regarding sexually violent predators).
21. CAL. W.F. & INST. CODE § 6604 (enacted by Chapter 763); see id. (requiring that the fact finder
determine whether, beyond a reasonable doubt, the defendant is a sexually violent predator). For other state
statutes using the beyond a reasonable doubt standard for "sexually violent predator" determinations, see IOWA
CODE ANN. § 709C.6 (West Supp. 1995); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a07 (1994); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
71.09.040 (West 1992).
22. See CAL Wa.F. & INST. CODE §§ 4000-4096.5 (West 1994 & Supp. 1995) (discussing the duties
and powers given to the State Department of Mental Health).
23. Id. § 6604 (enacted by Chapter 763); see id. (warning that the person cannot be kept in actual
custody for a period longer than two years absent a subsequent finding for extended commitment pursuant to
the filing of a new petition under the Sexual Predator Article or unless the term of commitment changes in
accordance with California Penal Code § 6605(e)); id. (mandating that time spent on conditional release does
not count toward the two year commitment period, unless the individual is placed in a locked facility by the
conditional release program, in which instance the time spent in a locked location shall count toward the two
year term of commitment); id. (stating that the facility must be found on the grounds of an institution under
the control of the Department of Corrections). For examples of other states' commitment requirements, see
IOWA CODE ANN. § 709C.6(l) (West Supp. 1995); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a07(a) (1994); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 71.09.060(l) (West 1992).
24. CAL. Ware. & INT. CODE § 6605(a) (enacted by Chapter 763). For examples of other states that
allow yearly examinations to an individual committed as a sexual predator, see IOWA CODE ANN. § 709C.7
(West Supp. 1995); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a08 (1994); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.070 (West 1992).
25. CAL. WEMl. & INST. CODE § 6606(a) (enacted by Chapter 763); see id. (insisting that a person who
is committed as a sexual violent predator is to be provided with programming by the State Departm2nt of
Mental Health in treating the person for his or her diagnosed mental disorder); id. § 6606(b) (enacted by
Chapter 763) (providing that a person need not agree to treatment for a finding that a person is a sexual
predator, nor does treatment mean that the treatment must be a success or possibly successful, nor does it mean
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Chapter 763 also provides a procedure for the person's release based upon the
opinion of the Director of Mental Health. In addition, Chapter 763 creates an
extensive procedure for the committed person to petition for his or her release
from treatment2
that the individual must acknowledge his or her condition and willingly engage in the treatment for that
condition); id. § 6606(c) (enacted by Chapter 763) (mandating that programming given by the State
Department of Mental Health in facilities must be consistent with current institutional standards for the
treatment of sex offenders, and must be based on a structured treatment procedure created by the State
Department of Mental Health); idU (stating that the procedure must describe the amount and kinds of treatment
components that are administered in the program, and must dictate how assessment data will be used to locate
the course of treatment for each individual person); id. (requiring that the protocol must also specify the
measures that will be used to determine treatment progress and changes with respect to the person's risk of re-
offense).
26. Id. § 6607(a) (enacted by Chapter 763); see id. (stating that if the Director of Mental Health finds
that the person's condition has changed such that the person is not likely to commit acts of sexual violence
while under watch and treatment in the community, the director must provide to the county attorney a request
for the attorney to petition the court for a conditional release of the person); id. § 6607(b) (enacted by Chapter
763) (providing that when a petition is filed for a conditional release, the court must hear the petition pursuant
to the procedure that is set forth in California Penal Code § 6608).
27. Id. §§ 6605,6608 (enacted by Chapter 763); see id. § 6605(b) (enacted by Chapter 763) (announcing
that the director of the State Department of Mental Health must provide the committed person with a yearly
written notice of that person's right to petition the court for a conditional release pursuant to California Penal
Code § 6608); id. (providing that the petition must contain a waiver of rights and if the individual does not
affirmatively waive his or her right to petition the court for his or her conditional release, the court must set
a show-cause hearing to find out whether facts exist that would warrant a hearing on whether the individual's
condition has changed so that he or she would not be a danger to society if discharged and the committed
person has the right to have an attorney present at the show-cause hearing); id. § 6605(c) (enacted by Chapter
763) (stating that if at the show-cause hearing, probable cause exists to believe the person can be discharged,
then a hearing must be set to determine if the person can be released); id. § 6605(d) (enacted by Chapter 763)
(providing that at the hearing, the committed individual has a right to be present and is entitled to all
constitutional protections that were given to him or her at the commitment proceeding); id. (relating that the
county attorney has the right to demand a jury trial and to have the committed person examined by experts
chosen by the state); id. (instructing that the committed person also has the right to a jury trial, the help of
counsel, and to have experts examine him or her on his or her behalf, and that the court must appoint an expert
if the person is indigent and asks for such appointment); id. (propounding that the burden of proof at the
hearing is placed upon the state and thus, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the person should
remain committed); id. § 6605(e) (enacted by Chapter 763) (declaring that if the jury or court finds against the
committed person at the hearing, conducted pursuant to California Welfare and Institutions Code § 6605(d),
then the period of comnmitment of the individual will run for a period of two years from the date of the finding;
but if the fact finder rules in favor of the committed person, he or she must be unconditionally released and
discharged); id. § 6605(f) (enacted by Chapter 763) (allowing for a procedure in which the California State
Department of Mental Health may seek an unconditional release and discharge of a person who it believes is
no longer a sexually violent predator); id. § 6608(a) (enacted by Chapter 763) (stating that a person may
petition for release without the approval of the Director of Mental Health, but if an individual has already filed
a petition for conditional release without the approval of the Director and the court found, either upon
examination of the petition or following a hearing, that the petition was frivolous or that the person's condition
had not changed so as to make him a safe member of the community, then the court must deny the subsequent
petition unless it shows facts upon which a court could determine that the condition of the committed person
has changed such that a hearing is necessary); id. (announcing that upon the receipt of the first or later petition
from a person without approval of the Director, the court must endeavor whenever possible to examine the
petition and determine whether it is based upon frivolous grounds and if so, the court must deny the petition
without a hearing); id. (reciting that an individual who petitions for conditional or unconditional release has
the right to assistance from an attorney); id. § 6608(b) (enacted by Chapter 763) (mandating that at least 15
days before the hearing, the court must provide notice to the county's attorney, the committed person's




Chapter 763 was signed on the same day as Chapter 762.28 The significance
of this is that both pieces of legislation are identical in content, word for word; the
only difference is that Chapter 763 originated in the Assembly while Chapter 762
originated in the Senate.29 Assemblymember Rogan, the author of Chapter 763,
and Senator Mountjoy, the author of Chapter 762, worked together to get these
laws passed.30 Thus, the two Chapters can probably be considered the same
legislation. Therefore, considering that the two Chapters were treated as one
single piece of legislation, this legislative review will present information found
in conjunction with each bill.
Governor Pete Wilson ardently supports Chapter 763."t According to
Assemblymember Rogan, approximately 3000 sex offenders, including predatory
child molestors, forcible rapists, and repeat violent sex offenders, are auto-
matically released each year into society." Among these individuals this year will
upon the petition can be had until the committed person has been under confinement and care for at least one
year from the order date of the commitment); id. § 6608(d) (enacted by Chapter 763) (setting forth a
conditional release program of one year for people released pursuant to a petition under California Penal Code
§ 6608); id. § 6608(e) (enacted by Chapter 763) (stating the method for recommending a conditional release
program); id. § 6608(g) (enacted by Chapter 763) (explaining that if the court rules against the committed at
the trial for an unconditional release from commitment, the court may put the person in outpatient status as set
forth in California Penal Code §§ 1600-1620); id. § 6608(h) (enacted by Chapter 763) (reporting that if the
court refuses to place the person in an appropriate forensic conditional release program, or if the petition for
unconditional release is denied, the person must wait at least one year before filing another petition); id. §
6608(i) (enacted by Chapter 763) (mandating that the petitioner has the burden of proving by a preponderance
of evidence when a hearing is requested under California Penal Code § 6603); id. § 6608(k) (enacted by
Chapter 763) (noting that time that is spent in a conditional release program pursuant to California Penal Code
§ 6608 does not count toward the time of commitment unless the individual is confined in a locked location
during part of the conditional release program, in which case, the time spent locked up will count toward the
term of the commitment). For examples of other states' petition for release procedures, see IOWA COD. ANN.
§§ 709C.8, 709C.9 (West Supp. 1995); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-29-alO, 59-29-al I (1994); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 71.09.090,71.09.100 (West 1992 & Supp. 1994). See generally McCaffrey, supra note 18, at 393-95
(discussing the release procedure of committed sexual violent predators in the State of Kansas).
28. Mary L. Vellinga, Mentally Ill Sex Criminals Face Longer Lockup, SACRAMENTO BEE, Oct. 11,
1995, at A3.
29. Telephone Interview with Nancy Leneis, Legislative Consultant to Senator Richard Mounfjoy on
SB 1143 (Oct. 11, 1995) (notes on file with the Pacific Law Journal). Compare 1995 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 762,
sec. 1-3, at 4604-10, with 1995 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 763, sec. 1-3, at 4610-16.
30. Telephone Interview with Nancy Leneis, supra note 29; see Vellinga, supra note 28. at A3 (labeling
both SB 1143 and AB 888 as a "two bill package" and noting that they were passed together by an
overwhelming bipartisan vote in the Assembly and Senate).
31. Vellinga, supra note 28, at A3; see id. (quoting Governor Wilson as stating that Chapter 763 is a
way to keep society's most dangerous and mentally disturbed predators off the streets); id. (citing Governor
Wilson as believing that Chapter 763 will rid California of liberal laws that allow sick and dangerous criminals
to be released from prison).
32. ASSEMBLY FLOOR, COMTE ANALYSIS OFAB 888, at 4 (June 2, 1995).
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be Reginald Muldrew, the "Pillowcase" serial rapist, who, as of this writing, is
scheduled to be released from prison in early December, 1995.
3
The California Legislature declares that there are a small number of sexually
violent predators in society?34 Although the number is small, these individuals are
perceived by the California Legislature as being dangerous to the health and
safety of others.35
The author of Chapter 763 states that past law created no authority to detain
these individuals.36 Thus, Chapter 763 was enacted in realization of this and
therefore establishes a civil commitment procedure for the placement and
treatment of these individuals in a safe mental health facility after their release
from incarceration3 7
As of January 1, 1994, the California Department of Corrections had 8295
prisoners who fell under the provisions of Chapter 763.3' However, it is not
known how many inmates would have actually been deemed sexually violent
predators.3 9
33. Serial Rapist Free Next Month, SACRAMENTo BEE, Oct. 11, 1995, at B4; see id. (reporting that
Muldrew will complete his sentence on November 29 and should be free five days later); id. (discussing the
sexual crimes committed by Muldrew); see also Vellinga, supra note 28, at A3 (quoting Senator Mountjoy as
stating that he decided to create this legislation last year after thousands of people in his district protested out
of fear that Muldrew would be paroled to their area).
34. 1995 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 763, sec. 3, at 4611-16 (enacting CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 6600-
6608).
35. Id.; see Telephone Interview with Nancy Leneis, supra note 29 (stating that it is unconscionable
for sexual predators to prey upon innocent people and that these predators are not well and need to receive
appropriate treatment); id. (relating an example of a woman who had ammonia poured in her eyes, was raped
by a group of individuals, and was raped with a knife as well; presently the woman is in the hospital again,
fighting for her life, while the people who did this to her will be released from prison in one year);
Metropolitan Digest/ Los Angeles County News in Brief. Glendale; Wilson Backs Bill to Commit Violent Sex
Offenders, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 20, 1995, at B2 (stating that Governor Pete Wilson supported a bill similar to SB
1143 in fighting sexual predators); Tom Precious, How Many... Children Will It Have to Take?, TIMES UNION
(Albany, N.Y.), June 15, 1995, at Al (discussing horrendous sexual acts committed on children and the anger
expressed by people over these types of acts); Tony Rizzo, Sex Predator Law Gets Johnson County Test; Trial
to Decide If Man Will be Ordered to a Mental Institution, KAN. CITY STAR, Apr. 4, 1995, at A l (describing
numerous sex crimes one individual has committed in his lifetime; including masturbation in front of young
girls, spying on the girls' shower while employed as a school janitor, attempted rape of his then wife, and the
making of obscene phone calls); cf. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01 (1994) (proclaiming the legislative intent
behind the State of Kansas' sexually violent predator statutes); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.010 (West
1992) (describing the legislative intent behind the State of Washington's sexually violent predator statutes).
36. ASSEMBLY FLOOR, COMMrrfEE ANALYSIS oFAB 888, at 4 (June 2, 1995); see SENATE COMMrrraa
oN CRMINALPROcEDURE,CoMMrrmEEANALYSisOFSB 1143, at 2-3 (Apr. 25, 1995) (discussing the California
Mentally Disordered Act, which was enacted in 1967 and repealed in 1981, which allowed for the commitment
of the offender based upon a showing beyond a reasonable doubt that there was a danger and that the person
could benefit from the treatment); id. at 3 (discussing current California law concerning mentally disordered
offenders, which includes both an inpatient or outpatient treatment program for applicable persons).
37. ASSEMBLY FLOOR, COMMrrrEE ANALYSTS OFAB 888, at 4 (Sept. 15, 1995).
38. SENATE COMMTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS. COMMITEE ANALYSIS OF AB 888, at I (Sept. 6, 1995).
39. SENATECOMMrrEEONAPPROPRIArIONS,COMMrrrEEANALYSISOFSB 1143, at 1 (May 15, 1995);
see id. (suggesting that staff of the California Department of Corrections believes that a high number of
individuals would be convicted).
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Chapter 763 will most likely face constitutional challenges in many areas.40
What follows is a discussion in each area of potential constitutional challenge.
DOUBLE JEOPARDY AND Ex POST FAcTO LAWS
Civil commitment procedures have faced challenges under the Double
Jeopardy Clause4 ' and the Ex Post Facto Clause.4" However, a very early
Supreme Court Case held that the Ex Post Facto Clause only applies to
retrospective criminal statutes.43 The California Legislature, in its declaration
regarding Chapter 763, labels Chapter 763 a civil commitment program."
In contrast, the Supreme Court held in United States v. Halpeti,5 that the
Double Jeopardy Clause can apply in a civil setting when the additional civil
penalty is punitive in nature. ' Critics believe that Chapter 763 is punitive in
nature, based on their belief that the intent of Chapter 763 is to keep sexual
predators incarcerated.47
Nonetheless, in a recent Washington State case, the Washington Supreme
Court held that statutory commitment of sexually violent predators in Washington
is civil in nature and therefore does not violate the prohibition against ex post
facto laws.48 Further, by application of the test set forth in Halper, the
Washington Supreme Court found that the statutory commitment of sexually
violent predators in Washington does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause.4 9
Thus, based on the Washington State Supreme Court's analysis, Chapter 763
40. SENATE FLOOR, CoM~irrrEE ANALYSIS OF AB 888, at 4 (Sept. 13, 1995); see SENATE FLOOR,
CoMMtrTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 1143, at 4 (May 31, 1995) (noting that the ACLU opposes SB 1143 (AB 888)
on both policy and constitutional grounds and believes that it violates substantive due process).
41. See U.S. CONsT. amend V (proclaiming that no person can be tried twice for the same offence);
Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784,794 (1969) (holding that through the Fourteenth Amendment, the Double
Jeopardy Clause applies to the states).
42. McCaffrey, supra note 18, at 895; see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 (stating that no ex post facto law
can be passed); id. § 10, cl. I (mandating that no state can pass an ex post facto law); CAL. CONST. art. I, § 9
(mandating that ex post facto laws may not be passed). See generally 7 B.E. WrrKIN, SUiMARY OF CALIwORNIA
LAW, Constitutional Law § 419 (9th ed. 1988) (explaining that an ex post facto law is a retrospective statute
that applies to crimes committed before the passage of the statute and substantially harms the accused).
43. Calderv. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 391 (1798).
44. 1995 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 763, sec. 3. at 4611-16 (enacting CAL. WELF. & IZsT. CODE §§ 6600-
6608).
45. 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
46. Id. at 448-49; see id. at 447-48 (holding that the labeling of a statute as either criminal or civil is
not of great importance, but that a civil as well as a criminal sanction can constitute punishment when the
penalty as applied serves the goals of punishment); id. at 448 (noting that the goals of punishment are
retribution and deterrence); id. at 448-49 (holding that under the Double Jeopardy Clause a person who has
previously been punished in a criminal action may not be subjected to an additional civil penalty to the extent
that the second penalty can not be fairly characterized as remedial, but only as a deterrent or retribution).
47. SENATE COMMrrrW E ON CRBIINAL PROCEDURE, COM mTE ANALYSIS OF SB 1143, at 12 (Apr. 25,
1995).
48. In re Young, 857 P.2d 989,999 (Wash. 1993).
49. Id. at 999-1000.
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would appear to survive both of these constitutional challenges since its wording
is based in part upon Washington's sexual predator statutes.50
However, in Young v. Weston,51 a United States District judge found that
Washington's Sexual Violent Predator Statute does violate both the Ex Post Facto
Clause and the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Constitution. 2 Applying the test
set forth in United States v. Ward,3 the court determined that the Washington
statute is criminal in nature and violates the Ex Post Facto Clause.' The court
found that the Double Jeopardy Clause was violated through application of the
Halper test, which is the exact opposite result of that reached by the Washington
State Supreme Court in In re Young. s5
In Allen v. Illinois,56 the Supreme Court found an Illinois civil commitment
procedure based upon dangerous sexual acts to be civil in nature.' The Supreme
Court based its holding on the fact that the Illinois Supreme Court found the
statute to be civil in nature, the state was statutorily obligated to provide care and
treatment to those committed, committed persons were released when they were
no longer considered dangerous, and release on a conditional basis was made
50. SENATE COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, COMMITrEE ANALYSIS OF SB 1143, at 4 (Apr. 25,
1995); see id. (stating that SB 1143 is loosely patterned in part after Washington's sexual predator statutes);
id. (reporting that SB 1143 is also loosely patterned in part after Minnesota's civil commitment statutes); see
also Bailey v. Gardebring, 940 F.2d 1150, 1153 (8th Cir. 1991) (affirning the holdings of the district court and
state courts before it, that Minnesota's civil commitment of a sexually violent predator does not violate the
Constitution), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1516 (1992); McCaffrey, supra note 18, at 896 (noting that the statutory
language of the Sexual Predator Act in Kansas is very similar to that of the Illinois statute upheld in Allen v.
Illinois, 478 U.S. 364 (1985)); id. (stating that civil commitment is found to be constitutional because of
different goals associated with civil commitment as compared to criminal confinement); id. (explaining that
civil commitment is aimed towards help, care, and treatment, while criminal incarceration is geared toward
deterrence and retribution).
51. No. C94-480C, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12928 (W.D. Wash. 1995).
52. Id. at *30.
53. 448 U.S. 242 (1980).
54. Young v. Weston, No. C94-480C, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12928, *28 (W.D. Wash. 1995); see id.
at *22-23 (citing United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242 (1980) and stating that where the legislature has
expressed an intention to establish a civil law, the Court must determine whether that law is so punitive either
in purpose or effect as to negate that expressed intention; only the clearest proof will work to establish the
unconstitutionality of a statute on this ground); id. at *23-24 (providing a list of factors to assist a court in
determining whether a statute is civil or criminal for purposes of the Ex Post Facto Clause: (1) whether the
sanction includes an affirmative disability or restraint, (2) whether it has in the past been regarded as a
punishment, (3) whether it materializes only on a finding of scienter, (4) whether the statute's operation will
promote retribution and deterrence, which are the traditional aims of punishment, (5) whether the behavior to
which it attaches is already a crime, (6) whether another purpose to which it could be rationally connected is
assignable for it, and (7) whether it appears to be excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned); id.
at *25-28 (using and applying some of the factors listed above in reaching its conclusion).
55. Id. at *28-30.
56. 478 U.S. 364 (1986).
57. Id. at 375.
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available." Since Chapter 763 arguably provides all of these measures, "the
argument that Chapter 763 is civil in nature may pass the test set forth in Allen.
Considering conflicting precedent at various levels on the issue of whether
the similar Washington State Sexual Predator Statutes violate the Ex Post Facto
and Double Jeopardy Clauses, it is unclear whether Chapter 763 will pass these
constitutional obstacles. Nonetheless, it may be safe to assume that the
Washington Supreme Court's decision may carry more weight than the district
court decision. Strengthening this argument is the fact that the decision is being
appealed.6° This would mean, of course, that the district court's decision could be
overturned.
The argument for reversal may be strong for both the Ex Post Facto Clause
and Double Jeopardy Clause analyses. Since it is central to both an ex post facto
and double jeopardy challenge that the law in question be determined to be a
criminal-type punishment, a court must find such punishment before finding
either clause violated. The District Court in Young v. Weston recognized this and
explicitly so stated.6 t Given the alleged equality of the analysis under both
clauses, the court may, by using the Ward test, have nonetheless applied the
wrong test with respect to the Ex Post Facto Clause analysis 2 and, in turn,
prejudiced the Double Jeopardy Clause analysis by espousing the sameness of
both analyses. Though the Court set forth the Halper standard in its Double
Jeopardy Clause analysis, it arguably did not apply it.63
58. Id. at 369,369 n.4; see 1995 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 763, sec. 3, at 4611-16 (enacting CAL. WarF. &
INST. CODE §§ 6600-6608) (stating that Chapter 763 is civil in nature); see also CAL. WELr. & INST. CODE §
6606(a) (enacted by Chapter 763) (guaranteeing treatment to individuals committed as sexually violent
predators); a § 6608(a) (enacted by Chapter 763) (allowing an individual to petition for both conditional and
unconditional release).
59. See CAL. War. & INST. CODE § 6606(a) (enacted by Chapter 763) (obligating the state to provide
treatment for the committed sexually violent predator); see also id. § 6605(f) (enacted by Chapter 763)
(providing a procedure to release committed sexually violent predators when they are deemed no longer
dangerous); id. § 6608(a) (enacted by Chapter 763) (allowing for release of a committed sexually violent
predator upon a conditional basis). But see Young v. Weston, No. C94-480C, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12928,
*26 (W.D. Wash. 1995) (distinguishing the Illinois statutory scheme, that was upheld in Allen, from the
Washington statutory scheme in that the Washington statutory scheme does not have the requirement that the
State elect either punishment or treatment at the time the individual is charged); id. (contrasting the two statutes
further in that the Washington statutory scheme mandates that the convicted sex offender serve his sentence
prior to commitment, and thus, the state does not have the power to initiate proceedings until the sentence of
the individual in question is about to expire, or has expired).
60. Vellinga, supra note 28.
61. Young v. Weston, No. C94-480C, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12928, *30 (W.D. Wash. 1995); see Id.
(determining that in the court's analysis of the Ex Post Facto Clause, the Washington statute in question serves
the traditional aims of punishment, which are retribution and deterrence; the analysis applies equally for the
question posed regarding the double jeopardy challenge).
62. See United States v. $405,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210, 1218 (9th Cir. 1994) (interpreting
the Ward test as having been abandoned by the United States Supreme Court in Halper).
63. Young v. Weston, No. C94-480C, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12928, *28-30 (W.D. Wash. 1995).
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SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
The United States Supreme Court has held that the right to be free from
bodily restraint is a fundamental right." Substantive due process 65 requires that
any governmental restrictions on a fundamental right must be examined under
strict scrutiny; that is, the restriction must be the least restrictive means of
accomplishing a compelling governmental interest.! InAddington v. Texas,67 the
Supreme Court held that the state must prove by clear and convincing evidence
that the individual who is to be committed is mentally ill and that he or she
requires hospitalization for his or her own benefit and for the safety of others.68
Further, in Foucha v. Louisiana,6' the Supreme Court held that an individual can
be committed through civil commitment proceedings, and satisfy substantive due
process, only if the state proves by clear and convincing evidence that the
individual is mentally ill and dangerous. 0 Since Chapter 763 requires a burden
of proof beyond a reasonable doubt,7t Chapter 763 should face no attack for
committing a person due to a low standard of proof.
The Washington State case of In re Young7' held that a Washington State
dangerous sexual predator commitment statute did in fact further a compelling
state interest both in treating sexual predators and in protecting society from their
actions.73 Also, the Supreme Court of Washington found that both mental
abnormality and personality disorders are legitimate mental disorders and thus
satisfy the mental illness requirement as set forth in Foucha.74 Further, the
64. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739,750 (1987).
65. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (mandating that no state can take away from any person his life,
liberty, or property, absent due process of law). See generally 7 B.E. WrmN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW,
Constitutional Law § 481 (9th ed. 1988 & Supp 1995) (discussing procedural and substantive due process).
66. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973), reh'g denied, 410 U.S. 959 (1973).
67. 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
68. Id. at 433.
69. 112 S. Ct. 1780 (1992).
70. Id. at 1784
71. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6604 (enacted by Chapter 763) (requiring a burden of proof of
beyond a reasonable dcubt in determining whether a person is a sexually violent predator).
72. 857 P.2d 989 (Wash. 1993).
73. Id. at 1000.
74. Id. at 1001-03, nn.4-6; see SENATE COMMrTEE ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, COMMrrTEE ANALYSIS
oFSB 1143, at 11 (Apr. 25, 1995) (arguing that SB 1143 falls to meet the minimum requirements as set forth
in Foucha since "sexually violent predator" as defined in the statute does not apply to individuals who are
mentally ill); see also Erin Gunn, Comment, Recent Developments: Washington's Sexually Violent Predator
Law: The "Predatory" Requirement, 5 UCLA WOMEN'S L. J. 277,278 (1994) (asserting that Washington's
sexually violent predator law is unconstitutional because it allows a person to be committed based solely upon
assumptions of future dangerousness and that the law allows for the civil commitment of persons who do not
have a mental illness); id. at 282 (propounding that even if Washington's sexually violent predator law is not
criminal in nature, it is an unconstitutional civil statute due to the belief that it does not require proof of mental
illness for commitment); Roy E. Pardee III, Note, Fear and Loathing in Louisiana: Confining the Sane
Dangerous Insanity Acquittee, 36 ARIZ. L. REV. 223, 230-32 (1994) (arguing that Washington State's sexual
predator civil confinement laws are unconstitutional and the terms personality disorder and mental abnormality
as defined are not mental illnesses).
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Washington Supreme Court held that to commit presently impriso'ied individuals
does not require a recent overt act to prove dangerousness." However, in the case
of persons who are not presently imprisoned, the petition for commitment must
include an allegation of a recent overt act that is sufficient to establish probable
cause.
7 6
Making the issue more confusing is the fact that the court in Young v. Weston
held that the Washington State statute violates an individual's right to substantive
due process, which is the exact opposite holding of that in In re Young. 77 The
court in Young v. Weston based its decision in part upon the finding that
Washington's Sexually Violent Predator Statute can confine a person for an
indefinite period of time.73 Further, the opinion attacked the Washington statute
as abandoning the requirement of a mental illness for civil committment. 9
In contrast to the Washington statute, Chapter 763 requires that for a person
to be committed as a sexually violent predator, he or she must have a diagnosed
mental disorder.80 Though the mental condition requirement is not known as
mental abnormality under Chapter 763, the definition is exactly the same as
Washington State's definition of mental abnormality but for one word: Chapter
763 replaces the word "means" with "includes" in the defintion.8t Further, experts
in the trials in question in the Washington State Supreme Court case believed the
term mental abnormality to be nearly identical by definition to the term "mental
disorder."32 Thus, both terms probably can be used interchangeably.
Therefore, given the scholarly criticism of the legitamacy of mental
abnormality as a mental illness, the broader definition found in Chapter 763 of
mental disorder, and the fact that the Washington Supreme Court based its ruling
75. In re Young, 857 P.2d at 1008-09.
76. Id. at 1009.
77. Young v. Weston, No. C94-480C, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12928, *20 (W.D. Wash. 1995).
78. lad at *14; see Vellinga, supra note 28 (quoting Senator Mountjoy as proclaiming that California's
Sexually Violent Predator Laws has the potential of keeping these individuals in jail indefinitely); see also
SENATE FLOOR, COsmrEE ANALYSiS oFAB 888, at 4 (Sept. 13, 1995) (noting that AB 888 is opposed by the
American Civil Liberties Union due to its belief that the law violates principles of substantive due process
because AB 888 would permit the state to indefinitely confine in mental facilities individuals convicted of
sexually motivated crimes based on perceived fears that these individuals will commit future crimes).
79. Young, No. C94-480C, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12928 at *14-20.
80. CAL. WELF. & INsT. CODE § 6600(a) (enacted by Chapter 763).
81. Compare id § 6600(c) (enacted by Chapter 763) (defining "diagnosed mental disorder" as including
a congential or acquired condition that affects the emotional or volitional capacity that makes the person
susceptible to commit criminal sexual acts in such a degree that makes the person a danger to the health and
safety of others) with VASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.020(2) (West Supp. 1995) (defining "mental
abnormality" as meaning a congential or acquired condition that affects the emotional or volitional capacity
that makes the person susceptible to commit criminal sexual acts in such a degree that makes the person a
danger to the health and safety of others). See IOWA CODE ANN. § 709C.2(1) (West Supp. 1995) (providing a
definition of "mental abnormality" exactly the same as the one found in Washington Code § 71.09.020(2));
KAN. STAT. ANN. 59-29a02(b) (1994) (defining "mental abnormality' exactly the same as found in Washington
Code § 71.09.020(2)); see also Young v. Weston, No. C94-480C, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12928 at *16 (finding that
Washington Code § 71.09.020(2) provides a definition of no value to treatment professionals and in turn, is
a sign that the State did not intend to commit only the seriously mentally ill).
82. In re Young, 857 P.2d989, 1001 (Wash. 1993).
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upon a narrower definition of mental abnormality, no case is on point concerning
the language found in Chapter 763. Even Governor Wilson seems confused in an
attempt to distinguish Chapter 763 from Washington law. Governor Wilson
believes that Chapter 763 should withstand constitutional attack due in part to his
statement that an individual must be found to have a diagnosable mental illness. 3
The term "mental illness" is not found anywhere in the text of Chapter 763. The
Governor seems to be confusing the term "mental illenss" with the term "mental
disorder," which is arguably "mental abnormality" in disguise.
Thus, given the arguably open ended definition of mental disorder found in
Chapter 763 (which is a mental abnormality in disguise), a person possibly could
be committed who is not mentally ill, which would violate the requirements of
Foucha and in turn, deny the person his or her right to due process on a
substantive level.
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
The United States Constitution guarantees procedural due process.84 The
procedural portion of the Due Process Clause guarantees that a person cannot be
deprived of life, liberty, or property without constitutionally adequate process.85
However, note the distinction that procedural due process requirements are
provided to protect individuals not from the deprivation of the right, but from the
erroneous or unjustified deprivation of life, liberty, or property.
8 6
The United States Supreme Court has held that the right to be free from
bodily restraint is a strong liberty interest.s7 Thus, it would appear that procedural
due process must be afforded to commited sexually violent predators.88
Due process has been interpreted by the United States Supreme Court to be
flexible in nature when procedural protections are provided for whatever is called
for in a particular situation.89 However, the United States Supreme Court has held
that three distinct factors must be considered in the application of procedural due
process. 90 However, based upon the Washington Supreme Court's finding in In
83. Vellinga, supra note 28.
84. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see id. (mandating that no State, without due process of law, take
from any person his or her life, liberty, or property). See generally 7 B.E. WmrraN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA
LAW, Constitutional Law § 481 (9th ed. 1988 & Supp 1995) (discussing procedural and substantive due
process).
85. Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125-26 (1990).
86. Id.
87. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739,750 (1987).
88. ASSEMBLYCOMMrTEEoNPuEiUcSAFETY, COmmrmfANALYSiSOFSB 1143,at 8 (July 11, 1995);
see id. (believing that a liberty interest is involved with SB 1143, and thus, procedural due process must be
satisfied).
89. Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961).
90. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976); see id. (providing the following factors to be
considered: (1) the private interest that will be influenced by the official action; (2) the risk of any deprivation
of such interest based upon error through the procedures used and the likely value, if any exists, of any other
or substitute procedural safeguards; and (3) the Government's interest, which includes the function involved
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re Young, it would appear that Chapter 763 should survive a procedural due
process attack.91 The author of Chapter 763 also believes that procedural due
process is met in the present instance?2
CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT
The Eighth Amendment protects against cruel and unusual punishment. 93 The
basic test to determine whether a punishment is cruel or unusual is to look toward
the evolving standards of decency that show the progress of a society that is
maturing? 4 Further, it has been said that a punishment is considered cruel and
unusual if it does not afford human dignity.95
Chapter 763 may face attack based upon cruel and unusual punishment as last
year a United States magistrate found that the lack of adequate care for mentally
ill prisoners by the Department of Corrections is cruel and unusual punishment
based upon indifference expressed by the Department.6 In fact, it is suggested
that the Department of Corrections acknowledges that mental health care within
the Department has been lacking in quality for many years.
97
and the administrative and fiscal burdens that the additional or different procedural requirement would need).
91. In re Young, 857 P.2d 989, 1011-12 (Wash. 1993); see id. (discussing and applying due process
principles to the Washington State Sexual Predator Statutes and holding that they do not violate due process).
But see Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of Offense: Punishment, Treatment, and the
Difference it Makes, 68 B.U. L. REV. 821,893 (1988) (asserting that in institutions such as facilities for the
mentally ill and mentally retarded, states confine individuals for their own benefit without providing to these
individuals procedural safeguards that are found in criminal proceedings); id. at 893 n.350 (suggesting that
imprisoning a person without treatment is punishment and punishing a person requires full criminal procedural
safeguards); id. at 893-94 (arguing that the promise of a benefit in these settings in turn justifie3 less stringent
procedural safeguards, and that failing to perform the expected treatment results in custodial confinement,
punitive incarceration, and a loss of liberty, which is for all intents and purposes, a due process violation).
92. ASSEmBLYCOMMrrTEEONPUBLucSAFETY,COMMrTrEEANALYSISOFSB 1143,at8 (July 11, 1995);
see i&d (noting among other things that SB 1143 requires a trial to be had if necessary, counsel to be provided
to the person, and the right of yearly review).
93. U.S. CONST. amend VIII.
94. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (plurality opinion) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S.
86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion)).
95. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,270 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring).
96. SENATE COMrTE ON CRIMINAL PROcEDURE, COMM1iTEE ANALYSIS oF SB 1143, at 8 (Apr. 25,
1995); see id. (noting that the delivery of mental health care within the California Department of Corrections
has been for many years, and still is, highly inadequate); id. (finding also that mentally ill persons who do
receive some types of treatment suffer unecessary delays in access to needed psychiatric care).
97. Id.; see Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (stating that intentional indifference to serious
medical needs of prisoners is cruel and unusual punishment, and thus violates the Eighth Amendment); Bailey
v. Gardebring, 940 F.2d 1150, 1155 (8th Cir. 1991) (interpreting Estelle to mean that absent a reliable medical
diagnosis of some serious mental illness that can be treated, at least partially by some type of treatment,
prisoners have no right founded upon the Constitution to state-provided psychiatric treatment), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 1516 (1992); cf. Feld, supra note 91, at 893 (describing the environment of Texas juvenile treatment
facilities as violent and understaffed); id. at 894-95 (offering examples of abuses found in juvenile centers).
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CONCLUSION
Even though there is past case law that looks favorably upon Chapter 763,
Chapter 763 may still face constitutional challenge. In re Young, the Washington
Supreme Court case, which holds Chapter 763's strongest support, is only a state
decided case. Chapter 763 is modeled in part after the Washington statutes, but
considering the possible difference in mental illness definitions, Chapter 763
could face substantive due process challenges.
Further, given the fact that the United States Supreme Court has not heard a
case involving the Washington statutes and that ample criticism exists that attacks
the validity of Washington's sexual predator laws, Chapter 763 may very well
face constitutional challenge in the future in multiple areas. The possibility of
Chapter 763 facing constitutional attack may be increased by the unfavorable
district court decision. Conceivably, from this district court case, the United




Government Code § 6254 (amended); Penal Code § 646.92 (new); §
646.9 (amended).
AB 985 (Firestone); 1995 STAT. Ch. 438
Under existing law, a person is guilty of the crime of stalking when he or she
willfully,' maliciously, 2 and repeatedly follows or harasses3 another person and
makes a credible threat with the intent to place that person in reasonable fear for
his or her safety, or the safety of his or her immediate family.4 Existing law
1. See CAL. PENALCODE § 7 (West 1988) (defining "willfully" as a purpose or willingness to commit
the act, but intent to violate the law is not required); see also People v. McCaughey, 261 Cal. App. 2d 131, 135,
67 Cal. Rptr. 683, 685 (1968) (ruling that the term "willfully" does not require an evil intent, but rather, a
purpose or willingness to commit the act).
2. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 7 (West 1988) (defining "maliciously" as wishing to vex, annoy, or injure
another person).
3. See id. § 646.9(d) (amended by Chapter 438) (defining "harasses" as a knowing and willful course
of conduct, without a legitimate purpose meant to seriously alarm, annoy, torment, or terrorize a specific
person).
4. lit § 646.9(a) (amended by Chapter 438); see id. (providing that a violation is punishable by up to
one year in jail and/or a fine not exceeding $1000); id. § 646.9(k) (amended by Chapter 438) (defining
"immediate family" as any spouse, parent, child, or person who regularly resides in the household); id. §
646.9(b) (amended by Chapter 438) (stating that a violation where there has been a restraining order in place
is punishable by a term in prison of up to four years); id. § 646.9(c) (amended by Chapter 438) (punishing
subsequent violations by imprisonment for up to four years); see also People v. Heilman, 25 Cal. App. 4th 391,
400, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 422, 427 (1994) (concluding that the use of the word "repeatedly" did not render
California Penal Code § 646.9 unconstitutionally vague since its meaning was one of common understanding
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defines "credible threat" to mean any threat, or a threat combined with conduct,
made with the intent and apparent ability to carry out the threat, so as to put the
targeted person in reasonable fear for his or her safety or the safety of his or her
immediate family.5
Chapter 438 provides that it is not necessary to prove that the defendant
intended to carry out the threat.
6
Prior law permitted the court to issue restraining orders valid for up to ten
years against a defendant convicted of stalking, but orders over five years could
only be granted in extreme cases.7 Chapter 438 removes the extreme case require-
ment for restraining orders exceeding five years.8
Chapter 438 also permits the court to require a person convicted of felonious
stalking to register as a sex offender if the court determines that the offense is
sexual in nature.9 Additionally, Chapter 438 adds stalking to the list of crimes in
which disclosure of information regarding the identity of the victiml° is
prohibited.i
and did not create a danger of arbitrary enforcement); cf. Commonwealth v. Kwiatkowski, 637 N.E.2d 854,
857 (Mass. 1994) (deciding that the use of the terms "repeatedly follows or harasses," was unconstitutionally
vague since it was uncertain whether the harassment had to take place on more than one occasion). See
generally Nannette Diacovo, Comment, California's Anti-Stalking Statute: Deterrent or False Sense of
Security?, 24 SW. U. L. REV. 389 (1995) (providing an overview of California Penal Code § 646.9 as well as
its effectiveness in deterring the crime of stalking).
5. CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9(g) (amended by Chapter 438); see id. (providing that a talking
conviction will not be barred even though the defendant was incarcerated at the time of making the threat); ef.
DE.. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1312A(b)(3) (1994) (requiring the threat to be made against the victim's life or to
cause serious bodily harm).
6. C.AL. PENAL CODE § 646.9(g) (amended by Chapter 438).
7. 1992 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 627, sec. 1, at 2421 (amending CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9(i)).
8. CAL PENAL CODE § 646.9(j) (amended by Chapter 438). Compare 1992 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 627,
sec. 1, at 2421 (amending CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9(i)) (stating that the length of the order was to be based
upon the seriousness of the facts of the case, the probability of future violations, and ensuring the safety of the
victim) with CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.90) (amended by Chapter 438) (retaining the same factors in conidering
the length of the order).
9. CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9(d) (amended by Chapter 438); see id. § 290(e) (We;t Supp. 1995)
(requiring the court to state the reasons on record for requiring the registration of the offender); see also People
v. King, 16 Cal. App. 4th 567, 576,20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 220,225 (1993) (holding that a defendant's culpability
for a misdemeanor sex offense was not so disproportionate to the punishment of requiring him to register as
a sex offender pursuant to California Penal Code § 290, as to constitute cruel and unusual punishment); cf
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3717(d)(1)(C)(i),(ii) (1994) (permitting a court to extend the post-release supervision
period of a defendant convicted of a sex offense provided the court states on the record the reasons for the
extension); id. § 22-3717(d)(1)(C)(vii) (1994) (requiring the registration as habitual sex offenders of persons
convicted of sex offenses or crimes which are sexual in nature). But see In re Reed, 33 Cal. 3d. 914, 926, 663
P.2d 216, 222, 191 Cal. Rptr. 658, 665 (1983) (holding that requiring a defendant to register as a sex offender
for a conviction of soliciting lewd or dissolute conduct was disproportional to the offense and constituted cruel
and unusual punishment).
10. See CAL. PENALCODE § 679.01 (West 1988) (defining "victim" as someone against whom a crime
is committed).
11. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 6254(0(2) (amended by Chapter 438); see id. (listing crimes for which
disclosure of information conceming- the victim is proscribed); see also Black Panther Party v. Kehoe, 42 Cal.
App. 3d 645, 655, 117 Cal. Rptr. 106, 112 (1974) (holding that exemptions from disclosure of public records
do not violate the public's First Amendment right of access to information). See generally Sarah H. Hutt, Note,
In Praise of Public Access: Why the Government Should Disclose the Identities ofAlleged Crime Victims, 41
Pacific Law Journal/Vol. 27
Crimes
COMMENT
The crime of stalking is a recent phenomenon and many states have rushed
to implement statutes 2 to counter its violent consequences since California
enacted the nation's first anti-stalking law in 1990.13
There has been some concern that anti-stalking legislation violates
constitutional rights, and several states' anti-stalking laws have been ruled
unconstitutional due to vagueness. 4
The United States Supreme Court has held that a statute must define the
criminal offense with sufficient clarity so that an ordinary person can understand
what conduct is prohibited, otherwise that statute will be unconstitutionally
DUKE LJ. 368 (1991) (examining whether restrictions on the release of information concerning victims
infringes on the public's right to access information).
12. See ALAsKA STAT. §§ 11.41.260, 11.41.270 (1994) (prohibiting activities that constitute
nonconsensual contact); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-71-229(a)(1) (Michie 1993) (imposing the requirement that the
defendant harass the victim and make a terroristic threat in order to be convicted of stalking); D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 22-504(b) (1994) (providing that a person who repeatedly follows or harasses another without a legal purpose
with the intent to cause emotional distress is guilty of the crime of stalking); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-90(a)
(Michie 1994) (defining "stalking" as following, placing under surveillance, or contacting another person
without his or her consent for the purpose of harassing or intimidating that person); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 720,
para. 5/12-7.3(a) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1995) (requiring that the defendant knowingly and without justification
follow another person on at least two occasions and communicate a threat or place that person in reasonable
apprehension of bodily harm before the statute's protections can take effect); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A,
§ 506-A(l) (West Supp. 1994) (providing that any person who engages in a course of conduct with the intent
to harass, torment, or threaten another person after having been forbidden to do so by a law officer or judge
is guilty of the crime of harassment); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-220(1)(a),(b) (1993) (criminalizing conduct
which causes another person substantial emotional distress by defendant's repeatedly following, harassing,
threatening, or intimidating that person); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 120.13, 120.14 (McKinney Supp. 1995)
(classifying stalking as the crime of menacing); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-277.3(a)(1)-(3) (1993) (prohibiting a
defendant from following or being in the presence of another person on more than one occasion without legal
purpose and with the intent to cause that person emotional distress, or after reasonable warning to desist on
behalf of that person); OR. REV. STAT. § 163.732(1) (Supp. 1994) (defining "stalking" as a repeated and
unwanted contact with a person, serving no legitimate purpose, which causes that person to be alarmed or
coerced); TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.07(a)(l)-(7) (West 1994) (categorizing stalking as the crime of
harassment).
13. ASSEMBLYCOMMrrTEEoNPuBuC SAFETY, CO rrEE ANALYSIS OFAB 985, at 4 (Apr. 18,1995);
see id (observing that the rush by the states to enact anti-stalking statutes resulted in several flawed statutes).
See generally Susan E. Berstein, Note, Living Under Siege: Do Stalking Laws Protect Domestic Violence
Victims?, 15 CARDOzo L. REV. 525 (1994) (discussing the need for anti-stalking legislation); Laurie Salame,
Note, A National Survey of Stalking Laws: A Legislative Trend Comes to the Aid of Domestic Violence Victims
and Others, 27 SuFFoLKU. L. REv. 67 (1993) (providing an overview of all the states' anti-stalking legislation
as well as challenges that have arisen); Marsha Ginsburg, Tougher Law Takes New Aim at Stalkers, S.F.
ExAANER, Jan. 2, 1994, at Al (stating that although the stalkings of celebrities gets more notice, 90% of all
stalking victims are ordinary people); Mike Tharp, In the Mind ofa Stalker, U.S. NEWs & WORLD REP., Feb.
17, 1992, at 28 (observing that 1 in 20 adults will be stalked in their lifetime).
14. Dean Copelan, Comment, Is Georgia's Stalking Law Unconstitutionally Vague?, 45 MERCER L.
REV. 853, 853 (1994); see Commonwealth v. Kwiatkowski, 637 N.E.2d 854, 857 (Mass. 1994) (holding that
the use of the terms, "repeatedly follows or harasses", was unconstitutionally vague since it was uncertain
whether the harassment had to take place on more than one occasion); Oregon v. Norris-Romine, 894 P.2d
1221, 1225 (Or. App. 1995) (finding that the use of the words "without a legitimate purpose" made the stalking
statute unconstitutionally vague). See generally M. Katherine Boychuk, Comment, Are Stalking Laws
Unconstitutionally Vague or Overbroad?, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 769 (1994) (discussing potential challenges to
the constitutionality of stalking laws).
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vague.'5 California's anti-stalking law survived a constitutional challenge in 1994
when an appellate court held that the statute was not unconstitutionally vague.
6
Chapter 438 was enacted to help clarify the ambiguity in the wording of the
previous statute, which seemed to require that the defendant actually intend to
carry out the threat, and not just intend to terrorize the victim.' 7 Proponents of
Chapter 438 argued that requiring the defendant to intend to carry out the threat
would make prosecutions for stalking more difficult, and lessen the intended
protection offered by the statute.'"
Chapter 438, in listing the elements of a credible threat, employs language
similar to that used in California's "Terrorist Threats" statute, which has been
upheld as constitutional.' 9
Chapter 438 also requires registration of certain stalking violators to deter
future stalking violations.' If a person falls to comply with the registration
requirement, the police will have grounds upon which to arrest the offender
15. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352,357 (1983); see id. at 359 (stating that an anti-loitering statute
was unconstitutionally vague since it encouraged arbitrary enforcement by providing police officers with the
discretion to determine what was credible and reliable identification); Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405
U.S. 156, 162 (1972) (holding the city's anti-vagrancy statute to be unconstitutionally vaguc since it did not
adequately specify what conduct was prohibited).
16. People v. Heilman, 25 Cal. App. 4th 391,401, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 422, 428 (1994); see id. at ,400, 30
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 427 (holding that the meaning of the word "repeatedly" was not uncertain as it was of common
usage and its use would not encourage arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement); see also Marjorie A. Caner,
Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of Stalking Statutes, 29 A.L.R. 5T 487, 497 (1995)
(explaining that the court in People v. Heilman found that it is the defendant's intent which triggers the
applicability of California Penal Code § 646.9, which ensures against law enforcement officials obtaining
boundless discretion in defining the offense).
17. SENATE COMMITTEE ON CRMINAL PROCEDURES, COMMiTTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 985, at 3 (July 5,
1995); see SENATEFLOOR,COMMrmrEEANALYSIsoFAB985, at 3 (July 17,1995) (stating that this clarification
is needed to prevent stalkers from going free). Compare 1990 Cal. Stat. ch. 1527, sec. 1, at 2 (enacting CAL.
PENAL CODE § 646.9(e)) (making it unlawful for the defendant to make a threat with the intent and apparent
ability to carry it out) with CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9(g) (amended by Chapter 438) (providing that it is not
required to prove that the defendant intended to carry out the threat).
18. ASSEMBLYCOMMIrTEONPUBUCSAFErY,COMmTlTrEANALYSisoFAB985, at4 (Apr. 18, 1995);
see SENATE Co~wMIEE ON CRIMwNAL PROCEDURE, COMMiTTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 985, at 4 (July 5. 1995)
(referring to a Los Angeles District Attorney's office memorandum which states that California Penal Code
§ 646.9 was intended to punish defendants who intend to put a victim in fear as a result of a threat made by
the defendant, even though the defendant did not intend to carry out the threat); ASSFBLY COMMIrrTEE ON
PUBLIC SAFEry, supra (discussing prosecutors' concerns that the law was almost unenforceable because of the
requirement that both specific intent and credible threat had to be proven).
19. People v. Fisher, 12 Cal. App. 4th 1556, 1560, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 889, 891 (1993) (rejecting the
argument that California Penal Code § 422 was unconstitutionally overbroad because a threat which the
speaker dees not intend to implement is not speech protected by the First Amendment); see In re David L., 234
Cal. App. 3d 1655, 1661, 286 Cal. Rptr. 398,402 (1991) (holding that California Penal Code § 422 was not
unconstitutionally overbroad since it did not reach a substantial amount of protected conduct). Compare CAL.
PENALCoDE § 422 (West Supp. 1995) (prohibiting the making of a threat with the intent that the statement be
taken as a threat, even if there is no intent to carry out the threat) with id. § 646.9(g) (amended by Chapt,.-r 438)
(specifying that it is not necessary to prove that the defendant intended to carry out the threat).
20. CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9(d) (amended by Chapter 438).
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should he or she resume his or her pattern of harassment.21
Finally, Chapter 438 preserves the privacy of stalking victims by requiring




Penal Code § 594.5 (amended); Welfare and Institutions Code § 656
(amended).
AB 1837 (Figueora); 1995 STAT. Ch. 42
Under existing law, no provision from the California Penal Code will
invalidate any local ordinance regulating the sale of aerosol paint containers or
other liquid substances capable of defacing property t Chapter 42 supplements
existing law by providing that nothing in the Penal Code will invalidate local
ordinances dealing with civil administrative regulations, procedures, or penalties
which govern the placement of graffiti2 or other inscribed material on all public
or privately owned properties-both real or personal
Existing law sets forth specific conditions that must be satisfied in order to
declare a minor a ward4 of the court as follows: (1) the petition must be verified,
21. ASSEMBLYCOM TrrIEEONPUBLIC SAFETY, COMMrrrEE ANALYSIS OFAB985, at 3 (Apr. 18, 1995);
see also CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15, § 3000 (1994) (defining "harassment" as engaging in a course of conduct
which serves no legitimate purpose and annoys, alarms, or terrorizes the targeted person).
22. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1545(b) (West 1982) (defining "law enforcement agencies" as including
the State's Attorney General, district attorneys, and agencies empowered to investigate and prosecute crime).
23. CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.92(b) (amended by Chapter 438); see SENATE FLOOR, COMMITTEE
ANALYSIS OF AB 985, at 4 (July 17, 1995) (predicting that AB 985 will increase the protection of the victim
since it will prevent the stalker from learning additional information concerning the targeted victim);
ASSEMBLY COI MEE ON PUBLC SAFETY, CoMMrrEE ANALYSIS OF AB 985, at 3 (Apr. 18, 1995) (stating
the author's intent to preserve victim confidentiality).
1. CAL PENAL CODE § 594.5 (amended by Chapter 42); cf. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 806.13(l)(a) (West
1992) (specifying that a person is guilty of criminal mischief if he willfully and maliciously injures or damages
any real or personal property belonging to another, including the placement of graffiti on the property); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 55, para. 5/5-1078.5 (Smith-Hurd 1995) (indicating that a county board may ban graffiti and
establish penalties within the county, except within a municipality's corporate limits).
2. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 640.5(f) (West Supp. 1995) (specifying that "graffiti" includes any
unauthorized markings, wordings, or designs that are placed by any means on real or personal property).
3. Id. § 594.5 (amended by Chapter 42). See generally Steve Terrell, Should Parents Answer for
Children's Actions?, SANTA FE NEW MEXICAN, Mar. 19, 1995, at B1 (discussing a state law in New Mexico
which permits victims to seek compensation from parents of juvenile offenders); id. (asserting that inadequate
parental supervision is a predominant cause of juvenile crime).
4. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1583 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "ward" as "a person, especially a
child or incompetent, placed by the court under the care and supervision of a guardian or conservator").
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and (2) the minor's parents or legal guardian must be notified if there is a current
proceeding pending against the minor for any specified graffiti offense.5
Additionally, under existing law, liabilities are imposed on the children and their
parents as a result of the children's juvenile offenses. Chapter 42 adds other
specified offenses involving vandalism within the provisions already specified
under existing law.7
5. CAL WELF. & INsr. CODE § 656(a)-(k) (amended by Chapter 42); see id. (enumerating the required
contents of the petition as the following: (1) The court's name; (2) the title of the proceeding; (3) the applicable
code section and subdivision for instituting the proceedings; (4) the minor's name, age, and address, if any;
(5) the parent's and/or guardian's name and residence addresses, if known to the petitioner-if there is no
parent or guardian living within California, or if the residence location is unknown, the petition must also
contain the name and residence address of any adult relative residing within the county, or if none, the adult
relative living nearest to the court's location; (6) a separate and concise factual statement supporting the
conclusion that the minor identified by the petition fits within the definition of each of the sections and
subdivisions under which the proceedings are instituted; (7) whether or not the minor upon whose behalf the
petition is brought is in custody-including the precise date and time the minor was taken into custody; (8)
notification to the father, mother, spouse, or other person liable for the minor's support that specified sections
may make that person, the person's estate, and the minor's estate liable for the cost associated with the minor
child's care, support, maintenance, legal services provided, and probationary supervision provided by the
county, (9) a notice to the minor's parent or legal guardian that a proceeding is pending against the minor for
a violation of §§ 640.5 or 640.6 of the California Penal Code, and that if the minor is found guilty, that any
community service which may be required may be performed under the parents' or legal guardian's direct
supervision if the minor cannot pay any fine assessed, and that the parent or legal guardian of the minor will
be liable for payment of the fine); id. § 656(k) (amended by Chapter 42) (setting forth that the minor's parents
or legal guardian must be notified if the minor is ordered to make restitution to the victim pursuant to §§ 729.6
or 731.1, and that the parent or guardian may be liable for restitution); see also id. § 729.6(a)(2) (West Supp.
1995) (specifying the restitutionary measures that the minor must make); id. § 731.1(a)(2) (West Supp. 1995)
(suggesting a restitution order in lieu of a fine or placement of the minor with the youth authority); CAL PENAL
CODE § 640.5(a) (West Supp. 1995) (providing that those who deface with graffiti or other inscribed material
any governmental facility or vehicle, or any part of a public transportation system, or any entity subsidized by
the Department of Transportation, or any leased or rented facility or vehicle for which any of the afore-
mentioned entities incurs repair or cleanup costs not exceeding $250, is guilty of an infraction); id. (indicating
that the punishment for the infraction is a fine of no more than $500 and a minimum of twenty-four hours of
community service); id. § 640.6(a) (West Supp. 1995) (providing that any person who defaces with graffiti
another's property, and the cost of the damage or destruction is less than $250, is guilty of an infraction,
punishable by a fine not in excess of $500); CAL. Gov'T CODE § 811.2 (West 1995) (setting forth that "public
entity" includes any of the following: the State, the Regents of the University of California, a county, city,
district, public authority, public agency, and any other political subdivision or public corporation within
California); CAL PUB. UTI.. CODE § 99211 (West 1991) (defining "public transportation system" as any system
which serves the public by providing transportation services on land or water).
6. CAL WELF. & INST. CODE § 656(j), (k) (amended by Chapter 42); see id. § 656(h) (amended by
Chapter 42) (stating that the liabilities established by California Welfare and Institutions Code §§ 903-903.2
are joint and several). See generally Chris J. Ore, Review of Selected 1994 California Legislation, 26 PAC. L.J,
202, 393 (1995) (discussing the increase in the maximum damages amount that may be imputed to parents for
their children's vandalism and graffiti).
7. Id. § 656G) (amended by Chapter 42); see id. (providing that §§ 594.2 and 640.7 of the California
Penal Code are included in the offenses involving vandalism that require notice to the parent or legal guardian
of the minor); see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 594.2(a) (West Supp. 1995) (asserting that it is a misdemeanor to
be in possession of the following: a masonry or glass drill bit, a carbide drill bit, a glass cutter, a grinding stone,
an awl, a chisel, a carbide scribe, an aerosol paint container, a felt tip marker, or any other marking substance
intended to be used for vandalism or graffiti); id. § 594.2(c)(1) (West Supp. 1995) (specifying that a "felt tip
marker" means any broad-tipped marker pen with a tip exceeding three-eighths of one inch in width, or any
similar instrument with non-water soluble ink); id. § 594.2(c)(2) (West Supp. 1995) (defining "marking
substance," as any instrument-other than aerosol paint containers and felt tip markers-that could be used
as a graffiti instrument to draw, spray, paint, etch, or mark); id. § 640.7(a) (West Supp. 1995) (maintaining that
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Chapter 42 was enacted to specify that a municipality's authority to set forth
specific guidelines intended to clean away graffiti and to repair or replace graffiti-
damaged property, is not superseded by state law.8 Furthermore, Chapter 42
corrects previous chaptering problems by putting California Penal Code sections
544.2 and 640.7 back into California Welfare and Institutions Code § 656,
whereby the parents of minors charged pursuant to these Penal Code sections are
rebuttably presumed to be jointly and severally liable for restitution ordersO
According to the author of Chapter 42, by re-establishing municipality
authority in these areas the bill will encourage local governing bodies to
promulgate regulations (ordinances) intended to curtail the problems caused by
graffiti and to implement solutions to meet individual community needs."°
Tad A. Devlin
any person who violates §§ 640.5, 640.6, or 594 of the California Penal Code on or within 100 feet of a
highway, or its appurtenances-not including signs naming streets-is guilty of a misdemeanor, punishable
by imprisonment in a county jail not in excess of six months, orby a fine of no more than $1000, orby both).
See generally 2 B.E. WrnaN & NoRMAN L. EPSTEIN, CALIFORmA CRwMINAL LAW, Crimes Against Property
§ 678(1)(a) (2d ed. Supp. 1995) (discussing the new law, California Penal Code § 640.7, regarding graffiti
offenses committed near highway); Sean P. Lafferty, Review of Selected 1994 California Legislation, 26 PAC.
LJ. 202,465 (1995) (describing additions to the 1993 California Graffiti Omnibus Bill, 1993 Cal. Legis. Serv.
ch. 605, see. 1-22, at 2621-45-specifically California Penal Code § 594.2-that broaden the list of prohibited
marking instruments).
8. ASSEMBLYCOMMrrrEEONPUBLICSAFETY, CoMMrrrEEANALYsIS OFAB 1837, at 2 (May 2,1995).
See generally Richard Simon, Riordan OK's $1000 Penalty for Tagging; Legislation: Mayor Signs Law
Providing Civil Sanctions, City Attorney Would Have to Ask Court to Impose the Fine, L.A. TIES, July 9,
1993, at BI (reporting the signing of a new measure that establishes civil penalties of up to $1000 for graffiti
offenders; further, explaining that fines collected from graffiti offenders will be used to pay $500 rewards to
those individuals who provide information leading to the arrest and conviction of offenders).
9. SENATE COMMIrEE ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, COMMnTFEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1837, at 3 (June 6,
1995).
10. Id.; see ASSaMBLYFLOOR,COMMrrnEEANALYSiSOpAB 1837, at2 (May 11, 1995) (noting that in
San Jose, statistics since July 1, 1994, have shown that 365 juveniles have been reprimanded for vandalism,
and further stating that since the initiation of the Anti-Graffiti program, over 490,000 square feet of graffiti has
been cleaned); see also In re Rudy L., 29 Cal. App. 4th 1007, 1012, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 864, 867 (1994) (citing
a report that indicated graffiti and vandalism fuel public outrage, that graffiti removal costs are tremendous,
and graffiti instigates territorial wars and gang violence). See generally David R. Truman, The Jets and Sharks
are Dead: State Statutory Responses to Criminal Street Gangs, 73 WASH. U.L.Q. 683, 685 n.12 (1995)
(discussing street gangs and their wide use of graffiti, and noting the neighborhoods' fear of gang violence);
Patricia Callahan, Decking the Halls; Schurz Students Spend Break Cleaning Up School, Cm. TR1B., Dec. 28,
1994, at 1 (reporting that a school program was instituted where twenty students cleaned bathrooms, locker
rooms, and hallways of their school to eliminate graffiti and the possibility of gang violence outbreaks on their
campus); Emily DeNitto, Merchants, City Face Writing on the Wall, CRAiN's N.Y. BUs., Apr. 10, 1995, at 19
(noting that a local merchants group in Brooklyn has taken steps to eliminate graffiti by setting up a graffiti
offender hotline to report acts of vandalism, and by investigating special paint and wall sealants that could
prevent graffiti or make cleanup easier); Simon, supra note 8 (citing a quote from Los Angeles mayor Richard
Riordan who called graffiti, "a constant assault on the psyche of Angelenos"); Coping With Graffiti Vandals,
S.F. CHRON., Jan. 1, 1993, at A26 (reporting that the city of Oakland was contemplating formal action to




Penal Code § 594 (amended).
AB 392 (Gallegos); 1995 STAT. Ch. 38
Under existing law, every person who maliciously damages; destroys, or
defaces, with graffiti,' real property belonging to any public entity2 or the federal
government, is subject to a permissive inference that he or she neither owned the
property nor had the permission of the owner to deface, damage or destroy the
property
Chapter 38 makes this permissive inference applicable to every person who
maliciously defaces with graffiti or damages, or destroys real property, vehicles,
signs, fixtures, or furnishings belonging to any public entity or the federal
government.4
1. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 594(e) (amended by Chapter 38) (defining "graffiti" or other inscribed
material as, among other things, any unauthorized inscription, word, figure, mark, or design that is written,
marked, etched, scratched, drawn, or painted on real or personal property); cf. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 145.60(1)
(McKinney 1994) (defining "graffiti" as the etching, painting, covering, drawing upon or otherwise placing
of a mark upon public or private property with intent to damage such property). See generally Maria V.
Daquipa, Review of Selected 1994 California Legislation, 26 PAC. L.J. 202,386, 389 (1995) (explaining that
the California Grafitti Omnibus Bill increased penalties for specified graffitti and vandalism offenses, and
included graffiti clean-up as a condition of probation for specified crimes).
2. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 811.2 (West 1980) (defining a "public entity" as including the State,
Regents of the University of California, a county, city, district, public authority, public agency, and any other
political subdivision or public corporation in the State).
3. Id. § 594(a) (amended by Chapter 38); see id. (specifying that any person who damages, destroys,
or defaces with graffiti or other inscribed material, any real or personal property not his or her own, in cases
other than those specified by state law, is guilty of vandalism); id. § 594.3 (West 1988) (enumerating a separate
crime and punishment for any person who knowingly commits any act of vandalism to a church, synagogue,
building owned and occupied by a religious educational institution, or other place primarily used as a place
of worship where religious services are regularly conducted); see also id. § 594(b) (amended by Chapter 38)
(enumerating the penalties for defacement, damage, or destruction of property as the following: (1) if the
amount of defacement, damage, or destruction is $50,000 or more, the vandalism is punishable by
imprisonment in the state prison or in a county jail not exceeding one year, or by a fine of not more than
$50,000, or by both; (2) if the amount damage is between $5000 or more, but less than $50,000, the vandalism
is punishable by imprisonment in the state prison or in a county jail not exceeding one year, or by a fine of not
more than $10,000, or by both; (3) if the amount of defacement, damage, or destruction is $400 or more, but
less than $5000, the vandalism is punishable by imprisonment in a county jail not exceeding one year, or by
a fine of $5000, or by both; (4) if the amount of defacement, damage, or destruction is less than $400, the
vandalism is punishable by imprisonment in a county jail for not more than six months, or by a fine of not more
than $1000, or by both); id. § 594(c) (amended by Chapter 38) (stating that upon conviction, the court may,
in addition to any other punishment and at the victim's option, order the defendant to clean up, repair, or
replace the damaged property himself or herself, or to pay someone else to do so); id. § 594(d) (providing that
if a minor is personally unable to pay the fine for a violation of this section, the parent of that minor is liable
for payment of the fine); id. (specifying that a court may waive a payment of the fine or any part thereof by the
parent upon a finding of good cause).
4. Id. § 594(a) (amended by Chapter 38); cf. ARK. CODE ANN. § 27-52-101(a) (Michie 1994)
(specifying that in Arkansas, no person may, without authorization, attempt to, or in fact, alter, deface, damage,
knock down, or remove any official highway traffic-control device, road marker, lighting equipment, or any
railroad crossing sign or signal, or any inscription, or shield); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 806.13(l)(a) (West 1992)
(providing that in Florida a person commits the offense of criminal mischief if he or she willfully and
maliciously places graffiti on any real or personal property belonging to another); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-6-
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Chapter 38 closes a loophole in previous law.5 The law prior to Chapter 38
established a permissive inference only for governmental real property.6
However, the majority of vandalism occurs on overpasses, highway signs, and
vehicles.7 Chapter 38 expands the inference to property that is most commonly
vandalized, thus providing prosecutors with an easier mechanism for punishing
vandals.8
Molly J. Mrowka
Crimes; vehicles-automated enforcement system
Vehicle Code § 21455.5 (new and repealed); §§ 210, 22451, 40518
(amended, repealed, and new); §§ 14602.6, 14604,40000.11 (amended).
SB 833 (Kopp); 1995 STAT. Ch. 922
Existing law authorizes government agencies to equip rail transit crossings,
in cooperation with law enforcement agencies, with automated rail crossing
enforcement systems!1 Existing law also provides a special written, mailed
101(1) (1994) (defining the criminal offense of "criminal mischief' as the knowing or purposeful injury,
damage, or destruction of any property of another or public property without consent); N.Y. PENAL LAW §
145.65 (McKinney 1994) (providing that a person is guilty of possession of graffiti instruments when he or
she possesses any tool, instrument, article, substance, solution, or other compound designed or commonly used
to etch, paint, cover, draw upon, or otherwise place a mark upon a piece of property which that person has no
permission or authority to etch, paint, cover, draw upon or otherwise mark, under circumstances evincing an
intent to damage the property); id. § 145.60(2) (McKinney 1994) (specifying that no person may make graffiti
of any type on any building, public or private, or any other property, real or personal, owned by any person,
firm or corporation or any public agency or instrumentality, without the express permission of the owner or
operator of said property).
5. ASSEiBLY COMM]TEEON PJBLIC SAFETY, COMMrTEEANALYSIS OF AB 392, at 2 (Mar. 21, 1995).
6. 1994 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 909, sec. 3. at 3892-93 (amending CAL. PENAL CODE § 594).
7. ASSEMBLY COMMrTEEON PUBuCSAFETY, COMMrrTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 392, at 2 (Mar. 21,1995);
see also Robert J. Byers, SignsAlways in Season for Highway Hunters, CHARLE ON GAZETTE, Sept. 28, 1994,
at PlC (discussing that in West Virginia, the state has a significant problem with people shooting at road
signs); id. (specifying that the state also has problems with spray painting and theft of road signs; for example,
six students died in a car accident at an intersection after a stop sign was stolen); Richard Louv, Below the
Surface, Taggers Seek to Impress, SAN DIECO UNION-TRB., August 18, 1993, at A2 (explaining that having
one's name marked on a freeway sign is "the ultimate achievement for taggers"); War Against Graffiti Los
Angeles Has Lost, but San Diego Fights On, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRiB., March 12, 1995, at G2 (reporting that
in San Diego, Cal-Trans is spending at least $20,000 a month to clean up graffiti on signs, overpasses and walls
along the freeways, and Cal-Trans has a full-time crew working forty-hours per week solely painting out
graffiti); id. (specifying that repairing one overhead sign can cost thousands of dollars).
8. ASSEiBLY COMMnI'rEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMrr=E ANALYSIS OF AB 392, at 2 (Mar. 21,1995).
1. CAL. VEH. CODE § 21362.5(a) (West Supp. 1995); see id. (permitting rail transit grade crossings
to be equipped with an automated rail crossing enforcement system if the system is identified by signs clearly
indicating the presence of the system); see also 1995 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 922, sec. 2, at 5459-60 (enacting
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notification procedure regarding violations recorded by the automated rail
crossing enforcement system, and limits the availability of photographic records
to the purposes of law enforcement.'
Chapter 922 expressly applies the procedures of the automated rail crossing
enforcement system to an official traffic control signal displaying different
colored lights? Chapter 922 renames the automated rail crossing enforcement
system as the automated enforcement system.4 These changes by Chapter 922 will
be effective until January, 1, 1999, and then will be repealed5
Existing law authorizes a peace officer' to arrest a person and seize the
person's vehicle when the officer determines that the person was driving the
vehicle with a suspended or revoked license, or even if the person had never
CAL. VEH. CODE § 210) (defining "automated rail crossing enforcement system" as any system operated by
a governmental agency that photographs a driver's responses to a rail or rail transit signal or crossing gate, and
one that is designed to obtain a clear photograph of a vehicle's license plate and the driver of the vehicle); id.
(indicating that this section, which concerns automated rail crossing enforcement systems, will become
operative on January 1, 1999); id. at 5459 (explaining that the section concerning automated enforcement
systems is to remain in effect until January 1, 1999, unless a later enacted statute deletes or extends this date).
2. CAL. VEH. CODE §§ 21362.5(b), 40518(a), (b) (West Supp. 1995); see id. § 21362.5(b) (West Supp.
1995) (mandating that the photographic records made by automated rail crossing enforcement systems are
confidential and made available only to governmental and law enforcement agencies); id. § 40518(a), (b) (West
Supp. 1995) (requiring a written notice to be mailed within 30 days of the alleged violation, and that the
appearance date is to be 10 days after the notice is delivered). See generally Kenneth J. Pogue, Review of
Selected 1994 California Legislation, 26 PAC. LJ. 202, 733-34 (1995) (explaining that the automated rail
crossing enforcement system is designed to deter violations of rail crossings and prevent related accidents).
3. CAL. VEH. CODE § 21455.5(a) (enacted and repealed by Chapter 922); see id. (permitting an
automated enforcement system to be installed at a limit line, intersection, or other location of a traffic signal
if the system is clearly identified by signs clearly indicating the presence of the system or if signs are placed
at all major entrances to the city); see also id. § 21450 (West Supp. 1995) (mandating that when traffic Is
controlled by an official traffic control signal showing different colored lights one at a time or in combination,
only red, yellow, or green may be utilized); cf N.Y. VEa. & TRAF. LAW § I 111-a(a), (g) (McKinney Supp.
1995) (authorizing cities with a population of one million or more to install traffic-control signal photo-
monitoring devices at no more than 25 intersections, and permitting summons by first class mail identifying
the violation, where it took place, and the date and time); VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-833.01(A), (G) (Michic Supp.
1995) (permitting, until July 1, 1998, certain local governments to install traffic light signal photo-monitoring
systems at no more than 25 locations, and providing that a summons may be executed by first-class mail sent
to the address of the owner, but no contempt or arrest will occur if the owner does not appear under this
summons procedure). See generally Peter Baker, Smile! You're on Big Brother's Camera Virginia Area to Test
Traffic-Monitoring System, BEACON J. (Akron, Ak.), Mar. 13, 1995, at A4 (explaining that a traffic light photo
system contains sensors in the ground that indicates when a car enters the intersection after the light turns red,
and a high resolution camera takes two pictures, one for showing the movement through the intersection and
the other to be enlarged for identifying the license plate number).
4. CAL. VEH. CODE § 210 (amended and repealed by Chapter 922); see id. (including within the
definition of "automated enforcement system" the provision for photographic records taken at an official traffic
control signal).
5. Id.
6. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 830.1(a) (West Supp. 1995) (defining "peace officer" as any sheriff,
undersheriff, deputy sheriff, employed in that capacity by a city, any peace officer, employed in that capacity
and appointed by a city's chief of police or the chief executive of the agency, any chief of police, or police
officer of a district authorized by statute to maintain a police department); id. § 830.2(c), (d), (g) (West Supp.
1995) (defining "peace officer" as a member of the University of California Police Department, California State
University Police Department, and Department of Parks and Recreation); id. § 830.31 (d) (West Supp. 1995)
(defining "peace officer" as a housing patrol officer).
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obtained a driver's license. 7 Existing law requires impoundment of the vehicle for
thirty days.
Chapter 922 empowers the officer to remove and seize the vehicle without the
necessity of arresting the person when the vehicle driven by the person without
a valid driver's license is involved in a traffic accident.9 Furthermore, Chapter
922 establishes procedures to be followed for the release of the vehicle prior to
the end of thirty-day impoundment period, including a requirement that once the
legal owner has obtained possession of the vehicle, the legal owner is not to
return the vehicle to the registered owner until after the end of the thirty-day
period, and not until the registered owner tenders to the legal owner proof of a
valid driver's license or valid temporary license'
Existing law determines that violations of certain provisions relating to
vehicles are misdemeanors rather than infractions." Chapter 922 makes a
violation of specified provisions relating to driving with a suspended or revoked
driver's license a misdemeanor. 2
7. CAL. VEH. CODE § 14602.6(a) (amended by Chapter 922); cf MICH. Cow. LAWS ANN. §
257.904b(1) (West Supp. 1995) (permitting a court to impound a vehicle for not more than 120 days if a person
is convicted of an offense relating to operating a vehicle under a suspended, revoked, or denied driver's
license).
8. CAL. VEH. CODE § 14602.6(a) (amended by Chapter 922).
9. Ia ; cf WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 46.20.435(1) (West 1987) (authorizing a law enforcement officer
to immediately impound a vehicle upon determination that a person is operating the vehicle without a valid
driver's license or a driver's license that has been expired for 90 days or more).
10. CAL. VEH. CODE § 14602.6(f)(1)-(3), (gXl)-(3) (amended by Chapter 922); see id. § 14602.6(0(1)-
(3) (amended by Chapter 922) (allowing the release of a vehicle to the legal owner if the legal owner is a
licensed financial institution legally operating in the state, the legal owner or the legal owner's agent pays all
towing and storage fees related to the vehicle's seizure, or the legal owner or the legal owner's agent presents
foreclosure documents or an affidavit of repossession for the vehicle); id § 14602.6(g)(1) (amended by Chapter
922) (providing that a legal owner or the legal owner's agent that obtains release cannot release the vehicle to
the registered owner of the vehicle or any agents of the registered owner, unless the registered owner is a rental
car agency, until termination of 30 day period); id § 14602.6(g)(2) (amended by Chapter 922) (mandating that
the legal owner or the legal owner's agent not relinquish the vehicle to the registered owner until the registered
owner or that owner's agent presents a valid driver's license or temporary driver's license).
11. Id. § 40000.11(a)-(p) (amended by Chapter 922); see id. (determining that a violation is a
misdemeanor and not an infraction, which includes, but is not limited to, provisions relating to unlicensed
drivers, special drivers' certificates to operate a schoolbus, and to special drivers' certificates to operate a farm
labor vehicle).
12. Id. § 40000.1 1(k) (amended by Chapter 922); see id. § 14601 (West Supp. 1995) (mandating that
no person can drive a motor vehicle when the person's license is suspended or revoked for reckless driving if
the person has knowledge of the suspension or revocation); id. § 14601.1 (West Supp. 1995) (prohibiting a
person from driving a motor vehicle at any time when the person's driving privilege is suspended or revoked
for any offense, except for those specified in the Califomia Penal Code §§ 14601.2. 14601.5, if the person has
knowledge of the suspension or revocation); iat § 14601.2 (West Supp. 1995) (providing that it is unlawful for
a person to drive without a license when the person's license has been suspended for driving under the
influence of alcohol or drugs if the person has knowledge of the suspension or revocation); id. § 14601.5 (West
Supp. 1995) (prohibiting a person from operating a vehicle without a driver's license when the person's license
has been suspended for refusing to take a chemical, breath, urine, or preliminary alcohol screening test if the




The purpose of Chapter 922 is to install the automated enforcement system
in order to reduce the number of violations as well as the number of traffic
accidents and fatalities at intersections relating to drivers running through red
lights."3 Thus, Chapter 922 could improve road safety without diverting police
officers from enforcing law that prohibits other criminal activities.
14
According to police agencies, impounding vehicles provides a way to take
these dangerous drivers off the road, and proves effective in suppressing other
criminal activities involving the use of vehicles."5 As existing law regarding
impoundment indicates, Chapter 922 will encourage unlicensed drivers to clear
up their driving record with the Department of Motor Vehicles. 6
13. ASSEMBLY COMMITrEE ON TRANSPORTATION, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 833, at 3 (July 10,
1995); see SENATE COMMitFEE ONTRANSPORTATION, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 833, at 3 (May 2, 1995)
(providing various studies and tests of the equipment concluding that a substantial number of urban vehicle
crashes at intersections are due to driver running through red lights); id. (stating that reports from Victoria,
Canada, showed a 72% decrease in red light violations and Melbourne, Australia, reported a 32% reduction
in traffic fatalities, both reports attribute the declines to the automated enforcement units). See generally Doris
Sue Wong & Thomas C. Palmer Jr., Camera Would Catch State's Driving Cheats, BOSTOs4 GLOBE, Dec. 2,
1993, at 1 (noting that 30% of Massachusetts' accidents occurred at intersections, with two-thirds of those
accidents being caused by red light violators, and that in New York tha photo-monitoring system caused traffic
lights to be obeyed by an increase of 80%).
14. See Picture Perfect: Digital Camera to Nab Speeders, Red-Runners, ST. LOUIS POST DISPATCH,
Mar. 19, 1995, at 3D (discussing the assertion by police and politicians that the photo system will improve road
safety dramatically when police officers are too busy chasing drug dealers and carijackers to watch stoplights).
15. Id.; see SENATE COMMrrrEE ON TRANSPORTATION, CoMmFFrEE ANALYSIS OF SB 833, at 3 (May
2, 1995) (indicating that law enforcement agencies throughout California have made frequent and effective use
of the recently-enacted vehicle impoundment provisions, have impounded thousands of vehicles related to
unlicensed drivers, and have concluded that impoundment takes these drivers off the road as well as suppresses
other criminal activity involving the use of vehicles); see also David Dietz, Unlicensed Drivers Face Car
Seizure Harsher Punishments Go into Effect Sunday, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 28, 1994, at AI (noting that Santa
Rosa, California, has been fighting unlicensed drivers with a special impoundment, and asserting that the
impoundment has reduced the number of accidents by as much as 50%). But see Joe Swickard. Illegal Drivers
Pose a Deadly Threat, DETROr FREE PRESS, Apr. 18, 1995, at IB (suggesting that if the police impound cars,
the unlicensed driver might find other cars to drive). See generally Cynthia H. Craft, Katz's 'Safe Streets Act'
Passes One Roadblock, L.A. TnS, Aug. 10, 1995, at B6 (indicating that one million motorists have never
had a driver's license, another 720,000 are driving with a suspended or revoked license, and that a driver with
a suspended license is four times as likely to be involved in a fatal accident); Lisa Respers, Laiw Will Let
Officials Seize Cars of Unlicensed Drivers, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 29, 1994, at BI (stating that 20% of the drivers
involved in a fatal accident were driving without a valid driver's license).
16. ASSEMBLY CoMMrrTrEE ON TRANSPORTATION, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 833, at 3 (July 10,
1995).
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Furthermore, Chapter 922 was enacted to address uncertainties and other
unclear situations regarding the impoundment and release provisions. 7
Chad D. Bernard
17. Id.; see SENATE COMMITrEE ON TRANSPORTATION, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 833, at 3 (May
2, 1995) (indicating the inability of numerous financial institutions' and rental agencies' to reclaim vehicles
they legally owned but leased, financed, or rented to others that have been impounded by the police); id.
(noting that some law enforcement agencies have refused to release vehicles before the end of the 30 day
period, causing significant impound fees to the legal owner when the registered owners subsequently did not
reclaim the vehicles). See generally Maria Alicia Gaura, No License, No Car For Would-Be Drivers, S.F.
CHRON., July 11, 1995, at AI3 (quoting Senator Quentin Kopp as saying that just because a rental car is driven
by an unlicensed driver, the company should not have to wait 30 days to recover, nor should a bank have to
wait to repossess a car as long as the unlicensed driver is not allowed to drive).
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